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Introduction
Traditional economic theory assumes that agents have selfish preferences about ma-
terial payoffs. They do not care whether their actions affect others, and act as maxi-
mizers of their own material well-being. This assumption leads to strong theoretical
predictions about economic decision making. However, as evidence from experimen-
tal and empirical research in psychology and economics shows, observed behavior
is in conflict with theoretically predicted behavior, suggesting that individuals are
guided by more than just selfish preferences. For their well-being intentions behind
their (and possibly others’) actions as well as the consequences for the outcomes of
others may also matter. Hence, people have concerns for others and exhibit social
preferences.
The present work is a collection of three essays providing a theoretical analysis
and empirical evidence of the implications of interdependent social preferences for
game-theoretic situations. The first essay focuses on the theory of implementation
and studies implementation problems when agents are inclined to respond to the
behavior of others in a reciprocal way. The second essay explores the formation of
cooperative behavior in an empirical analysis of a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma
game and highlights the relevance and informational value of communication. The
last essay continuous the empirical investigation of cooperative behavior and em-
phasizes the potential of people’s physical attractiveness to elicit cooperation.
Chapter one studies the problem of a planner who faces a number of agents and
wishes to implement a socially optimal outcome. The implementation problem arises
due to the asymmetric information between the planner and the agents. While the
agents collectively know their true preferences over the set of outcomes, the planner
does not. Instead, the planner relies on the agents’ individual reports in form of
messages, that contain information about their preferences. However, an agent’s
message can be a strategic lie in order to influence the outcome to her advantage.
An illustrative example of such a scenario is an auction in which agents may strate-
gically select their bids, balancing prices and winning probabilities. The design or
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rules of the institution, the mechanism, through which the agents interact therefore
has a major impact on the agents’ strategic behavior and on the outcomes of the
interaction. The purpose of an auction, for instance, is to make sure that the win-
ner is the one who values the auctioned object the most. Accordingly, a mechanism
should induce the agents to reveal their true preferences over outcomes.
The classic approach to implementation assumes that agents are motivated solely
by the pursuit of self-interest (selfish preferences). Contrary to most of the ex-
isting literature on implementation, the present essay assumes that agents exhibit
intention-based reciprocity preferences. They are willing to sacrifice their own ma-
terial well-being in order to either punish behavior by others that they perceive as
unkind, or to reward behavior by others that they perceive as kind. The equilibrium
concept is a Nash fairness equilibrium and a notion of Nash fairness implementation
is introduced, which captures reciprocity motives by the agents.
The first part of the analysis focuses on the canonical mechanism, that has been used
for Nash implementation. The results show that the implementation problem might
not be solvable with the canonical mechanism when agents have reciprocity prefer-
ences. A decisive role plays the agent’s individual willingness to trade-off material
payoffs and reciprocal kindness. In three abstract settings, in which the agents’ pref-
erences are structured differently, the potential but also the limits of the canonical
mechanism are shown. In the first two settings the canonical mechanism either has
no equilibrium, or many unwanted equilibria if the agents’ concern for reciprocity is
large enough (exceeding a certain threshold). In the third setting, however, it can
be shown that the canonical mechanism yields the intended outcome, irrespective of
the agents’ willingness to trade-off material payoffs and reciprocal kindness, in which
case the social choice function admits a “psychologically robust” implementation.
In the second part of the analysis the psychological robustness is addressed explicitly
and analyzed for general mechanisms. The main result establishes that every Nash
equilibrium of any mechanism, in which a single agent cannot affect the equilibrium
outcome, is also a psychologically robust equilibrium. The problem is, however, that
a psychologically robust equilibrium, which has the desired outcome in one state,
continuous to be an equilibrium for all other states. This, in turn, implies that the
equilibrium outcome need not be unique. Hence, as soon as psychological robustness
is obtained, there are many psychologically robust equilibria which may not have
the desired outcome.
Chapters two and three are motivated by the observation that people cooperate
in the absence of strategic or material incentives to do so. The investigation of
cooperative behavior constitutes a major topic in economics, and the well-known
prisoner’s dilemma game has become the classic economic example to demonstrate
non-cooperative behavior. Two agents face a dilemma in which, independent of the
other’s action, each agent is better off by defection than by cooperation. However,
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the outcome obtained when both defect is worse for each agent than the outcome
obtained if both had cooperated. Traditional economic theory predicts no cooper-
ation, though it leads to a solution in which both agents end up worse off than if
both act contrary to self-interest.
In chapter two, data from the British television show “Golden Balls” is used to
analyze people’s behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma, in which defection is a weakly
dominant strategy. The game show provides an environment with extraordinarily
high stakes, face-to-face communication between players and pre-play interactions.
In the pre-play, contestants accumulate stakes and select their partner for the pris-
oner’s dilemma, in which they play to eventually share a jackpot. This jackpot, on
average, amounts to £13 000, and ranges from £3 to £100 150. Material incentives
are therefore high-powered and might be expected to offset any other concerns like
fairness or reciprocity.
The main results are a unilateral cooperation rate of 54% and a mutual cooperation
rate of 33%. Communication, both verbal and non-verbal, and stake size have a ma-
jor impact on cooperative behavior. In particular, promises and handshakes are used
to initiate cooperation from the opponent. But, while a mere promise in combina-
tion with a handshake increases a contestant’s likelihood to cooperate, a handshake
alone increases the likelihood to defect. Although one might expect that handshakes
serve as a positive commitment device, contestants lie when shaking hands, and use
them as an instrument to manipulate the opponent’s attitude towards cooperation.
Also, a negative correlation between stake size as well as expected stake size and
cooperation is observed.
Further, there is a strong link between contestants’ behavior in the pre-play and
the behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. Contestants who, from a purely material
perspective, should have been voted off the game in the pre-play, show a higher
propensity to cooperate. Here, cooperation can be interpreted as a result of re-
ciprocal behavior: contestants who owe their survival of the pre-play to their final
opponent, although their survival involves no material gain, are willing to cooperate
in order to reward the kind behavior by the opponent. The data also offers the op-
portunity to test for consistent behavior of contestants in the sense that they act in
accord with a pre-announcement of their intended action for the prisoner’s dilemma.
69% of finalists who, before the show, state either to cooperate or to defect, actually
choose their action consistently with their statement.
Within the pre-play, contestants strategically select their partner for the prisoner’s
dilemma. On the one hand, contestants are concerned about maximizing stake
size for the prisoner’s dilemma game, on the other hand, they are concerned about
surviving the pre-play. Driven by the fear of being eliminated from the game, con-
testants may lie or bluff about stakes at play. But lies are revealed. The analysis
shows that lying is punished by a higher propensity to be eliminated from the game.
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Again, this behavior can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity. Lying is perceived
as unkind behavior, and agents reciprocate unkindness with unkindness in form of
voting liars off the game. In addition, contestants are bounded rational in the deci-
sion to lie in the sense that they essentially make the decision to lie contingent on
the own position in the game, but the strengths and weaknesses of the other players
are mostly neglected. Our findings highlight the relevance and informational value
of communication, and enrich the literature with findings on non-verbal communi-
cation, pre-commitment, and modes of lying.
The third chapter continuous the investigation of cooperative behavior, but the
center of attention is a special physical characteristic of people: their beauty.
There is empirical evidence that beautiful people are rewarded with significant eco-
nomic benefits in form of higher salaries or better career prospects. The literature
argues that so called “beauty-is-good” stereotyping can explain this “beauty pre-
mium.” That is, people believe that physically attractive people are, for instance,
more productive, more talented, or more trustworthy than less attractive people,
and this stereotype-belief then mediates people’s behavior towards the attractive.
In this chapter the effect of physical attractiveness on cooperative behavior is an-
alyzed. Data from 211 episodes of the television game show “Golden Balls” are
combined with data from independent facial appearance ratings of the show’s con-
testants. In a survey, 728 people rated the facial appearance of 844 contestants
on the basis of portrait photographs. These ratings are used to construct various
measures of facial attractiveness for each contestant.
The results show that facially attractive contestants provoke cooperative behavior
from their counterparts. This preferential treatment or beauty premium rewards
attractive contestants with substantially higher monetary gains of up to £2 153,
and the probability to obtain positive earnings increases by 5.9 percentage points.
This finding applies across sexes, and is independent of other demographic charac-
teristics, stake size, communication and past behavior. Further, the result is not
driven by non-cooperative behavior of the attractive. With minor qualifications for
younger and female contestants, facially attractive contestants are no more or less
likely to cooperate than less attractive contestants.
However, the analysis reveals that the attractiveness effect vanishes in interactions
between two contestants of the same sex. Contestants are more cooperative towards
the attractive opponent only if the opponent is of the opposite sex. This suggests
that stereotype beliefs about attractive people cannot explain our results consis-
tently. Also, attractiveness has no effect in group-decisions made by the contestants
prior to the prisoner’s dilemma. People seem to have a preference to cooperate more
with someone towards whom they are personally attracted. This preference reaches
full effect when people interact in pairs and lack other relevant information about
the opponent for taking their decision.
Chapter 1
Nash Implementation with
Reciprocity Preferences
1 Introduction
The theory of implementation studies the problem of a planner who wishes to imple-
ment a socially optimal outcome, depending on the preferences over a set of possible
outcomes of a number of agents. The implementation problem arises from the asym-
metric information between the planner and the agents. In particular, the planner
does not know the agents’ true preferences over possible outcomes, and therefore
must rely on the agents’ individual reports in form of messages. These messages
contain information about the agents’ preferences. However, an agents’ message
can be a strategic lie in order to influence the outcome to her advantage. Hence,
the planner designs a mechanism, a game-form, through which the agents’ interact.
Further, the planner defines a social choice function, which assigns an outcome to
each possible profile of the agents’ preferences. The solution to the implementation
problem is then provided by a mechanism, such that every equilibrium has the out-
come associated with the social choice function in the true state (for a survey of the
literature see e.g., Jackson, 2001).
The theory usually assumes that agents have selfish preferences about outcomes.
However, a large body of evidence from experimental and empirical research shows
that people very often care about whether their behavior is perceived to be fair
by one another, and therefore take into account underlying intentions behind their
actions. A prominent idea is that of reciprocity, which describes peoples’ willingness
to sacrifice own material well-being in order to either punish or reward behavior
by others that they perceive as unkind or kind, respectively (for a survey see e.g.,
Sobel, 2005).
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In this study I take up the issue of reciprocity and incorporate a model of fair-
ness and reciprocity into implementation theory. In particular, I investigate the
implications of intention-based reciprocity preferences for Nash implementation (see
Maskin, 1999). In modeling reciprocity I adopt the approach by Rabin (1993), who
introduces the solution concept of fairness equilibrium in games of complete infor-
mation. Agents are fairness utility maximizers, with the fairness utility specified as a
function of the material payoff and a psychological payoff. This psychological payoff
captures reciprocity motives, in the sense that an agent receives a positive psycho-
logical payoff from treating an other agent kindly (unkindly) when she believes that
this agent is kind (unkind) towards her as well; otherwise the psychological payoff is
negative. Hence, in a fairness equilibrium agents optimally respond to the actions
and beliefs (about actions and beliefs) of the other agents, taking into account their
own and the others’ intentions. Further, the psychological payoff depends on (exoge-
nously) given weights, that measure an agent’s individual sensitivity for reciprocity,
i.e., how strong kindness sensations affect the agent’s behavior. These weights will
have a decisive role in the later analysis.
With this solution concept at hand, I define a social choice function to be Nash
fairness implementable if every Nash fairness equilibrium outcome of the game in-
duced by a mechanism coincides with the allocation specified by the social choice
function. Further, in line with Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012), I call a strategy pro-
file a psychologically robust equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium irrespective of the
agents willingness to trade-off material payoffs and reciprocal kindness, such that the
agents’ sensitivity for reciprocity does not affect (Nash) equilibrium behavior. Ac-
cordingly, a social choice function is psychologically robustly implementable if every
psychologically robust equilibrium has the desired outcome, i.e., the one specified
by the social choice function, and there exists no (other) Nash fairness equilibrium
that has a different outcome.
In the first part of the analysis I focus on the canonical mechanism as introduced by
e.g., Repullo (1987)), and investigate whether this mechanism allows for unique im-
plementation in Nash fairness equilibrium. I consider three specific settings, which
demonstrate the potential and limits of the applicability of the canonical mechanism,
and establish the following results:
(1) in an environment in which the agents’ preference orderings over outcomes
form a Condorcet cycle, a Nash implementable social choice function (which
assigns the preferred outcome to exactly one agent) is Nash fairness imple-
mentable provided the agents concern for reciprocity are small, i.e., below a
given threshold. If the agents’ concerns for reciprocity exceed that thresh-
old, the canonical mechanism has no equilibrium. The intuition behind the
result is the following: by the Condorcet cyclical ordering of preferences, in
each state every agent top-ranks a different alternative, such that in equilib-
rium only one agent receives her preferred outcome. The other agents, who
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do not receive their preferred outcome, have now strong motives to punish the
one who gets the preferred outcome. This punishment bears costs in form of
a lower material payoff, but also gains from a positive psychological payoff.
Hence, for large values of reciprocity, the agents have an incentive to deviate
from truth-telling, which, in turn, implies that there will be no truthful Nash
fairness equilibrium.
(2) in an environment in which the agents have aligned preferences, a Nash im-
plementable social choice function is not Nash fairness implementable in the
canonical mechanism provided the agents’ concern for reciprocity is large. In
contrast to the result above, here reciprocity preferences raise the problem of
multiple equilibria. In particular, the outcome specified by the social choice
function is the one that all agents prefer the most in the true state, and the
canonical mechanism yields this outcome whatever the agents’ concern for
reciprocity. However, if all agents coordinate on the (same) least preferred
outcome, they are as unkind as possible towards each other. The mutual un-
kindness translates into a positive psychological payoff. It follows that the
message profile with maximal unkindness constitutes a Nash fairness equilib-
rium for high values of reciprocity; and this, in turn, implies that the outcome
of the canonical mechanism is not unique.
(3) finally, in an environment in which the agents’ face a minority conflict in
preferences, a Nash implementable social choice function is psychologically
robustly implementable as the unique outcome of the canonical mechanism.
Here, all but one agent top-rank the same alternative, and this alternative is
the one that is associated with the social choice function in the true state. For
the remaining agent this outcome is the least preferred one in the true state.
The canonical mechanism then allows unique implementation, irrespective of
the agents’ concern for reciprocity.
Further, I derive a property that together with Nash implementability provides a
sufficient condition for a social choice function to be not psychologically robustly
implementable in the canonical mechanism, i.e., the canonical mechanism does not
yield the desired outcome for higher values of reciprocity.
In the second part of this study I address the psychological robustness for general
mechanisms. I establish that a Nash equilibrium of any mechanism that prohibits
a single agent to affect the equilibrium outcome, is a psychologically robust equilib-
rium. However, those mechanisms cannot handle the problem of multiple equilibria.
As soon as the possibility to affect the Nash equilibrium outcome is shut down, one
obtains psychological robustness, but also non-uniqueness.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In section 2 the related literature
is discussed. Section 3 describes the setup, containing a formal mechanism design
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framework, and defines the solution concepts of Nash fairness equilibrium and psy-
chological robust equilibrium. Section 4 reviews Maskin’s famous theorem for Nash
implementation. Section 5 deals with the analysis of Nash fairness implementation
in the canonical mechanism. Section 6 explores psychologically robust mechanisms.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
This study links two broad streams in the literature, (i) the theory of Nash imple-
mentation, and (ii) the behavioral approach of fairness and reciprocity.
(i) Nash implementation theory
The vast majority of the implementation literature follows mainstream economic
theory by assuming that agents only care about (material) outcomes. In complete
information environments, when agents are rational in their behavior, the most
prominent idea is that of Nash equilibrium: each agent’s action is an optimal re-
sponse to the (given) actions of the other agents.
Maskin (1999, in circulation since 1977) first provided a solution to the implementa-
tion problem when there is complete information and the solution concept is Nash
equilibrium. He proposes two conditions on the social choice function to be Nash
implementable, namely monotonicity and no-veto power. Monotonicity is necessary
for Nash implementation, and monotonicity coupled with no-veto power is sufficient
for Nash implementability when there are at least three agents. A complete proof
of Maskin’s theorem was established by Wiliams (1986), Repullo (1987), and Saijo
(1988), who introduce a canonical mechanism that allows for Nash implementa-
tion of any social choice function in any (possible) environment. The theory can
be extended to multi-valued social choice functions, for which Maskin’s theorem
still applies. Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) provide a full
characterization for social choice correspondences to be Nash implementable, which
includes the two-person implementation problem. Additionally, several authors mo-
tivated replacements for the no-veto power condition, see e.g., Moore and Repullo
(1990), Sjo¨stro¨m (1991), Danilov (1992).1
Several authors criticized the classic assumption of unbounded rationality of the
agents, and investigated the implementation problem allowing for variations in the
agents’ behavior. Note that in the present work the agents do not depart from in-
1Besides, there has been considerable interest in implementation with more sophisticated equi-
librium concepts, that require weaker conditions for implementation, see e.g., Moore and Repullo
(1988). For a survey of the literature see e.g., Jackson (2001).
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dividual rationality. It is assumed that agents have reciprocity preferences, which
transform into rational strategies that are consistent with the rationality criteria of
standard game-theory.
Learning One strand of literature is concerned with the issue of how the equilib-
rium of a mechanism is reached, and whether it is stable. Cabrales (1999) studies
the problem of Nash implementation with “naive adaptive dynamics”, in the sense
that agents play the game repeatedly, whereby they can use the history from play
to improve their strategies, which are not necessarily best responses. It turns out
that agents adjust their strategies in the direction of better responses within a finite
canonical mechanism, and the dynamics converge to a (stable) Nash equilibrium.2 A
theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms, where bounded rationality is modeled
as the myopic behavior of agents to adjust their strategies to better responses, is es-
tablished by Cabrales and Serano (2011). They provide a complete characterization
for implementation in better-response dynamics.
Allowing for mistakes Sjo¨stro¨m (1993) considers trembling-hand perfect imple-
mentation, which offers an approach to modeling mistakes in implementation theory.
A trembling-hand perfect equilibrium accounts for off-the-equilibrium path actions
of the agents. The agents may choose (with negligible probability) unintended ac-
tions, which can be interpreted as modeling mistakes by the agents. Eliaz (2002)
studies the implementation problem when some “faulty” agents make mistakes in
the sense that they fail to choose equilibrium strategies correctly. The solution con-
cept is a k-fault tolerant Nash equilibrium, which requires robustness to deviations
from equilibrium by the faulty agents. Eliaz’s approach is extended to incomplete
information environments by Doghmi and Ziad (2009), who accordingly introduce
the notion of k-fault tolerant Bayesian equilibrium.
Preference for honesty Further studies analyze mechanism design problem as-
suming that agents have process-regarding preferences, i.e., they care about the
process of how outcomes are achieved. For instance, these agents have an intrinsic
preference for honesty, and suffer a (small) utility loss if they lie in pursuit of wealth.
In this spirit, Matushima (2008a) and Matushima (2008b) show that every social
choice function is implementable in (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, and that a small
preference for honesty is sufficient to break down unwanted equilibria. Dutta and
Sen (2011) and Lombardi and Yoshilhara (2011) provide a general characterization
of Nash implementation with partially honest agents, i.e., at least one agent has a
strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truth-telling does not
lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying.
2In related work, Cabrales et al. (2003) tests the practical feasibility of a modified canonical
mechanism in a laboratory experiment. When the strategy space is finite, and with the option to
impose a fine on a dissident, the canonical mechanism successfully implements the social choice
function in 68-80% of cases.
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Related work is provided by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012), and Kartik and Ter-
cieux (2011), who study Nash implementation when the agents can provide some
evidence about the true state of the world, such that the planner is able to discrim-
inate between states.
(ii) Fairness and reciprocity
An ever-increasing theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the limited ability
of conventional game theoretic models to rationalize observed behavior, in which
considerations about fairness and reciprocity play a role. Several theories try to
explain reciprocal behavior assuming that utility functions are more complex in the
sense that players care about more than just their own material payoffs. These
theories can be classified into two categories: intention-based social preferences and
outcome-based social preferences. In this study I focus on intention-based social
preferences, i.e., preferences for reciprocity.3
Intention-based social preferences Reciprocity occurs when individuals act
kindly as a reward for kind behavior by others, and act unkindly as a punishment
for unkind behavior by others. Thereby, people view an action as kind or unkind by
underlying intentions in addition to the consequences of an action. The formalization
of intention-based reciprocity is pioneered by Rabin (1993) for static two-player nor-
mal form games. Kindness is evaluated at a norm, the equitable payoff, and a player
cares about the opponent’s material payoff only as a response to intentions. This
requires as translation from material payoffs to fairness utility payoffs, in which play-
ers, in addition to material payoffs, receive a positive payoff from repaying kindness
or punishing unkindness. Rabin’s solution concept is a fairness equilibrium, in which
strategies form best responses, and beliefs and actions are mutually consistent. That
is, players hold beliefs about other players intentions as well as beliefs about other
players possible alternatives. Since expectations matter, the appropriate framework
is the one of psychological game theory. First defined by Geanakoplos et al. (1989),
and later also by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), in a psychological game payoffs
dependent on both, actions and higher-order beliefs about actions. Segal and Sobel
(2007) generalize Rabin’s model providing an axiomatic foundation. Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) extend Rabin’s approach
of reciprocal kindness to multi-player extensive form games with complete informa-
tion. Their sequential reciprocity equilibrium requires that beliefs about intentions
are sequentially revised correctly as the game proceeds. Levine (1998), Charness
and Rabin (2002), and Cox et al. (2007) propose further modifications to Rabin’s
3Theories that model outcome-based social preferences assume that people intrinsically care
about their own and relative payoffs. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
incorporate outcome-based social preferences in their models, where the utility is specified as a
function of the players material payoff and the distribution of payoffs, such that fairness is modeled
as self-centered “inequality aversion”.
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approach, incorporating both reciprocity and distributional concerns in one model.
For a survey of the literature see Sobel (2005).
Intention-based Bayesian mechanism design More recently, Bierbrauer and
Netzer (2012) study Bayesian mechanism design in the presence of intention-based
social preferences. In a theoretical framework they define the solution concept of
Bayes-Nash fairness equilibrium (BNFE), and model intention-based reciprocity fol-
lowing Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). In the first part of
the paper, it is assumed that the social planner has information about how agents
perceive and balance kindness against material payoffs, which is referred to as the
exploration of “mechanisms with known kindness generating process”. A pseudo
revelation principle, that is a modified version of the fundamental revelation princi-
ple, is proven. It can be shown that under a non-direct mechanism, every efficient
social choice function can be implemented in BNFE. In the second part of the paper,
it is assumed that the social planner has no information about the weight agent’s
place on reciprocity. Attention is drawn to the psychological robustness of a mech-
anism with respect to reciprocal behavior of the agents. A mechanism is called
psychologically robust, if it implements a social choice function in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium irrespective of any concerns for reciprocity by the agents. Bierbrauer
and Netzer (2012) identify a sufficient condition, called “insurance property”, for
psychologically robust implementabililty of an incentive compatible social choice
function. Further, they prove that for any Bayes Nash implementable social choice
function, there exists an equivalent social choice function satisfying the insurance
property; and, under suitable budget balance assumptions, there exists a psycholog-
ically robust mechanism.
I add to Bierbrauer and Netzer’s (2012) approach, investigating the robustness of
Nash implementation pioneered by Maskin (1999) with respect to intention-based
reciprocity.
3 Setup
In the setup I largely follow the standard notation of Mas-Colell, Winston, and
Green (1995), Chap. 23.
3.1 The social choice problem
Let 〈I,X,Θ〉 represent the environment in which the (social) planner operates.
There are a finite number of N agents indexed by i ∈ I = {1, ..., N}, that need
to make a choice from some finite set of feasible alternatives X. Each agent
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has a certain type θi ∈ Θi. A state of the world consists of a profile of types
θ = (θ1, ..., θN) ∈ Θ, with Θ the finite set of states, which defines a preference profile
θ= (θ1, ...,θN) ∈ R, with R the set of possible profiles of preference orderings,
on the set of feasible alternatives X. For instance, x θi x′ (x θ x′) indicates that
agent i weakly (strictly) prefers alternative x to x′ in state θ.4
The environment is of complete information, i.e., the entire vector θ = (θ1, ..., θN) is
common knowledge among all agents, but not verifiable to the planner.
There is a material payoff function ui : X×Θ 7→ R representing agent i’s preferences
over alternatives in each particular state θ ∈ Θ.5
The planner’s overall goal is defined by a social choice function (SCF) f , which
determines a social desirable outcome x ∈ X for each state θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 1 (Social Choice Function (SCF)). A SCF f : Θ 7→ X specifies an
outcome f(θ) = x ∈ X for each state θ ∈ Θ.
3.2 Mechanisms
In order to reach the desired allocation despite the agent’s self-interest, the planner
commits to a mechanism, that defines the available strategies and the method used
to select an outcome based on the agents’ strategies.
Definition 2. A mechanism Φ = (M, g) consists of a message space M = M1 ×
...×MN , and a mapping g : M 7→ X.
The mapping g is called the outcome function and specifies an alternative for every
profile of messages.
3.3 Solution concepts
Fix a mechanism Φ = (M, g) and a profile of preferences θ ∈ Θ. For conve-
nience, suppress the dependence on θ. In an environment of complete information,
a mechanism Φ = (M, g) induces a normal-form game Γ := [I,M, (pii)i∈I ], with
m = (m1, ...,mN) ∈ M a message (strategy) profile6, and pii : M → R the material
payoff function for agent i.7
Let Bij = Mj denote the set of possible beliefs of agent i about agent j’s action,
4For simplification I assume that the set of alternatives is the same in all states.
5The utility function induces a binary relation θ on X, i.e., x θi x′ if and only if ui(x, θ) ≥
ui(x′, θ).
6A message profile can also be written as (mi,m−i), where mi ∈Mi denotes agent i’s message
and m−i ∈ M−i is a list of messages sent by all other agents j 6= i. For expositional simplicity, I
restrict attention to pure-strategies.
7Note that for any state θ ∈ Θ a mechanism Φ induces a normal-form game Γθ, with Γθ 6= Γθ′
for all θ′ ∈ Θ.
Chapter 1: Nash Implementation with Reciprocity Preferences 13
with bij ∈ Bij denoting agent i’s first-order belief about the action of agent j.
Then agent i’s material payoff from sending mi, given her belief about the messages
sent by all other agents, is equal to pii(mi, (bij)j 6=i) = ui(g(mi, (bij)j 6=i), θ).
(1) Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium solution concept is by large the most well-known in game
theory, given traditional assumptions about agents’ preferences, rationality, and
information available to the agents about each other.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)). Fix a state θ ∈ Θ. A message profile
m∗ of a mechanism Φ is a NE if, for every agent i ∈ I it holds that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi∈Mi
pii(mi, (bij)j 6=i), with bij = m∗j ∀j 6= i.
A NE is a profile of strategies (m∗i )i∈I such that for any agent i ∈ I the action m∗i
is a best response to the actions that she believes the other agents will take; and in
addition, these beliefs are correct.
(2) Nash fairness equilibrium
The Nash fairness equilibrium solution concept assumes that agents take into ac-
count the consequences and intentions of their actions. Agents are assumed to be
fairness utility maximizer, i.e., in addition to material payoffs, they receive a positive
(weighted) psychological payoff from being kind (unkind) to those, whose actions
are perceived kind (unkind), and they derive a negative psychological payoff from
being unkind (kind) to those whose actions are perceived kind (unkind). Consis-
tently, reciprocal motivations depend directly on beliefs (about beliefs) in addition
to which actions are chosen.
In the following I present Rabin’s (1993) approach and apply his notion of Nash
fairness equilibrium to mechanisms.
Let Cijk = Bjk = Mk denote the set of second-order beliefs, with cijk ∈ Cijk being
agent i’s belief about agent j’s beliefs about agent k’s behavior.
The kindness of the intention is evaluated at the equitable payoff. I specify the eq-
uitable payoff as the average between the largest and the smallest material payoff
that agent i can potentially give to agent j by choice of her own strategy mi, fixing
the strategies of all agents j 6= i, and excluding Pareto inefficient strategies. Let
pieij ((bij)j 6=i) denote the equitable payoff for agent j from the perspective of agent i,
given agent i’s beliefs about the actions of the other agents, (bij)j 6=i. Formally,
pieij ((bij)j 6=i) =
1
2
[
max
mi∈Mi
pij(mi, (bij)j 6=i) + min
mi∈Eij((bij)j 6=i)
pij(mi, (bij)j 6=i)
]
,
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where Eij((bij)j 6=i) ⊆ Mi denotes the set of conditionally and bilaterally Pareto
efficient strategies.8 Then, agent i’s kindness towards agent j, depending on both,
her own strategy mi and her belief about all other agents’ strategies (mij)j 6=i, is
κij(mi, (bij)j 6=i) = pij(mi, (bij)j 6=i)− pieij ((bij)j 6=i),
Whenever the material payoff, pij, that agent i is offering to agent j, exceeds the
equitable payoff, pieij , then agent i thinks she is kind to agent j.
Similarly one can evaluate agent i’s perceived kindness, that is, whether agent i
believes that agent j is kind to her,
λiji(bij, (cijk)k 6=j) = pii(bij, (cijk)k 6=j)− pieji ((cijk)k 6=j),
with pi
ej
i being the equitable payoff which agent i believes that agent j uses to
evaluate her fairness towards herself. Note that λiji(bij, (cijk)k 6=j) ≡ κji(bij, (cijk)k 6=j).
Now agent i’s fairness utility function can be formally defined as follows,
Ui(mi, (bij, (cijk)k 6=j)j 6=i) = pii(mi, (bij)j 6=i) +
∑
j 6=i
ξij · κij(mi, (bij)j 6=i) · λiji(bij, (cijk)k 6=j),
with ξij ≥ 0 an exogenously given weight measuring the extent of agent i’s reciprocity
concerns towards agent j. The fairness utility is a function of the agent’s material
payoff (first term) and a psychological payoff (left term), which is the sum of the
product of agent i’s own kindness and i’s perceived kindness across all agents j. The
multiplication of an agent’s kindness and the expected kindness captures reciprocity
motives – agent i’s utility increases when treating agent j kindly (unkindly), κij > 0
(κij < 0), if she believes that agent j is kind (unkind) to her as well, λiji > 0,
(λiji < 0)); by contrast, if agent i thinks that agent j is treating her kindly, λiji > 0,
her utility is decreasing if she is unkind herself, κij < 0, and vice versa.
Finally, in a Nash fairness equilibrium of the mechanism Φ, agents maximize fairness
8In the minimization part in the equitable payoff strategies are restricted to the subset of
bilaterally Pareto efficient strategies, where efficiency is defined as a belief-dependent property. A
strategy is called bilaterally Pareto inefficient if there exists another strategy m′i, which, conditional
on the belief about the other agents’ strategies (bij)j 6=i, yields no lower material payoff for any of
the two agents, and a strictly higher material payoff for at least one of them. The restriction to
a bilateral efficiency concept (and not a population-wide or global one) matches best the bilateral
concept of reciprocity, i.e., agent i only cares about the behavior (intentions) of agent j, but not
about the behavior of agent j towards a third agent k, such that efficiency is invoked conditional
on the other agents’ strategies. See Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) for a discussion about the
belief-dependent and bilaterally efficiency concept in line with Rabin (1993) compared to the
belief-independent and globally efficiency concept in line with Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
Also, in the specification of the equitable payoff one might not only assume a different efficiency
concept, generalizations might be to allow for arbitrary weights α ∈ [0, 1] placed on the minimum
and maximum material payoff, with the exogenous parameter α describing an agent’s degree of
satisfaction with the behavior of the others.
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utilities, and strategies match beliefs correctly.
Definition 4 (Nash Fairness Equilibrium (NFE)). Fix a state θ ∈ Θ. A
message profile m∗ ∈M of a mechanism Φ is a NFE if, for all agents i ∈ I, it holds
that:
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi∈M
Ui(mi, (bij, (cijk)k 6=j)j 6=i),
with bij = m
∗
j , and cijk = bjk = m
∗
k, ∀ k 6= j, ∀ j 6= i.
In a NFE for any agent i ∈ I the action m∗i is the optimal choice, given correct first-
and second-order beliefs about the action of the other agents.
(3) Psychologically robust equilibrium
Throughout it is assumed that the intensity of reciprocal preferences is common
knowledge among agents, but not to the planner. The planner cannot measure
the intensity of how an agent’s kind (unkind) treatment raises (lowers) the weight
that is placed on the other’s material payoff, making an agent more (less) willing
to sacrifice her own material payoff in favor (expense) of her opponent. Therefore,
it is interesting to analyze the psychological robustness of an equilibrium, where
psychological robustness is defined with respect to the agents’ individual weights
they place on reciprocity concerns, ξ = (ξij)i,j∈I,i 6=j.
I adopt the approach of Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) who introduce the notion
of psychologically robust equilibria in a Bayesian setting. Analogously, I say that a
profile of messages is a psychologically robust equilibrium, if it is a NE irrespective of
the degree of reciprocity concerns that the agents might have, such that the agent’s
sensitivity for reciprocity does not affect equilibrium behavior.
Definition 5 (Psychologically Robust Equilibrium (PRE)). Fix a state θ ∈
Θ. A message profile m∗ ∈ M of a mechanism Φ is a PRE if, for all agents i ∈ I,
it holds that m∗ is a NFE, for every ξ ∈ [0,∞)N(N−1).
Note that PRE is a refinement of NE. If ξij = 0 for all agents i, j ∈ I and i 6= j,
then the agents act as selfish payoff maximizers and NFE coincides with NE.
3.4 Implementation
Since the planner does not observe the state of the world, her goal is to design a
mechanism that induces the agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over out-
comes. The implementation problem is solved when the set of equilibrium outcomes
of the mechanism coincides with the allocation in each possible state of the world.
Let Γθ denote the normal-form game induced by Φ in state θ ∈ Θ, and let m∗(θ) be
a collection of NFE of the games Γθ, for all θ ∈ Θ.
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Definition 6 (Nash fairness implementation (NFI)). An SCF f is Nash fair-
ness implementable if there exists a mechanism Φ = (M, g) such that, for any θ ∈ Θ
and for every NFE m∗(θ) of the normal-form game Γθ induced by Φ, it holds that:
f(θ) = g(m∗(θ)).
Hence, a social choice function is Nash fairness implementable if every Nash equi-
librium yields the desired outcome.
Further, a social choice function is psychologically robustly implementable, if there
is at least one PRE which has the desired outcome, and there is no NFE which has
a different outcome.
Definition 7 (Psychologically robust implementation). A SCF f is psycho-
logically robustly implementable if there exists a mechanism Φ = (M, g) such that,
for any θ ∈ Θ, there exists a PRE m∗(θ) of the normal-form game Γθ induced by Φ,
with f(θ) = g(m∗(θ)), and there exists no NFE m˜(θ) with g(m˜(θ)) 6= g(m∗(θ)), for
any ξ ∈ [0,∞)N(N−1).
4 Maskin’s result
A challenge in implementation theory is to rule out undesired (untruthful) equilib-
ria. The major breakthrough in characterizing uniqueness was the classic paper by
Maskin (1999, in circulation since 1977), providing necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a SCF to be implementable in NE. The necessary condition for Nash
implementation is monotonicity.
Definition 8 (Monotonicity). An SCF f is monotonic if for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and
x = f(θ), but x 6= f(θ′), for some x ∈ X, there exist some agent i ∈ I, and some
x′ ∈ X such that x θi x′ and x′ θ′i x.9
The definition follows the reasoning that, if an outcome x ∈ X is the socially desired
outcome in state θ, but not in state θ′, then at least one agent must have reversed
her preferences when moving from state θ to θ′.
Monotonicity together with a property called no-veto power is jointly sufficient for
Nash implementability.
9The monotonicity requirement can be expressed in two (equivalent) ways. The second defi-
nition is as follows: a SCF f is monotonic if for any θ, θ′ and x = f(θ) such that for each agent
i ∈ I and x′ ∈ X the relation x θi x′ implies x θ
′
i x
′ and x = f(θ′). Intuitively, if an outcome
is chosen by the SCF in state θ and moves up in each agent’s preference ranking when moving to
another state θ′, then it should continue to be the desired alternative at θ′.
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Definition 9 (No-veto power (NVP)). An SCF f satisfies NVP if x = f(θ),
whenever for some state θ and some alternative x ∈ X, we have x θj x′, for all
x′ ∈ X, and for all j ∈ I except at most one.
The no-veto power condition states that one agent alone cannot veto the majority
view. If in some state θ an alternative x is top-ranked in the preference ordering by
at least (N − 1) agents, then x should be chosen by the SCF.
Theorem 1 (Maskin, 1999). (1) If a SCF f is implementable in NE, then it
must be monotonic. (2) Given at least three agents (N ≥ 3), any monotonic SCF f
satisfying no-veto power is implementable in NE.
The mechanism that has been frequently used to implement social choice functions
in Nash equilibrium is the “canonical mechanism”. Below the canonical mechanism
is presented, following the design of Repullo (1987).
Canonical mechanism (Repullo, 1987) Denote the canonical mechanism by
ΦC = (M, g): each agent i ∈ I simultaneously sends a message mi, which consists of
a state of the world θ ∈ Θ, an alternative x ∈ X, and an integer z ∈ Z+, with Z+ the
set of non-negative integers, mi = (x
i, θi, zi) ∈ Mi. With slight abuse of notation,
a message is said to be the same for (at least) two agents if it coincides in the
announced alternative and state, independent of the integer, i.e., I write mi = (x, θ)
whenever mi = mj for some arbitrary integer z
i. The outcome function g of Φ is
defined by the following three rules:
(1) If all N agents send the same message m1 = ... = mN = (x, θ), and x = f(θ),
then the outcome is g(m) = x.
(2) If (N − 1) agents send the same message mi = (x, θ), and x = f(θ), then the
outcome is g(m) = x, except if the dissident j announces mj = (x
j, θj, zj)
with mj 6= mi, then
(i) g(m) = x if xj θj x, and
(ii) g(m) = xj otherwise.
(3) In all remaining cases, an integer game is played: the agent who announces the
highest integer in her message wins in the sense that the outcome implemented
is the alternative she proposes, i.e., g(m) = xi, where i is such that z
i ≥ zj
for all i, j ∈ I, i 6= j. In case of ties, g(m) = xi, where xi is the alternative
chosen by agent i, who is the agent with the lowest index among those agents
who announced the highest integer.
The intuition of the canonical mechanism is as follows: if all agents reach a consensus
such that the desired alternative is the one which the SCF associates with the true
preference profile, then this alternative is implemented. If one agent disagrees and
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proposes a different alternative, then there is a test that the alternative has to
pass. If it passes the test, the alternative outcome is implemented, otherwise it
is not. Often the agents whose messages pass the test are called test agents (see
e.g., Moore, 1992; Cabrales, 1999). The outcome can only be changed if the test
agent announces an alternative that she does not prefer to the one chosen by the
other agents in the announced state. If more than one agent disagrees it cannot be
inferred who is truthful and who is lying. The integer game then guarantees that
there will always be one agent who has an incentive to deviate announcing a higher
and higher integer, such that there will not exist an equilibrium.10
5 Implementation in Nash fairness equilibrium
The canonical mechanism allows implementation of social choice function that sat-
isfy monotonicity and no-veto power as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. In
the following I ask to which extent a unique implementation in Nash fairness equi-
librium is possible. I consider three specific settings, which show that the existence
of a truthful Nash fairness equilibrium outcome as well as that the uniqueness of
the equilibrium outcome is not guaranteed for higher values of reciprocity.
In particular, (i) when the agents’ preference orderings form a Condorcet cycle in
each state of the world, then the canonical mechanism allows a unique implemen-
tation in Nash fairness equilibrium for small values of reciprocity; otherwise there
will be no Nash fairness equilibrium; (ii) when the agents’ have aligned preferences
over outcomes, then the canonical mechanism does not yield a unique outcome
for high values of reciprocity, i.e., exceeding an upper-bound; and (iii) when the
agents face a minority conflict in preferences, then a social choice function is indeed
implementable in Nash fairness equilibrium irrespective of the agents’ concern for
reciprocity, furthermore, this social choice function is also psychologically robustly
implementable.
In addition, for the Condorcet setting, a detailed analysis of the determinants that
specify the “degree of robustness” of the truth-telling Nash fairness equilibrium out-
come with respect to upper-bounds on the agents’ weights for reciprocity is provided.
10Many of the (constructive) proofs in the implementation literature employ integer games or
replace the integer game by a modulo game (see e.g., Saijo, 1988; Danilov, 1992) to eliminate
unwanted equilibria. Integer games have no pure-strategy equilibria, since any agent can obtain
her most preferred outcome by the choice of an higher integer. In the modulo game each agent
announces an integer from a finite set and the agent whose index matches the sum of the integers
modulo the number of agents receives the allocation she has announced. By the same logic as of
the integer game, if the outcome is not best for each agent, then there will always be an agent
who wishes to announce a different, i.e., a higher integer. However, the unnatural feature of both
integer and modulo games is often criticized in the literature, see e.g. Moore (1992), and Jackson
(1992).
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In particular, I determine the effects of ceteris paribus changes of the parameters
that specify the agents’ expected loss and benefit from reciprocal behavior.
Finally, a property, which I call “conflict property”, is derived, that together with
Nash implementability provides a sufficient condition for a social choice function
to be not psychologically robustly implementable. In other words, there exists no
psychologically robust equilibrium which has the desired outcome in the true state.
Note, in the following the terms “desired outcome” or “truth-telling outcome” have
similar meaning in the sense that they denote the outcome which the social choice
function associates with the true state of the world. By the same reasoning, a
“truth-telling message profile” denotes the profile in which all agents coordinate on
the desired outcome.
5.1 Limitations of the canonical mechanism
Let’s start with an abstract setting in which the agents’ preferences over outcomes
form a Condorcet cycle in each state of the world, i.e., in and within every state of
the world each agent top-ranks a different alternative. Consider Example 1.
Example 1 (Condorcet cycle). Suppose there are three agents, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a set
of three alternatives {x1, x2, x3}, and three possible states of the world, {θ1, θ2, θ3}.
The agents’ preference orderings over alternatives in the three states form a 3 × 3
Condorcet cycle described by the following matrix,
states θ1 θ2 θ3
agents 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
x1 x2 x3 x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x1
alternatives x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3 x3 x1 x2
x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3
such that, for instance, in state θ1 agent 1 has the preferences ordering x1  x2  x3.
Due to the cyclical order of preferences among agents and states, in each state every
agent prefers a different alternative the most and the least. Hence, in each state
any single-valued SCF must assign the best and the worst alternative in the agents’
preference ordering to one of the agents. The SCF f is defined as follows:
f(θk) = xk, with k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The SCF satisfies Maskin’s conditions of monotonicity and NVP and is therefore
implementable in NE.11. Suppose there exists a material equivalent for the utility
enjoyed with each outcome. Let pii ∈ {H,M,L}, denote the material payoff, where
11The proofs are relegated to Appendix A.3.1
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H denotes the highest possible material payoff, M = δH + (1− δ)L, with δ ∈ (0, 1),
the medium payoff, and L the lowest possible payoff. Since agents’ preference order-
ings and appropriate monetary equivalents cycle within the three states, preferences
among agents are symmetric.
Obviously, in this Condorcet example there is always one agent who receives the
lowest material payoff in the allocation prescribed by the social choice function, such
that truth-telling might not be an obvious choice. In the Nash equilibrium the agents
for whom the outcome does not yield the highest material payoff might interpret
the behavior of the one agent who receives her top-ranked alternative as unkind. If
punishment is possible, depending on the rules of the canonical mechanism, then
agents may be willing to punish this unkind behavior, provided that reciprocity
motives are strong enough. Indeed, it can be shown that truth-telling is a Nash
fairness equilibrium outcome if and only if the agents’ sensitivity for reciprocity is
limited to an upper-bound; otherwise, there exists no equilibrium. The following
proposition states the result.
Proposition 1. Consider Example 1. The social choice function f is implementable
in NFE in the canonical mechanism if and only if
ξii′ ≤ δ
(1− δ)2
4
(H − L) ≡ ε1, ∀i, i
′ ∈ I, i′ 6= i.
Otherwise, there exists no NFE.
A formal proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.3.3; for a detailed
description of the rules of the canonical mechanism specific for the example I refer
to Appendix A.1.
The logic of the result is as follows. Suppose all agents announce the truth-telling
message profile m∗. Then there is always one agent who either receives the lowest
(agent L), or the intermediate (agent M), or the highest (agent H) material payoff
in the allocation prescribed by the social choice function; and for all pairs of agents,
at least one of them is kindness-neutral towards the other. In particular, agent L
is kindness-neutral towards both agent H and M , since she cannot change the out-
come by the rules of ΦC ; and agent M is kindness-neutral towards agent H, since
all outcomes she can induce by the rules of ΦC yield Pareto inefficient outcomes
and therefore equilibrium payoffs and equitable payoffs coincide. Hence, the fairness
utilities from truth-telling equal the material payoffs, i.e, Ui(m
∗) = pii(m∗), for all
agents i ∈ I. However, by choosing m∗H agent H gives agent M the lowest material
payoff. Agent M now thinks that agent H is being unkind: agent H is a test agent
and could have chosen a message, which had changed the outcome of ΦC in favor for
agent M . Therefore agent M is willing to be unkind as well. Dependent on the size
of ξMH > 0, agent M may find it optimal to deviate from truth-telling in order to
punish agent H for her unkind behavior. Although this punishment makes herself
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materially worse off, agent M derives satisfaction from a positive psychological pay-
off. Therefore, the size of ξMH must be restricted to a certain cutoff value ε1 > 0,
such that m∗ is a NFE, otherwise mDM maximizes UM(mM ,m
∗
−i), which implies that
truth-telling is not a NFE. Thus, the truth-telling message profile m∗ is a NFE if and
only if ξMH ≤ ε1. Because of the cyclical order of preferences, any other (untruthful)
message profiles m 6= m∗ will have an outcome that gives one agent the highest, one
agent the intermediate, and one agent the lowest material payoff (in the true state);
but now agent L will be a test agent. Agent L always has an incentive to change
the outcome to her advantage, and punishes the others for their unkind behavior.
Thus, there exist no other NFE, for all ξii′ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Example 1 shows that, in a Condorcet setting, a social choice function is imple-
mentable as the outcome of a canonical mechanism, if and only if reciprocity pref-
erences are not too strong. In particular, if the agents’ motives for reciprocity are
below an upper-bound, i.e., ξii′ ≤ ε1, for i, i′ ∈ I, i 6= i′, then reciprocity-induced
punishment becomes unattractive or impossible. But, if the agents motives for reci-
procity are strong, i.e., ξii′ > ε1, for i, i
′ ∈ I, i 6= i′, then there exists no equilibrium.
Note that there is no problem with unwanted or multiple equilibrium outcomes. If
reciprocity concerns are large enough, then the mechanism does not yield the desired
equilibrium outcome and there is also no other equilibrium outcome irrespective of
the weight ξii′ . Hence, if the upper-bound on the reciprocity weights, which depends
on the exogenous parameters chosen for the material payoff, is very low, then al-
ready a small sensitivity for reciprocity is enough to eliminate any equilibria. For a
detailed discussion of the psychological incentives in Example 1 see Section 5.3.
The next example demonstrates that the desired outcome does not need to be the
unique outcome of the canonical mechanism, if the agents’ concerns for reciprocity
are large enough. In this setting the agents have aligned preferences over alterna-
tives. In particular, in every state each agent has the same ranking over alternatives,
and the outcome associated with the social choice function is the one which is pre-
ferred by all agents.
Example 2 (Aligned Preferences). Consider an environment with three agents,
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a set of three alternatives {x1, x2, x3}, and two possible states of the
world, θ1, θ2, such that in every state the agent’s preferences among outcomes are
aligned.
states θ1 θ2
agents 1 2 3 1 2 3
x1 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2
alternatives x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x2 x2 x2 x1 x1 x1
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Suppose the SCF f is defined as follows:
f(θk) = xk, with k ∈ {1, 2},
such that in each state the outcome chosen by f is the socially and collectively
desired one. Trivially, the SCF f is monotonic and satisfies NVP, so that it is
Nash implementable. Again, suppose there exists a material equivalent for the utility
enjoyed with each outcome, denoted by pii ∈ {H,M,L}, with H > M > L, and
M = δH + (1− δ)L, with δ ∈ (0, 1).
In Example 2 the truthful NE outcome is clearly the desired one, i.e., the outcome
that is associated with the social choice function in the true state. However, when
the agents’ concern for intentions is large, then there might exist other equilibria.
Consider the profile in which all agents coordinate on the least preferred alternative
in the true state. The outcome results in the lowest material payoff for each agents,
and they are maximal unkind towards each other. The psychological payoff from
mutual unkindness may now offset the costs associated with the low material payoff,
provided reciprocity concerns are large enough. Indeed, the profile with “maximal
unkindness” is a Nash fairness equilibrium of the canonical mechanism, iff the agents’
concern for intentions are strong enough, and this equilibrium has an outcome which
is not the desired one. The next proposition shows the result.
Proposition 2. Consider Example 2 and the canonical mechanism. If ξ is such
that ∑
i′ 6=i
ξii′ ≥ 1
H − L ≡ ε2, ∀i, i
′ ∈ I, i′ 6= i,
then the social choice function f is not implementable in NFE in the canonical
mechanism, due to non-uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome.
Again, a formal proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix A.3.4. The intu-
ition is the following. In each state all agents top-rank the same alternative, and this
alternative is the one associated with the social choice function. When all agents
coordinate on the desired outcome, then the canonical mechanism yields the desired
outcome which gives each agent the maximum material payoff. Further, all pairs of
agents are kindness-neutral towards each other, which implies that fairness utilities
coincide with material payoffs, Ui(m
∗) = pii(m∗). Since beliefs are all zero, no agent
can profit from a unilateral deviation. Any unilateral deviation from truth-telling
results in a lower material payoff than the one obtained from truth-telling. Hence,
for every ξ ∈ [0,∞)6 the message profile m∗ is a NFE.
Now, suppose the true state is θ1, and that all agents agree on the same message
m˜i = (x2, θ2). By rule (1) of Φ
C , outcome x2 is implemented, which yields for
each agent the lowest material payoff (since the true state is θ1). This makes all
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pairs of agents as unkind as possible towards each other. However, being mutu-
ally unkind yields a positive psychological payoff for each agent. Consider now a
possible unilateral deviation mDi 6= m˜i such that the outcome of ΦC changes. Any
such message mDi is now interpreted as kind. The outcome yields a higher material
payoff than the one resulting from m˜, but, given beliefs, a negative psychological
payoff. It can be shown that if the size of the sum of the reciprocity weights is large
enough,
∑
i 6=i′ ξii′ ≥ ε2 for all i, i′ ∈ I, and i′ 6= i, then the “benefit” from a larger
material payoff cannot offset the loss from a negative psychological payoff. This,
in turn, implies that the profile m˜ constitutes, in addition to m∗, a NFE of Φc, iff∑
i 6=i′ ξii′ ≥ ε2, with an outcome unequal to the desired outcome.
Example 2 demonstrates that the assumption of reciprocity preferences can raise
the problem of multiple equilibria in the canonical mechanism. Although there ex-
ists a NFE that has the desired outcome for any ξ ∈ [0,∞)N(N−1), the equilibrium
outcome is not unique.
To sum up, Example 1 and Example 2 illustrate that Maskin’s results about imple-
mentation have only limited applicability when the solution concept is NFE. When
agents behave in a reciprocal manner, such that they are inclined to respond pos-
itively or negatively toward the actions of others, then the canonical mechanism
does not necessarily yield the desired outcome. For strong reciprocity motives ei-
ther truth-telling is not an equilibrium outcome, or truth-telling is not the unique
equilibrium.
5.2 A possibility result
In this section a possibility result is derived. In the environment defined by the
next example, the social choice function can indeed be implemented as the desired
equilibrium outcome of the canonical mechanism, whatever the agents concerns for
reciprocity. In the setting, agents face a “minority conflict” among preferences over
alternatives. In particular, there are (N − 1) agents who all top-rank the same
alternative in their preference orderings, and there is exactly one agent who least
prefers this alternative. Consider Example 3.
Example 3 (Minority conflict). Consider an environment with three agents,
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a set of three alternatives {x1, x2, x3}, and two possible states of the
world, θ1, θ2. In every state there are two agents who (globally) top-rank the same
alternative, whereas this alternative is (globally) lowest-ranked for a third agent.
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states θ1 θ2
agents 1 2 3 1 2 3
x1 x1 x2 x2 x1 x2
alternatives x3 x2 x3 x3 x3 x1
x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3
Define the SCF f by
f(θk) = xk, with k ∈ {1, 2},
such that the SCF is implementable in NE.12 Again, suppose there exists a material
equivalent for the utility enjoyed with each outcome, denoted by pii ∈ {H,M,L},
with H > M > L, and M = δH + (1− δ)L, but now δ ∈ (1
2
, 1).
The minority conflict among agents’ preferences makes it possible that the outcome
of the canonical mechanism will be the desired outcome, whatever the agents’ will-
ingness to trade-off material payoffs and kindness sensations. However, there will
be more than one psychologically robust equilibrium, but all those equilibria have
the desired outcome. Proposition 3 states the result.
Proposition 3. Consider Example 3. The social choice function f is psychologically
robustly implementable, i.e., the SCF is implementable as the unique NFE outcome
of the canonical mechanism, for every ξ ∈ [0,∞)N(N−1).
For the formal proof of Proposition 3 I refer to Appendix A.3.5; a detailed descrip-
tion of the rules of the canonical mechanism specific for Example 3 can be found in
Appendix A.2.
To see the logic behind Proposition 3 suppose all agents announce the truth-telling
message m∗i . Then the outcome results in the highest payoff for two agents i and i
′,
and the lowest material payoff for a third agent i′′. Since both agents i and i′ receive
the highest material payoff, any other choice would yield a lower material payoff for
both of them, implying that they are kindness-neutral towards each other. Agent
i′′ cannot change the outcome by the rules of ΦC , which implies that agent i′′ is
kindness-neutral towards both agent i and agent i′. Hence, for all pairs of agents at
least one of them is kindness-neutral, such that Ui(m
∗) = pii(m∗). Consider agent i
and agent i′ who can potentially change the outcome of the canonical mechanism.
Since truth-telling delivers the maximum material payoff for both, and since the
corresponding beliefs are zero, any deviation would yield a fairness utility below the
one from truth-telling. Thus, there is no profitable deviation, implying that truth-
telling is a PRE.
Now consider a profile of messages in which agent i and agent i′ announce the truth,
12The SCF is Maskin monotonic and satisfies NVP, for the proofs see Appendix A.3.2.
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but agent i′′ does not, such that rule (2) applies. However, agent i′′ cannot change
the outcome by the rules of ΦC , and the outcome associated with the social choice
function in the true state will be implemented. Again, the outcome yields the high-
est material payoff for both agent i and i′, and for all pairs of agents at least one
of them is kindness-neutral. Hence, all profiles m with mi′′ 6= m∗i = m∗i′ , are also
psychologically robust equilibria, and yield the same outcome, that is the one asso-
ciated with the true message profile. It can be shown that any other message profile
cannot be supported by NFE, for every ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Summarizing, it has been shown that in a setting with minority conflict among
agents’ preferences, the canonical mechanism is the appropriate tool for truthful
implementation in NFE, whatever the agents’ concern for reciprocity.
5.3 The incentives for reciprocity in Example 1
In the following, attention is drawn again to Example 1 of Section 5.1. I analyze
in more detail the determinants of the degree of “robustness” of the truthful Nash
fairness equilibrium with respect to the agents’ reciprocity weights. Recall from
Example 1 that the canonical mechanism yields an outcome that is top-ranked for
exactly one agent. In equilibrium, the behavior of this agents is perceived as unkind
by the other two agents. One of these two agents might then have the possibility
to reciprocate the perceived unkindness, provided her weight placed on reciprocity
exceeds an upper-bound. The upper-bound is determined by exogenous parameters,
that describe the (relative) difference between agents’ material gains resulting from
the outcome of the canonical mechanism. Therefore, changes to those parameters
have an impact on the strength by which kindness sensations affect behavior.
In the first part of this section, the costs and benefits from punishment are derived,
as functions of the exogenous parameters δ, and (H−L). In a second step, a compar-
ative statics analysis is accomplished, considering ceteris paribus changes of those
parameters. It can be shown that the incentives for punishment vary substantially.
5.3.1 Costs and Benefits of Punishment
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.3.3, when all agents coordinate
on the truth-telling message profile, the mechanism yields the desired outcome,
which results in the highest material payoff for agent H, the intermediate material
payoff for agent M , and the lowest material payoff for agent L. In particular,
UH(m
∗) = piH(m∗) = H, UM(m∗) = pi3(m∗) = M = δH + (1 − δ)L, and UL(m∗) =
piL(m
∗) = L, with δ ∈ (0, 1), and H > M > L.
However, truth-telling by agent H is unkind towards both agent M and agent L. Let
us focus on the unkindness towards agent M : agent H (hypothetically) could have
changed the outcome in favor for agent M , i.e., to her top-ranked outcome, giving
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agent M the highest material payoff. Hence, κHM(m
∗) = 1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0.
I Unkindness of agent H towards agent M : U ≡ 1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0.
Therefore, agent M has an incentive to punish agent H for being unkind, and, since
agent M is a test agent, she can change the outcome of the canonical mechanism to
be the intermediate one for agent H, i.e., piH(m
∗
H ,m
D
M ,m
∗
L) = δH+(1−δ)L = M <
H, and κMH(m
∗
H ,m
D
M ,m
∗
L) =
1
2
(1 − δ)(L −H) < 0. Given beliefs, the punishment
of agent M towards agent H can be determined as follows,
I Punishment of agent M towards agent H: P ≡ 1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0.
However, the punishment goes along with costs and benefits for agent M . Compare
the fairness utilities of agent M , i.e., UM(m
∗) = M and UM(m∗H ,m
D
M ,m
∗
L) = L +
ξ31
1
4
(1 − δ)2(H − L)2. On the one hand, agent M benefits from punishment, since
punishing unkindness with unkindness results in an additional positive psychological
payoff, ξMH
1
4
(1− δ)2(H − L)2.
I Benefit from punishment for agent M : B ≡ ξMH 14(1− δ)2(H − L)2.
On the other hand, agent M suffers a loss through a lower material payoff, i.e.,
|M − L| = δ(H − L).
I Loss from punishment for agent M : L ≡ δ(H − L).
Hence, as soon as the benefits, B, exceed the loss from punishment, L, agent M
does no longer stick to the truth-telling strategy, and the truth-telling NFE breaks
down.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
Consider ceteris paribus changes of the parameters (H−L) δ, that determine agent
M ’s loss, L, and benefit, B, from punishment. Figure I and Figure II illustrate the
results.
Focus on (H−L). The spread between the best and worst material payoff, (H−L),
reflects the intensity of the agents’ preferences, and serves as an objective measure
of absolute stakes size. Concerning ceteris paribus change with respect to (H − L),
keeping δ and ξMH fixed, we have
∂L
∂(H−L) = δ > 0 and
∂B
∂(H−L) = −ξMH 12(1−δ)2(H−
L) > 0. That is, with an increase in (H − L) both, the loss and benefit from
punishment increase.
Focus on δ. The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the relative difference between the
agents’ intermediate material payoff and the highest and lowest material payoff. For
large δ, the difference between the agents’ highest and intermediate payoff is rela-
tively small. In the extreme case, δ → 1, both payoffs almost equal each other, and
the agents nearly become indifferent between the most preferred and intermediate
preferred alternative. Concerning ceteris paribus changes with respect to δ, keeping
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Figure I: Loss and benefit from punishment for fixed ξMH
Note: B and L describe the loss and benefit from punishment, respectively, keeping ξMH fixed. The left figure
shows B and L as functions of δ for two different levels of (H − L), i.e., B1 and L1 for (H − L) = 2 (dashed lines),
and B2 and L2 for (H −L) = 5 (solid lines). For larger values of (H −L), both B and L increase. The right figure
shows B and L as functions of (H − L), for two different levels of δ, i.e., B1 and L1 for δ = 0.2 (dashed lines), and
B2 and L2 for δ = 0.8 (solid lines). For larger values of δ B decreases and L increases, such that for δ = 0.8 L lies
above B.
Figure II: Loss and benefit for varying values of ξMH .
Note: B and L describe the loss and benefit from punishment, respectively, for varying levels of ξMH . The left
figure shows B and L as functions of δ, keeping (H − L) fixed. B1 for levels of ξMH = 1 (solid line), B2 for levels
of ξMH = 5 (dashed line), and B3 for levels of ξMH = 100 (dotted line); L is independent of ξMH . The loss from
punishment increases in δ and for higher levels of ξMH . The right figure shows B and L as functions of (H − L),
keeping δ fixed. B1 for levels of ξMH = 1 (solid line), B2 for levels of ξMH = 5 (dashed line), and B3 for levels of
ξMH = 100 (dotted line); L is independent of ξMH . The larger ξMH , the larger the incentive for punishment. The
benefit from punishment increases in (H − L) and for higher levels of ξMH .
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(H−L) and ξMH fixed, we have ∂L∂δ = H−L > 0 and ∂B∂δ = −ξMH 12(H−L)2(1−δ) < 0,
i.e., with an increase in δ the loss from punishment increases, but the benefit from
punishment decreases. Hence, if δ is sufficiently large, then the loss from punishment
will exceed the benefit, which eliminates agent M ’s incentive to deviate from truth-
telling.
Focus on ε1. Finally, consider the effects of ceteris paribus changes on the agents’
critical reciprocity weight ε1 =
δ
(1−δ)2
4
(H−L) , i.e.,
∂ε1
∂δ
=
4
(H − L)
[
1
(1− δ)2 +
2δ
(1− δ)3
]
> 0,
∂ε1
∂(H − L) = −
4δ
(1− δ)2
1
(H − L)2 < 0.
An increase in δ results in an increase of ε1. On the one hand, keeping (H − L)
fixed, and letting δ → 1 for δ ∈ (0, 1), we have limδ→1 ε1 =∞, such that in the limit
case the agents’ weight for reciprocity is nearly unbounded. This implies that agents
can have a strong preference for reciprocity which does not destroy the truth-telling
NFE. On the other hand, for (H − L) fixed, and δ → 0 for δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
limδ→0  = 0. Here, even if the agents’ have very small preferences for reciprocity,
the NFE breaks down: If δ is near zero, then the upper-bound on the agents’ weight
for reciprocity is near zero, such that for already very small reciprocity preferences,
truth-telling is no NFE.
An increase in (H − L) results in a decrease of ε1. The larger the spread between
stake size of the best and worst material payoff, the more restrictive the upper bound
on the agents’ reciprocity weights. In reverse to the effects of δ above, it becomes
beneficial for a particular agent to deviate from the truth-telling NFE when (H−L)
is relatively large.
5.4 On the existence of a truthful NFE
In this section I take up the issue of the existence of a truthful NFE in the canonical
mechanism. As Example 1 demonstrates, there are settings in which no Nash fair-
ness equilibrium exists for large values of reciprocity. Based on this observation, I
define a general property, which is called conflict property, that together with Nash
implementability provides a sufficient condition for a social choice function to be
not implementable as the desired equilibrium outcome of the canonical mechanism.
Note that this does not imply that there exists no NFE; it is just sufficient for truth-
telling to be not an equilibrium outcome.
Consider a social choice function that assigns an outcome to any possible profile
of the agent’s preferences in a way that this outcome is “good” for agent i, but
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“bad” for agent j. Then agent i and j have conflicting preferences over outcomes. If
both, agent i and j, are also test agents, i.e., they can affect the other’s payoff, then
agent j might be willing to sacrifice own material payoff in order to punish agent i.
Provided reciprocity motives are strong enough, this will destroy the truth-telling
equilibrium outcome.
Formally, the conflict property is defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Conflict). Given an environment 〈I,X,Θ〉. A SCF f has the
conflict property if there exist θ ∈ Θ, i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, and x, x′, x′′ ∈ X such that
(1) x = f(θ);
(2) x θi x′ and x θi x′′;
(3) x′′ θj x θj x′.
Statement (1) defines the SCF f . Statement (2) and (3) point out the conflict
between agent i and j in state θ. Statement (2) specifies that agent i prefers the
outcome associated with the social choice function to two other alternatives; state-
ment (3) ensures that the outcome associated with the social choice function is
neither top-ranked nor bottom-ranked for agent j. Hence, if all agents coordinate
on the same state and outcome associated with the social choice function, then agent
i and j are both test agents.
Further, in any NE bilateral kindness between agents cannot be positive. The lemma
below shows the result, which was originally derived by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012)
in the case of Bayes Nash equilibrium.13
Lemma 1. For any NE profile m∗ it holds that κij(m∗) ≤ 0 ∀ i, j ∈ I, j 6= i.
The conflict property together with Lemma 1 implies the result, which is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider an environment 〈I,X,Θ〉. Any social choice function f
that is implementable in NE and satisfies the conflict property is not psychologically
robustly implementable as the desired outcome of the canonical mechanism ΦC.
Proof. Consider the canonical mechanism ΦC . Suppose the true state is θ, such that
m∗ yields the NE outcome x of Φ. Then it holds that pii(m′i,m
∗
−i) ≤ pii(m∗i ,m∗−i)
for any m′i 6= m∗i ∈ Mi of agent i. From Lemma 1, it holds that κrs(m∗) ≤ 0, for
all agents r, s ∈ I, r 6= s. Lemma 1 together with the conflict property imply that
there exists agent i and j such that κij(m
∗) < 0, i.e., in state θ, for agent i we have
x θi x′′, but for agent j we have x ≺θj x′′, such that agent i could have changed the
13For the proof see Lemma 5 in Appendix A of Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012), pp. 47-48, which
can be applied to NE in a straightforward manner.
Chapter 1: Nash Implementation with Reciprocity Preferences 30
outcome of ΦC in favor of agent j.
Consider a profile ξ, where ξji > 0, j 6= i, and ξjk = 0, for all k 6= j, i. Condition
(3) of the conflict property ensures that there exists a message m′′j 6= m∗j ∈ Mj for
agent j that yields outcome x′. This implies κji(m′′j ,m
∗
−j) < 0, i 6= j, since x′ ≺θi x.
But then agent j has an incentive to deviate from the truth-telling message m∗j to
m′′j iff
ξji >
pij(m
∗)− pij(m′′j ,m∗−j)
κij(m∗)[κji(m′′j ,m
∗
−j)− κji(m∗)]
≡ ε¯.
Hence, there always exists a lower bound ε¯ > 0 on the weight ξji such that for ξji > ε¯
the message profile m∗ is not a NFE.
The conflict property together with implementability in NE are jointly sufficient for
non-implementability of a social choice function as a truthful equilibrium outcome in
the canonical mechanism. For certain degrees of the agent’s weights for reciprocity,
it becomes attractive for an agent to punish the other, trading-off material gains for
psychological gains, which destroys the truth-telling NFE.
6 Psychologically robust mechanisms
Are there “psychologically robust” mechanisms, which yield truth-telling as the
unique equilibrium outcome, whatever the agent’s sensitivity for reciprocity? In
this section I analyze the implementation problem demanding that the equilibrium
outcome is robust to any psychologically motivations by the agents, i.e., a NE should
be robust to varying degrees of the individual weights (ξij)i,j∈I,i 6=j. Example 3 of
the previous section demonstrates that in a specific environment all equilibria of
the canonical mechanism are psychologically robust equilibria and they have the
desired outcome. However, in general, a social choice function is not psychologically
robustly implementable in the canonical mechanism.
I establish the result that mechanisms, in which the rules prohibit a single agent
to affect the equilibrium outcome, are psychologically robust, in the sense that any
unanimous message profile is a psychologically robust equilibrium of the mechanism.
I call such mechanisms to be “outcome-robust”. However, outcome-robust mecha-
nisms cannot handle the problem of multiple equilibria. As soon as robustness of
the equilibrium outcome to unilateral deviations is required, a message profile that
is truth-telling in one state continuous to be an equilibrium for all other state, and
the equilibrium outcome need not be unique.
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The next section presents a mechanism that was proposed by Eliaz (2002) for fault-
tolerant implementation. This “fault-tolerant mechanism” is psychologically robust.
Subsequently, Section 6.2 exhibits a general result for outcome-robust mechanisms.
6.1 Robustness and the fault-tolerant mechanism
Eliaz (2002) analyzes the implementation problem allowing that a subset of k > 0
agents may fail to play equilibrium strategies, and establishes that a social choice
function is implementable in a fault-tolerant equilibrium. Fault-tolerant implemen-
tation requires robustness to k-deviations by the agents, which implies that those
agents cannot affect material payoffs in equilibrium. This makes Eliaz’s analysis
interesting for the problem of psychologically robust implementation. A psycholog-
ically robust implementation requires the equilibrium to be robust to deviations of
the agents due to reciprocity, which in turn implies that the agents cannot affect
material payoffs in order to trade-off material gains for psychological ones.
Fault-tolerant mechanism (Eliaz, 2002) Let ΦF = (M, g) denote the fault-
tolerant mechanism: each agent i ∈ I simultaneously proposes a message mi =
(xi, θi, zi), where x ∈ X, θ ∈ Θ and z a non-negative integer. Let K denote a
subset of k “faulty” agents, i.e., these agents behave randomly and may fail to
achieve their optimal strategies, and neither the social planner nor the majority of
non-faulty agents know the identity or exact number of the faulty agents. Suppose
0 < k < N
2
− 1. The outcome function g is defined by the following three rules:
(1) If at least N − k agents send the same message m1 = ... = mN−k = (x, θ), and
x = f(θ), then the outcome is g(m) = x.
(2) If exactly N−k−1 agents send the same message m1 = ... = mN−k−1 = (x, θ),
and x = f(θ), then the outcome is g(m) = x, except if all of the remaining
k + 1 agents announce mN−k = mN = (x′, θ′), with mj 6= mi, for i 6= j, and
i ∈ I \K, j ∈ K with K ⊆ I such that |K| = k + 1, then
(i) g(m) = x′ if for everyone of them x θi x′, i ∈ K;
(ii) g(m) = x otherwise.
(3) Otherwise an integer game is played and g(m) = xi, where i is such that
zi ≥ zj for all i, j ∈ I, i 6= j. In case of ties, g(m) = xi, where xi is the
alternative chosen by agent i, who is the agent with the lowest index among
those agents who announced the highest integer.
Rule (1) of ΦF defines that one agent alone cannot challenge the majority view; rule
(2) adds that only a minority of k+1 can change the outcome. These assumptions are
in contrast to the canonical mechanism, that enables a single agent to challenge the
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outcome.14 If a single agent cannot change the outcome, then her intentions when
choosing one message or another become irrelevant, which implies the equilibrium
to be psychologically robust. However, any unanimous message profile in which the
agents coordinate on an outcome associated with the social choice function is a PRE.
Proposition 5. Consider the fault-tolerant mechanism ΦF , for any k ≥ 1, and
N ≥ 5.15 Any unanimous message profile m with mi = (x, θ), and x = f(θ) is a
PRE.
Proof. Fix an (arbitrary) state θ ∈ Θ. Suppose all agents i ∈ I coordinate on the
same message mi = (x, θ), and fix a state θ ∈ Θ. Since f(θ) = x, rule (1) applies
and g(m) = x. Then the profile m is a PRE: suppose agent i′ 6= i deviates by
announcing some alternative message mDi 6= mi. Then still rule (1) applies and
the outcome remains x. Rule (1) guarantees that the outcome is unaffected by any
unilateral deviation, since it is enough that (N − 1) agents coordinate on the same
message. Hence, m is an equilibrium, for every ξ ∈ [0,∞)N(N−1).
By the rules of ΦF no agent can influence the outcome by a unilateral deviation. This
implies that the agents’ cannot respond to the behavior of others in a reciprocal way.
Hence, any profile in which all N agents coordinate on the same outcome associated
with the SCF f for that state θ is a PRE. If θ is the true state, than the equilibrium
is a truthful psychologically robust equilibrium. However, if θ is not the true state,
then the equilibrium is a untruthful psychologically robust equilibrium. Therefore,
fault-tolerant mechanism has multiple psychologically robust equilibria, implying
that it does not only yield the desired outcome.16
6.2 A general result
The fact that a mechanism does not allow a single agent to change the equilibrium
outcome, implies that reciprocity concerns cannot influence equilibrium behavior,
i.e., the mechanism rules out the possibility to punish unkind or to reward kind be-
havior. Therefore, any Nash equilibrium message profile, which induces the desired
outcome in one state, continues to be an equilibrium in some other state, which,
14Note that for k = 0 the fault-tolerant mechanism is the same as the canonical mechanism.
15By definition, the k-faulty agents are the minority, k < 12N − 1. By Maskin’s Theorem 1 we
need N ≥ 3 agents. Hence, to allow for k ≥ 1, we must have N ≥ 5.
16Eliaz discusses the multiple equilibrium problem, stating that “if all the players are non-faulty
and each plays according to an undesirable NE and each believes that all the other players are non-
faulty as well, then no player would have an incentive to deviate...” (p. 596), so that the outcome of
the mechanism would be a non-truthful equilibrium. However, the multiplicity problem is ruled out
by the introduction of a new solution concept called k-fault tolerant Nash equilibrium (k-FTNE).
k-FTNE requires robustness to k deviations of the agents, so that each agent best responds to the
actions of the (N −k) non-faulty agents, regardless of the identity and actions of the faulty agents.
Hence, k-FTNE is a strong refinement of NE. With the concept of PRE, it has been shown that
the problem of non-uniqueness remains.
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in turn, implies that the equilibrium outcome need not be unique. The following
proposition can be stated.17
Proposition 6. Consider any mechanism Φ with a profile of NE m∗(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ. Let the social choice function f be induced by m∗(θ), i.e., f(θ) = g(m∗(θ)).
If ∃θ′ such that
g(m∗(θ′)) = g(m′i,m
∗
−i(θ
′)), ∀m′i ∈Mi,∀i, (1)
then m∗(θ′) is a PRE in Γθ for all θ ∈ Θ.
Hence, if f is not trivial, i.e., f(θ′) 6= f(θ′′) for some θ′′ ∈ Θ, the equilibrium
outcome of Φ is not unique.
Proof. Fix a mechanism Φ. Let m∗(θ′) be a NE of the game Γθ
′
induced by Φ in
state θ′ with f(θ′) = g(m∗(θ′)) = g(m′i,m
∗
−i(θ
′)), ∀m′i, ∀i. Then m∗(θ′) is clearly
a PRE of Γθ
′
. Consider now any other game Γθ induced by Φ in state θ, with
θ ∈ Θ, θ 6= θ′. Suppose all agents coordinate on m∗(θ′) in Γθ. Since it holds that
g(m∗(θ′)) = g(m′i,m
∗
−i(θ
′)), ∀m′i ∈Mi, ∀i, m∗(θ′) is also a PRE of Γθ.
But since f is non-trivial, we have g(m∗(θ′)) = f(θ′) 6= f(θ′′), for some θ′′ ∈ Θ.
Hence, the equilibrium outcome in Γθ
′′
is not unique.
Hence, condition (1) of Proposition 6 ensures that any NE of a mechanism Φ is a PRE
of that mechanism Φ. However, uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome cannot be
achieved. As soon as the possibility that agents can affect the equilibrium outcome
is shut down, robustness is obtained, but also non-uniqueness.
7 Conclusion
In this study, I incorporated reciprocity preferences into the classic implementation
problem with complete information. Reciprocity captures the agents’ willingness to
trade-off material payoffs and kindness sensations. I adopt Rabin’s (1993) solution
concept of fairness equilibrium, and introduce the notion of Nash fairness imple-
mentation. A social choice function is defined to be Nash fairness implementable,
if in every state of the world, every Nash fairness equilibrium of the game induced
by a mechanism, has the desirable outcome, where the desirable outcome is the one
associated with the social choice function in the true state.
In specific settings, I apply the canonical mechanism, that has been used for Nash
17Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) derive a related result by introducing an “insurance property”
on the SCF, that constitutes – in a Bayesian setting – together with Bayes-Nash implementability,
a sufficient condition on the SCF to be implementable in PRE. Note that they do not require
uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome.
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implementation (Repullo, 1987; Maskin, 1999), to the solution concept of Nash fair-
ness equilibrium.
To sum up the results, I show in three specific settings that (i) a Nash implementable
social choice function is not necessarily Nash fairness implementable in the canoni-
cal mechanism. A small preference for reciprocity can be enough to break down the
truthful equilibrium outcome; (ii) there might be many unwanted equilibrium out-
comes in the canonical mechanism when the agents’ concern for reciprocity are large;
and (iii) it is indeed possible to implement a social choice function in the canoni-
cal mechanism whatever the agents’ concern for reciprocity. Hence, the canonical
mechanism can be the appropriate tool for Nash fairness implementation of a social
choice function, but it need not necessarily be the case if the agents’ preferences for
reciprocity are large.
I derive a property that together with Nash implementability is sufficient for a social
choice function to be not Nash fairness implementable whatever the agents’ concern
for reciprocity. There will be always an upper-bound on the individual weight that
agents’ place on reciprocity, such that for weights above this upper-bound truth-
telling will not be an equilibrium outcome, and there might be undesired equilibrium
outcomes.
At last, I address the psychological robustness of general mechanisms. A mecha-
nism has a psychologically robust equilibrium if a message profile constitutes a Nash
equilibrium irrespective of how much kindness sensations affect the agents’ behav-
ior. I establish that any Nash equilibrium of a mechanism, in which the equilibrium
outcome cannot be changed by a single agent, is also a psychologically robust equi-
librium. However, these mechanisms cannot handle the problem of multiple equi-
lbria, i.e., any message profile that is a truth-telling in one state continuous to be
an equilibrium in all other states, such that the equilibrium outcomes need not be
unique.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Nick Netzer and Armin Schmutzler as well as the seminar par-
ticipants in Zurich for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support of the
Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Chapter 1: Nash Implementation with Reciprocity Preferences 35
Appendix
A.1 The canonical mechanism of Example 1
In the canonical mechanism ΦC = (M, g) of Example 1, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} simulta-
neously sends a message mi = (xi, θi, zi) ∈ Mi, with Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3} the set of states of
the world, X = {x1, x2, x3} the set of alternatives, and Z+ = {0, 1, 2, ...} the set of non-
negative integers. With slight abuse of notation, I write mi = (x, θ) whenever mi = mj
for some arbitrary integer zi.
The outcome function g of ΦC is defined by the following three rules:
(1) If all agents send the same message, i.e.,
(i) if m1 = m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
(ii) if m1 = m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
(iii) if m1 = m2 = m3 = (x3, θ3), then the outcome is g(m) = x3.
(2) If two agents i 6= i′ sent the same message mi = mi′ = (xj , θj), and xj = f(θj),
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then the outcome is g(m) = xj , except if the two agents announce
(i) mi = mi′ = (x1, θ1), and the dissident is
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x13, θ12, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x3;
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x13, θ13, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x3;
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x12, θ13, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
∗ agent 3 who announces m3 = (x32, θ32, z3), then the outcome is g(m) = x2.
(ii) mi = mi′ = (x2, θ2) and the dissident is
∗ agent 3 who announces m3 = (x31, θ33, z3), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
∗ agent 3 who announces m3 = (x31, θ31, z3), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
∗ agent 3 who announces m3 = (x33, θ31, z3), then the outcome is g(m) = x3;
∗ agent 2 who announces m2 = (x23, θ23, z2), then the outcome is g(m) = x3.
(iii) mi = mi′ = (x3, θ3) and the dissident is
∗ agent 2 who announces m2 = (x22, θ21, z2), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
∗ agent 2 who announces m2 = (x22, θ22, z2), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
∗ agent 2 who announces m2 = (x21, θ22, z2), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x11, θ11, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x1.
(3) In all other cases, an integer game is played and the outcome is the alternative
chosen by the agent who announces the highest integer. In case of ties, the outcome
is the alternative chosen by the agent with the lowest index among those agents who
announced the highest integer.
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A.2 The canonical mechanism of Example 3
In the canonical mechanism ΦC = (M, g) of Example 3, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} simul-
taneously sends a message mi = (xi, θi, zi) ∈ Mi, with Θ = {θ1, θ2} the set of states of
the world, X = {x1, x2, x3} the set of alternatives, and Z+ = {0, 1, 2, ...} the set of non-
negative integers. With slight abuse of notation, I write mi = (x, θ) whenever mi = mj
for some arbitrary integer zi.
The outcome function g of ΦC is defined by the following three rules:
(1) If all agents send the same message, i.e.,
(i) if m1 = m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
(ii) if m1 = m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
(2) If two agents i 6= i′ sent the same message mi = mi′ = (xj , θj), and xj = f(θj),
j ∈ {1, 2}, then the outcome is g(m) = xj , except if the two agents announce
(i) mi = mi′ = (x1, θ1), and the dissident is
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x12, θ12, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x2;
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x13, θ12, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x3;
(ii) mi = mi′ = (x2, θ2) and the dissident is
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x11, θ11, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x1;
∗ agent 1 who announces m1 = (x13, θ11, z1), then the outcome is g(m) = x3;
(3) In all other cases, an integer game is played and the outcome is the alternative
chosen by the agent who announces the highest integer. In case of ties, the outcome
is the alternative chosen by the agent with the lowest index among those agents who
announced the highest integer.
Chapter 1: Nash Implementation with Reciprocity Preferences 37
A.3 Proofs
In the following, with slight abuse of notation, I write mi = (x, θ) whenever mi = mj for
some arbitrary integer zi.
A.3.1 Monotonicity and NVP in Example 1
Claim 1 (Monotonicity). The SCF f of Example 1 satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Fix two states θk, θk′ ∈ Θ, k 6= k′, and k, k′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By definition f(θk) = xk.
Since the outcome xk is excluded from f when moving from state θk to another state θk′ ,
there must be preference reversal for at least one agent. Consider agent i ∈ I. We have
xk θki xk′ , but xk ≺θk′i xk′ , which satisfies the requirement of preference reversal.
Claim 2 (NVP). The SCF f of Example 1 satisfies NVP.
Proof. Since in each state θk ∈ Θ, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, each agent top-ranks a different alternative,
and f(θk) = xk, NVP is trivially satisfied.
A.3.2 Monotonicity and NVP in Example 3
Claim 3 (Monotonicity). The SCF f of Example 3 satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. By definition f(θk) = xk, k ∈ {1, 2}, and outcome xk is excluded from f when
moving from state θ1 to state θ2 (or vice versa). Then there must be preference reversal
for at least one agent. Consider agent 1. We have x1 θ11 x2, but x1 ≺θ21 x2, which satisfies
the requirement of preference reversal. q.e.d.
Claim 4 (NVP). The SCF f of Example 3 satisfies NVP.
Proof. In each state θk ∈ Θ, k ∈ {1, 2}, (N − 1) agents top-rank the same alternative xk,
and f(θk) = xk, such that NVP is satisfied. q.e.d.
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A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 will proceed through a number of lemmas. For convenience,
I denote the message of agent i by mi = (xij , θ
i
k, z
i), where i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For purpose
of clarity, let θ1 be the true state – the symmetry among agent’s preferences can later be
exploited to generalize the results for each of the three states being the true state.
Lemma 1. Let θ1 be the true state. Under the truth-telling message profile m∗ with
m∗i = (x
i
1, θ
i
1, z
i) ∈ Mi, for all pairs of agents, at least one of them is kindness neutral in
equilibrium, hence
U1(m∗) = pi1(m∗) = H, U2(m∗) = pi2(m∗) = L, U3(m∗) = pi3(m∗) = M.
Proof. Suppose all three agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3} announce the truth, m∗i = (x1, θ1). Since
f(θ1) = x1, the outcome is x1. The corresponding monetary payoffs of the agents are
pi1 = H, pi2 = L, and pi3 = δH+(1−δ)L = M . In order to determine the reciprocity payoff,
first the equitable payoffs and kindness terms of all agents are computed, maintaining
bilaterally Pareto efficiency within the set of feasible strategies. The equitable payoff,
pieii′ ((m
∗
ii′)i′ 6=i), for agent i
′ from the perspective of agent i, given truth-telling of the others
with i, i′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
pie21 (m
∗
1,m
∗
3) =
1
2
[H +H] = H;
pie31 (m
∗
1,m
∗
2) =
1
2
[H +H] = H;
pie12 (m
∗
2,m
∗
3) =
1
2
[H + L];
pie32 (m
∗
2,m
∗
1) =
1
2
[H + L];
pie13 (m
∗
3,m
∗
2) =
1
2
[H +M ];
pie23 (m
∗
3,m
∗
1) =
1
2
[M +M ] = M.
E.g., consider pie12 (m
∗
2,m
∗
3) and pi
e1
3 (m
∗
3,m
∗
2). Agent 1 (since she is a test agent) potentially
can induce either outcome x3 or x2 (see rule 2 (i) in Appendix A.1). Alternative x2 (x3) is
top-ranked for agent 2 (3), which would result in her highest material payoff, respectively.
Since both x2 and x3 make agent 1 herself worse off, the lowest payoff agent 1 can give to
agent 3 is M ; agent 2 already receives her lowest payoff = L. Since the equitable payoff
is the average between the minimum and maximum payoff agent 1 can potentially give to
each agent, we have pie12 (m
∗
2,m
∗
3) =
1
2 [H + L] and pi
e1
3 (m
∗
3,m
∗
2) =
1
2 [H +M ].
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Agent i’s belief about her own kindness towards agent i′, κii′(mi,m−i) = pii′(mi,m−i) −
pieii′ ((m
∗
ii′)i′ 6=i) can be calculated as follows:
κ12(m∗) = λ212(m∗) = L− 12[H + L] =
1
2
(L−H) < 0;
κ13(m∗) = λ313(m∗) = M − 12[H +M ] =
1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0;
κ21(m∗) = λ121(m∗) = H −H = 0;
κ23(m∗) = λ323(m∗) = M −M = 0;
κ31(m∗) = λ131(m∗) = H −H = 0;
κ32(m∗) = λ232(m∗) = L− 12(H + L) =
1
2
(L−H) < 0.
Then, the fairness utility for each agent i, Ui(m∗) = pii(m∗) +
∑
i 6=i′ ξii′κii′(m
∗)λii′i(m∗)
is given as
U1(m∗) = pi1(m∗) = H, U2(m∗) = pi2(m∗) = L, U3(m∗) = pi3(m∗) = M.
The fairness utilities coincide with the (pure) material payoffs, i.e., the fairness components
drop out of the agents’ utilities, because in each pair at least one agent is kindness neutral.
Lemma 2. Let θ1 be the true state. Given the truth-telling message profile m∗, there exists
a message mDi for agent 1 and agent 3, but not for agent 2, such that Ui(m
D
i ,m
∗
−i) 6=
Ui(m∗). In particular, for agent 1
- U1(mD1 ,m
∗
2,m
∗
3) = L, if m
D
1 = (x
1
3, θ
1
2, z
1);
- U1(mD1 ,m
∗
2,m
∗
3) = L, if m
D
1 = (x
1
3, θ
1
3, z
1);
- U1(mD1 ,m
∗
2,m
∗
3) = M , if m
D
1 = (x
1
2, θ
1
2, z
1);
and for agent 3
- U3(m∗1,m∗2,mD3 ) = L+ ξ31
1
4(M −H)2, if mD3 = (x32, θ32, z3).
Proof. Given the truth-telling message m∗i = (x
i
1, θ
i
1, z
i) of agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Consider a
unilateral deviation of agent i from m∗i .
(i) Deviation by agent 1. Consistent with rule 2 of ΦC (see Appendix A.1), agent 1 has
three options to change the outcome of ΦC :
(1) If agent 1 sends the message mD11 = (x
1
3, θ
1
2, z
1), then the outcome of ΦC
changes to g(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) = x3. Outcome x3 results in a strict worsening com-
pared to the truth-telling outcome for agent 1, pi1(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) = L < H, but
a strict improvement for both, agent 2 and 3, who receive pi2(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) = M
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and pi3(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) = H, respectively. Determining kindness, we have
κ12(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) =M −
1
2
(H + L) = (δ − 1
2
)(H − L) > 0, if δ > 1
2
;
κ13(mD11 ,m
∗
−i) =H −
1
2
(H +M) =
1
2
(1− δ)(H − L) > 0.
Note that agent 1’s belief about her kindness towards agent 2 does depend on
δ. That is, not only the smaller the spread between the best and intermediate
outcome, or the larger the spread between the intermediate and worst outcome
(the higher δ), the more agent 1 beliefs to be kind towards agent 2. For the
critical value δ = 12 , agent 1 is kindness neutral towards agent 2; as soon as
δ > 12 agent 1 thinks to be kind to agent 2, otherwise she thinks to be unkind.
(2) If agent 1 sends the message mD21 = (x
1
3, θ
1
3, z
1), then the outcome of ΦC
changes to g(mD21 ,m
∗
−i) = x3. Payoffs and kindness terms are similar to those
in (1).
(3) If agent 1 sends the message mD31 = (x
1
2, θ
1
2, z
1), then the outcome changes
to g(mD31 ,m
∗
−i) = x2. Outcome x2 results in a strict worsening for both,
agent 1 and agent 3, pi1(mD31 ,m
∗
−i) = M < H and pi3(m
D3
1 ,m
∗
−i) = L < M ,
respectively, and in a strict improvement for agent 2, pi2(mD31 ,m
∗
−i) = H. The
corresponding kindness terms are
κ12(mD31 ,m
∗
−i) =H −
1
2
(H + L) =
1
2
(H − L) > 0;
κ13(mD31 ,m
∗
−i) =L−
1
2
(H + L) =
1
2
(L−H) < 0.
In all cases (1)-(3), agent 1’s beliefs regarding the kindness of agent 2 and 3 do not
change and are similar to the ones under truth-telling, i.e., λ121(m∗) = λ131(m∗) = 0.
Hence, agent 1’s fairness utility after deviation from truth-telling is
UD1 (m
D
1 ,m
∗
−i) =
{
L, if (1) or (2);
M, if (3).
Agent 1’s fairness utility after deviation is independent of any reciprocity compo-
nents and coincides with the material payoff. Since U1(m∗) = H > U1(mD1 ,m∗2,m∗3),
there does not exist a “profitable” deviation from truth-telling by agent 1.
(ii) Deviation by agent 2. Agent 2 receives her worst alternative from truth-telling. By
rule 2 of ΦC (see Appendix A.1) she cannot change the outcome by a unilateral
deviation. Thus, U2(m∗1,mD2 ,m∗3) = U2(m∗) = L.
(iii) Deviation by agent 3. Suppose agent 3 unilaterally deviates from truth-telling by
announcing mD3 = (x
3
2, θ
3
2, z
3). Then, by rule 2 of ΦC (see Appendix A.1), the
outcome changes to x2. Outcome x2 results in monetary payoffs of pi1(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) =
M , pi2(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) = H, and pi3(m
D
3 ,m
∗
−i) = L. This is a strict worsening for agent 1
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and 3, but a strict improvement for agent 2. The kindness terms are
κ31(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) = M −
1
2
[H +M ] =
1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0;
κ32(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) = H −
1
2
[H + L] =
1
2
(H − L) > 0.
Further, λ131(m∗) = 12(1− δ)(L−H) < 0, λ232(m∗) = 0, λ313(m∗) = 12(1− δ)(L−
H) < 0, and λ323(m∗) = 0. Hence, we have
U3(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) = L+ ξ31
1
4
(1− δ)2(H − L)2 > L if ξ31 > 0.
Here, for some ξ31 > 0, agent 3 receives a positive reciprocity payoff in addition to
her material payoff.
Lemma 3. Let θ1 be the true state. Then,
(i) agent 1 and 2 never have an incentive to deviate from truth-telling, for any ξ ∈
[0,∞)6;
(ii) agent 3 has no incentive to deviate from truth-telling if and only if 0 ≤ ξ31 ≤ ε1
with ε1 = δ(1−δ)2
4
(H−L) .
Hence, the truth-telling message profile m∗ is a NFE if and only if ξ31 ≤ ε1.
Proof. Comparing fairness utilities, agents 1 and 2 both have no incentive to deviate from
truth-telling, since U1(mD1 ,m
∗
−i) < U1(m
∗) and U2(mD2 ,m∗−i) = U2(m
∗), respectively.
However, agent 3 has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling for certain values of ξ31.
That is,
U3(mD3 ,m
∗
−i) ≥ U3(m∗) ⇐⇒ L+ ξ31
1
4
(1− δ)2(L−H)2 ≥M
⇐⇒ ξ31 ≥ δ(1− δ)2
4
(H − L) .
Agent 3 does not deviate from truth-telling if and only if 0 ≤ ξ31 ≤ δ(1−δ)2 4(H−L) . Thus,
there is an upper-bound on agent 3’s reciprocity weight ξ31. If ξ31 > δ(1−δ)2
4
(H−L) , then
m∗ is not a NFE.
Lemma 4. Let θ1 be the true state and consider the message profile m with m1 = m2 =
m3 = (xk, θk), and k ∈ {2, 3}. Then m is not a NFE, for all ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Proof. Suppose all three agents untruthfully announce the same message, m 6= m∗ with
mi = (xk, θk), k ∈ {2, 3}. Then rule 1 of ΦC (see Appendix A.1) applies and g(m) =
f(θk) = xj . For agent 1 or agent 3 the outcome results in the lowest material payoff.
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Focus on agent 3. If mi = (x2, θ2) for all agents i ∈ I, then pi3(m) = L, pi2(m) = H,
pi1(m) = M . The relevant kindness terms for agent 3 are
κ31(m) = λ131(m) = M − 12(H + L) = (δ −
1
2
)(H − L);
κ32(m) = λ232(m) = H − 12(H + L) =
1
2
(H − L);
κ13(m) = λ313(m) = L− L = 0;
κ23(m) = λ323(m) = L− 12(H + L) =
1
2
(L−H).
Then agent 3’s fairness utility can be calculated as
U3(m) = L− ξ32 14(H − L)
2.
Unilateral deviation A potential deviation strategy of agent 3 is to announce mD3 =
(x33, θ
3
3, z
3). Given the fixed strategies of agent 1 and 2, m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2), rule 2 of
ΦC applies and the outcome of ΦC changes to x3. Material payoffs are pi1(mD3 ,m−i) = L,
pi2(mD3 ,m−i) = M , and pi3(mD3 ,m−i) = H. Whereas agent 3’s beliefs regarding the
kindness of agent 1 and 2 do not change, λ313(m) = 0, and λ323(m) = 12(L − H) < 0,
agent 3’s own kindness towards the others does,
κ31(mD3 ,m−i) = L−
1
2
(H + L) =
1
2
(L−H);
κ32(mD3 ,m−i) = M −
1
2
(H + L) = (H − L)(δ − 1
2
).
Then agent 3’s fairness utility after deviation is
U3(mD3 ,m−i) = H − ξ32
1
2
(δ − 1
2
)(H − L)2.
Comparing fairness utilities, it follows
U3(mD3 ,m−i) > U3(m) ⇐⇒
δ − 1
2
<
1
ξ32(H − L) .
The result will apply similarly if the focus is on agent 1, assuming m1 = m2 = m3 =
(x3, θ3). Hence, the profile m = ((x12, θ
1
2, z
1), (x22, θ
2
2, z
2), (x32, θ
3
2, z
3)) as well as the profile
m = ((x13, θ
1
3, z
1), (x23, θ
2
3, z
2), (x33, θ
3
3, z
3)) cannot be NFE.
Lemma 5. Let θ1 be the true state and consider a message profile m with mi = mi′ 6= mi′′,
such that rule 2 of ΦC applies. Then m is not a NFE, for all ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Proof. Suppose two agents i 6= i′ announce the same message, mi = mi′ = (xk, θk),
with k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, such that f(θk) = xk, but agent i′′ announces mi′′ 6= mi, such that the
outcome of ΦC will be determined by rule 2 (see Appendix A.1). For each possible strategy
profile it needs to be proven that at least one agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
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from her announced message.
In the following all possible strategy profiles and corresponding outcomes are listed. Note
that in brackets on the right side the rank of the resulting outcome for a corresponding
agent are identified. In particular, the left entry identifies the outcome to result in the
intermediate material payoff, M , or in the worst material payoff, L, for a particular agent
i, identified by the right entry. This classification will be used later in the proof.
(1) m1 = m2 6= m3 with
(a) m1 = m2 = (x1, θ1) and m3 = (x32, θ
3
3, z
3) → g(m) = x2 [M,1]
(b) m1 = m2 = (x1, θ1) and m3 6= (x32, θ32, z3) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(c) m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2) and m
(1)
3 = (x
3
1, θ
3
3, z
3) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(d) m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2) and m
(2)
3 = (x
3
1, θ
3
1, z
3) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(e) m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2) and m
(3)
3 = (x
3
3, θ
3
1, z
3) → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(f) m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2) and m3 6= m(1)3 ,m(2)3 ,m(3)3 → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
(g) m1 = m2 = (x3, θ3) and m3 arbitrary → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(2) m1 = m3 6= m2 with
(a) m1 = m3 = (x2, θ2) and m2 = (x23, θ
2
3, z
2) → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
(b) m1 = m3 = (x2, θ2) and m2 6= (x23, θ23, z2) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(c) m1 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m
(1)
2 = (x
2
2, θ
2
1, z
2) → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
(d) m1 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m
(2)
2 = (x
2
1, θ
2
2, z
2) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(e) m1 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m
(3)
2 = (x
2
2, θ
2
2, z
2) → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
(f) m1 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m2 6= m(1)2 ,m(2)2 ,m(3)2 → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(g) m1 = m3 = (x1, θ1) and m2 arbitrary → g(m) = x1 [M,3]
(3) m2 = m3 6= m1 with
(a) m2 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m1 = (x11, θ
1
1, z
1) → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(b) m2 = m3 = (x3, θ3) and m1 6= (x11, θ11, z1) → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(c) m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1) and m
(1)
1 = (x
1
3, θ
1
2, z
1) → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(d) m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1) and m
(2)
1 = (x
1
2, θ
1
3, z
1) → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
(e) m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1) and m
(3)
1 = (x
1
3, θ
1
3, z
1) → g(m) = x3 [L,1]
(f) m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1) and m1 6= m(1)1 ,m(2)1 ,m(3)1 → g(m) = x1 [L,2]
(g) m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2) and m1 arbitrary → g(m) = x2 [L,3]
Given the strategy profiles, it can be shown that in each case at least one agent has an
incentive to deviate from her announcement. Since the incentive to deviate depends on the
outcome the agents receive, two cases can be separated, focussing on the agents who (i)
get the intermediate material payoff (cases (1a) and (2g)), or (ii) get the lowest material
payoff (all remaining cases). The particular agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate,
eliciting the integer game. This is shown by an example for each of the two cases.
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Case (i): Profile (1a). Suppose the strategy profilem = ((x11, θ
1
1, z
1), (x21, θ
2
1, z
2), (x32, θ
3
2, z
3))
is a NFE. The mechanism’s outcome is g(m) = x2, which results in the material payoffs
pi1(m) = M , pi2(m) = H, and pi3(m) = L, i.e., agent 1 gets the intermediate payoff.
Calculating the equitable payoffs, one need to be careful to guarantee bilateral efficiency
among strategies. It is always possible for the agent to induce the integer game such
that the maximum (potential) payoff, that she could have given to the other agents, coin-
cides with their best payoff. But the minimum (potential) payoff must not always equal
the worst payoff, if this would make both agents worse off in a bilateral Pareto sense.
Straightforward calculation then lead to the relevant equitable payoff for agent 1, that are
pie12 (m2,m3) =
1
2
[H + L]; pie13 (m3,m2) =
1
2
[H + L];
pie21 (m1,m3) =
1
2
[H +M ]; pie31 (m1,m2) =
1
2
[H +M ].
Then, agent 1’s kindness towards agents 2 and 3 is
κ12(m) =
1
2
(H − L) > 0, and κ13(m) = 12(L−H) < 0,
with corresponding beliefs about the kindness of agent 2 and 3
λ121(m) =
1
2
(1− δ)(L−H) < 0, and λ131(m) = 12(1− δ)(L−H) < 0.
Hence, agent 1’s fairness utility is
U1(m) = M − (H − L)2 14(1− δ)[ξ12 + ξ13].
Suppose now agent 1 unilaterally deviates by announcing mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1) with z1 >
z2, z3. Then the outcome - by the integer game - changes to x1, resulting in piD1 = H.
Kindness is determined as
κ12(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2
(L−H), and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) = (δ −
1
2
)(H − L).
Then agent 1’s fairness utility after deviation is
UD1 (m
D
1 ,m−i) = H + (H − L)2
1
2
(1− δ)[1
2
ξ12 − (δ − 12)ξ13],
which always exceeds her fairness utility before,
U1(mD1 ,m−i) > U1(m) ⇐⇒ H −M > −(H − L)2
1
2
(1− δ)[ξ12 + ξ13(1− δ)].
Case (ii): Profile (1d). Suppose the strategy profilem = ((x12, θ
1
2, z
1), (x22, θ
2
2, z
2), (x31, θ
3
1, z
3))
is a NFE. The outcome of the mechanism is g(m) = x1, and material payoffs are pi1(m) =
H, pi2(m) = L, and pi3(m) = M , i.e., agent 2 receives the lowest payoff. The relevant
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equitable payoffs for agent 2 are
pie21 (m1,m3) = pi
e2
3 (m1,m3) = pi
e1
2 (m2,m3) = pi
e3
2 (m1,m2) =
1
2
(H + L).
Then, agent 2’s kindness towards agents 1 and 3 is
κ21(m) =
1
2
(H − L), and κ23(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0,
and her associated beliefs about the others kindness towards herself are
λ212(m) =
1
2
(H − L) and λ232(m) = 12(L−H).
Hence, agent 2’s fairness utility is calculated as
U2(m) = L− (H − L)2[14ξ21 +
1
2
(δ − 1
2
)ξ23].
However, agent 2 can do better. Given m1 = (x12, θ
1
2, z
1), and m3 = (x31, θ
3
1, z
3), agent
2 has an incentive to deviate to mD2 = (x
2
2, θ
2
2, z
2) with z2 > z1, z3. Then the integer
game takes place and agent 2 wins in the sense that the outcome changes to be x2 (and
pi2(mD2 ,m−i) = H). Hence,
κ21(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2
(1− δ)(L−H), and κ23(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2
(H − L).
Then agent 2’s fairness utility after deviation is
U2(mD2 ,m−i) = H + (H − L)2[
1
4
(1− δ)ξ21 + 14ξ23].
which always exceeds her fairness utility before, since
U2(mD2 ,m−i) > U2(m) ⇐⇒ 1 > −(H − L)[
1
4
ξ21(2− δ) + 12δξ23].
Lemma 6. Let θ1 be the true state. Any message profile m such that rule (3) applies is
not a NFE, for all ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Proof. Suppose all three agents announce different states and/or outcomes, such that the
integer game takes play. By the cyclical order of preferences among agents, there will be
always one agent i for whom the outcome is bad in the sense that it results in her lowest
material payoff. In her eyes at least one of the other agent’s was unkind, since they could
have announced a lower integer or agent i’s favorite outcome. Suppose m1 6= m2 6= m3
and m1 = (x11, θ
1
1, z
1) with z1 > z2, z3. By rule 3 of ΦC (see Appendix A.1), agent 1 wins
the integer game, and outcome x1 is implemented, which is the one that yields the highest
material payoff for herself, pi1(m) = H. Consider agent 2 for whom outcome x1 yields the
Chapter 1: Nash Implementation with Reciprocity Preferences 46
lowest material payoff, pi2(m) = L, and
κ12(m) =
1
2
(L−H) < 0, and κ32(m) = 12(L−H) < 0.
However, agent 2 is kind towards agent 1, and unkind towards agent 3 iff δ < 12 ,
κ21(m) =
1
2
(H − L) > 0,
κ23(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) < 0, iff δ <
1
2
.
Hence, agent 2’s fairness utility is determined as
U2(m) = L− ξ21 14(H − L)
2 − ξ23 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2.
Consider the unilateral deviation mD2 = (x
2
2, θ
2
1, z
2), with z2 > z1, z3, by agent 2 such that
her favorite outcome x2 is implemented. Then,
κ23(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2
(L−H) < 0,
κ21(mD2 ,m−i) = (δ −
1
2
)(H − L) < 0, iff δ < 1
2
.
The fairness utility after deviation is
UD2 (m
D
2 ,m−i) = H − ξ21
1
2
(δ − 1
2
)(H − L)2 + ξ23 14(H − L)
2,
which strictly exceeds the one before, U2(mD2 ,m−i) > U2(m). Hence, agent 2 always
has an incentive to deviate in the integer game. Note that the result does not depend
on whether the agent who wins the integer game actually announced an alternative that
yields the lowest material payoff for herself. E.g., suppose that m1 6= m2 6= m3 and
m1 = (x13, θ
1
1, z
1) with z1 > z2, z3, such that outcome x3 will be implemented by rule 3 of
ΦC . Again, agent 1 wins the integer game, but the outcome x3 actually yields the lowest
material payoff for herself, pi1(m) = L. By the same logic as above, agent 1 always has an
incentive to deviate, announcing the message m1 = (x11, θ
1
1, z
1) with z1 > z2, z3 such that
her favorite outcome will be implemented.
The results hold for each agent and state. Thus, there is no equilibrium of the integer
game.
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A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose θ1 is the true state. If all agents coordinate on the same outcome associated
with the SCF by announcing m∗i = (x1, θ1), i ∈ I, then the outcome is x1. Since x1 is
top-ranked by all agents, and since strategies must be bilaterally Pareto efficient, we have
κii′(m∗i ,m
∗
−i) = 0 for all i, i
′ ∈ I, i 6= i′, which implies Ui(m∗) = pii(m∗) = H. No agent has
an incentive to deviate to any other message mDi 6= m∗i , since by deviation piDi (mDi ,mD−i) <
pii(m∗) and since λii′i(m∗) = 0 for all i, i′ ∈ I, i 6= i′, so that any deviation will result
in a fairness utility lower than the fairness utility from truth-telling: UDi (m
D
i ,m
∗
−i) =
piDi (m
D
i ,m
D
−i) < Ui(m
∗). Thus, the truth-telling message profile m∗ is a NFE, for every
ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Now, assume that all agents coordinate on the same but untruthful message profile m˜ 6=
m∗, with m˜i = (x2, θ2), such that each agent announces her least preferred alternative
(in the true state θ1). Since f(θ2) = x2, rule (1) applies and the outcome is x2, which
yields the minimum material payoff for every agent, pii(m˜) = L. All agents are as unkind
as possible towards one another, since the equitable payoff coincides with the maximum
material payoff, i.e., the minimum payoff agent i can give to another agent i′ isH, otherwise
strategies are not bilaterally Pareto efficient. In particular, we have pieii′ (mi,mi′′) =
1
2(H+
H) = H, and κii′(m˜) = (L −H) < 0, for all i, i′ ∈ I, i 6= i′. Hence, the fairness utility is
Ui(m˜) = L+
∑
i′ 6=i ξii′(H − L)2.
Consider two possible deviation strategies. First, consider the possible unilateral deviation
m˜D1i = (x
i
3, θ
i
2, z
i) by agent i ∈ I, such that the outcome will change to x3. By this
deviation, agent i is unkind towards both other agents, κii′(m˜D1i , m˜−i) = κii′′(m˜
D1
i , m˜−i) =
(1 − δ)(L − H) < 0. Given beliefs, agent i’s fairness utility becomes Ui(m˜D1i , m˜−i) =
M +
∑
i′ 6=i ξii′(1− δ)(H −L)2, for all i, i′ ∈ I, i 6= i′. Comparing fairness utilities, we have
Ui(m˜) ≥ Ui(m˜D1i , m˜−i) iff
∑
i′ 6=i
ξii′ ≥ 1(H − L) .
Second, consider the possible unilateral deviation m˜D2i = (x
i
1, θ
i
1, z
i) by agent i, such that
the outcome will change to x1. By this deviation, agent i is now kindness-neutral towards
agent i′ and agent i′′, i.e., by the same reason as before, the equitable payoff coincides with
the highest material payoff, hence κii′(m˜D2i , m˜−i) = κii′′(m˜
D2
i , m˜−i) = H− 12(H +H) = 0.
Given beliefs, agent i’s fairness utility now becomes Ui(m˜D2i , m˜−i) = H, for all i, i
′ ∈ I,
i 6= i′. Again, comparing fairness utilities we have
Ui(m˜) ≥ Ui(m˜D2i , m˜−i) iff
∑
i′ 6=i
ξii′ ≥ 1(H − L) .
Hence, iff
∑
i′ 6=i ξii′ ≥ 1(H−L) , then m˜ is a NFE.

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A.3.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 will proceed through a number of lemmas. Again, for purpose
of clarity let θ1 represent the true state. The symmetry among agent’s preferences allows
us to generalize the results for θ2 being the true state. Note that the intermediate payoff
M is defined for δ ∈ (12 , 1).
Lemma 7. Let θ1 be the true state. Then the truth-telling message profile m∗ with m∗i =
(xi1, θ
i
1, z
i) ∈Mi is a PRE.
Proof. W.o.l.g. let xH denote the alternative which is top-ranked in an agent’s prefer-
ence ordering, and xL the alternative that is lowest-ranked. If all agents announce the
truth, m∗i = (x1, θ1), for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then rule 1 of ΦC (see Appendix A.2) ap-
plies and the outcome is g(m∗) = x1, with x1 = xH for agent 1 and 2, and x1 = xL
for agent 3; further, we have κ12(m∗) = κ21(m∗) = κ31(m∗) = κ32(m∗) = 0, implying
Ui(m∗) = pi∗i (m
∗), for all agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, in particular U1(m∗) = U2(m∗) = H, and
U3(m∗) = L. Then, no agent has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling for all ξii′ ∈
[0,∞)6. Suppose agent i announces mDi 6= m∗. Since beliefs are λ121(m∗) = λ131(m∗) =
λ212(m∗) = λ232(m∗) = 0, we have U1(mD1 ,m∗2,m∗3) = pi1(mD1 ,m∗2,m∗3) < U1(m∗), and
U2(m∗1,mD2 ,m∗3) = pi2(m∗1,mD2 ,m∗3) < U2(m∗). Consider therefore agent 3. However, since
x1 = xL for agent 3, she cannot change the equilibrium outcome by the rules of ΦC .
Hence, for any message mD3 6= m∗3, we have κ31(m∗1,m∗2,mD3 ) = κ32(m∗1,m∗2,mD3 ) = 0, and
thus U3(mD3 ,m
∗
1,m
∗
2) = pi3(m
D
3 ,m
∗
1,m
∗
2) = L = U3(m
∗).
Lemma 8. Let θ1 be the true state and consider the message profile m with m1 = m2 =
m3 = (x2, θ2). Then m is not a NFE, for all ξ ∈ [0,∞)6.
Proof. Suppose all three agents untruthfully announce the same message, m 6= m∗ with
mi = (x2, θ2), such that rule 1 of ΦC (see Appendix A.2) applies. Then g(m) = f(θ2) =
x2, and material payoffs are pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and pi3(m) = H. The kindness
terms are determined as κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, κ13(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, and
κ21(m) = κ23(m) = κ31(m) = κ32(m) = 0. This implies that each agent’s fairness utility
equals the material payoff, i.e., Ui(m) = pii(m).
Consider now a possible deviation by agent 1 to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1), such that the outcome
will change to x1. Since alternative x1 results in a material payoff of pi1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = H
for agent 1, and since beliefs are zero, it holds that U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = pi1(m
D
1 ,m2,m3) =
H > L = pi1(m) = U1(m), implying that the profile m cannot be a NFE.
Lemma 9. Let θ1 be the true state and consider a message profile m with mi = mi′ 6= mi′′
such that rule 2 of ΦC applies. Then, any profile m˜ with m˜1 = m˜2 = (x1, θ1) 6= m˜3 is a
PRE with outcome g(m˜) = g(m∗) = x1.
Proof. Suppose two agents i 6= i′ announce the same message, mi = mi′ = (xk, θk),
k ∈ {1, 2}, but the third agent i′′ announces mi′′ 6= mi such that rule 2 of ΦC (see
Appendix A.2 applies. In particular, the possible strategy profiles and corresponding
outcomes are
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(a) mi = mi′ = (x1, θ1) 6= mi′′
(1) m1 = m2 6= m3 and m3 arbitrary → g(m) = x1
(2) m1 = m3 6= m2 and m2 arbitrary → g(m) = x1
(3) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m(1)1 = (x12, θ12, z1) → g(m) = x2
(4) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m(2)1 = (x13, θ12, z1) → g(m) = x3
(5) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m1 6= m(1)1 ,m(2)1 → g(m) = x1
(b) mi = mi′ = (x2, θ2) 6= mi′′
(1) m1 = m2 6= m3 and m3 arbitrary → g(m) = x2
(2) m1 = m3 6= m2 and m2 arbitrary → g(m) = x2
(3) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m(1)1 = (x11, θ11, z1) → g(m) = x1
(4) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m(2)1 = (x13, θ11, z1) → g(m) = x3
(5) m2 = m3 6= m1 and m1 6= m(1)1 ,m(2)1 → g(m) = x2
Case (a). Consider the case when two agents announce the same message mi = mi′ =
(x1, θ1) 6= mi′′ . In particular,
(1) if m1 = m2 = (x1, θ1) 6= m3, with m3 arbitrary, then the outcome is x1. The sit-
uation is similar to the one in Lemma 7. Agent 3 cannot change the outcome by
the rules of ΦC , such that it does not make a difference which strategy she chooses.
Hence, fairness utilities from m also coincide with the material payoffs for each
agent; and no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from m for each ξii′ ∈
[0,∞)6, since U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = pi1(mD1 ,m2,m3) < U1(m), and U2(m1,mD2 ,m3) =
pi2(m1,mD2 ,m3) < U2(m), and U3(m
D
3 ,m1,m2) = pi3(m3,m1,m2) = L = U3(m).
Thus, the outcome under m coincides with the one under the truth-telling equilib-
rium message profile m∗.
(2) if m1 = m3 = (x1, θ1) 6= m2, with m2 arbitrary, then the outcome is x1. Material
payoffs are pi1(m) = pi2(m) = H, and pi3(m) = L; and kindness terms are κ12(m) =
0, κ13(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ21(m) = 0, κ23(m) = 12δ(L − H) < 0, κ31(m) =
κ32(m) = 12(H − L) > 0. Consider agent 3 with
U3(m) = L− ξ31 14(H − L)
2 − ξ32 14δ(H − L)
2.
Then agent 3 has an incentive to deviate to mD3 = (x
3
2, θ
3
2, z
3), with z3 > z1, z2,
inducing the integer game such that the outcome changes to x2: pi3(mD3 ,m−i) = H,
and κ31(mD3 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, and κ32(mD3 ,m−i) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, such
that
U3(m1,m2,mD3 ) = H + ξ31
1
4
(H − L)2 − ξ32 12δ(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 > U3(m).
(3) if m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1), but m1 = (x12, θ
1
2, z
1), then the outcome is x2. Outcome
x2 results in material payoffs pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and pi3(m) = H; and
kindness terms are κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, κ13(m) = 12(L − H) < 0,
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κ21(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ23(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ31(m) = 12(L − H) < 0,
κ32(m) = 12(1− δ)(H + L) > 0. Consider agent 1 with
U1(m) = L− ξ12 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 + ξ13 14(H − L)
2.
Then agent 1 has an incentive to deviate to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1), such that the outcome
changes to x1: pi1(mD1 ,m−i) = H, and κ12(mD1 ,m−i) = 0, and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = H + ξ13
1
4
(H − L)2 > U1(m).
(4) if m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1), but m1 = (x13, θ
1
2, z
1), then the outcome is x3. Outcome
x3 results in material payoffs pi1(m) = pi3(m) = M , and pi2(m) = L; and kindness
terms are κ12(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ13(m) = κ21(m) = κ23(m) = κ31(m) =
(δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, and κ32(m) = 12(L−H) < 0. Consider agent 2 with
U2(m) = L− (ξ21 + ξ23)12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2.
Then agent 2 has an incentive to deviate to mD2 = (x
2
1, θ
2
1, z
2), with z2 > z1, z2 such
that the integer game takes place and the outcome changes to x1: pi2(mD2 ,m−i) = H,
and κ21(mD2 ,m−i) = 0, and κ23(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U2(m1,mD2 ,m3) = H + ξ32
1
4
(H − L)2 > U2(m).
(5) if m2 = m3 = (x1, θ1) 6= m1, with m1 6= (x12, θ12, z1), and, m1 6= (x13, θ12, z1), then
the outcome is x1. Material payoffs are pi1(m) = pi2(m) = H, and pi3(m) = L; and
kindness terms are κ12(m) = 0, κ13(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ21(m) = 0, κ23(m) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, κ31(m) = κ32(m) = 12(H − L) > 0. Consider agent 3 with
U3(m) = L− (ξ31 + ξ23)14(H − L)
2.
Then agent 3 has an incentive to deviate to mD3 = (x
3
2, θ
3
2, z
3), with z3 > z1, z2,
inducing the integer game such that the outcome changes to x2: pi3(mD3 ,m−i) = H,
and κ31(mD3 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, and κ32(mD3 ,m−i) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, such
that
U3(m1,m2,mD3 ) = H + ξ31
1
4
(H − L)2 − ξ32 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 > U3(m).
Case (b). Consider the case when two agents announce the same message mi = mi′ =
(x2, θ2) 6= mi′′ . In particular,
(1) if m1 = m2 = (x2, θ2) 6= m3, with m3 arbitrary, then the outcome is x2. Material
payoffs are pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and pi1(m) = H; and kindness terms are
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κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, κ13(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ21(m) = 12(L −H) < 0,
κ23(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, and κ31(m) = κ32(m) = 0. Consider agent 1 with
U1(m) = L− ξ12 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2.
Then agent 1 has an incentive to deviate to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1) such that the outcome
changes to x1: pi1(mD1 ,m−i) = H, and κ12(mD1 ,m−i) = 0, and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = H > U1(m).
(2) if m1 = m3 = (x2, θ2) 6= m2, with m2 arbitrary, then the outcome is x2. Material
payoffs are pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and pi1(m) = H; and kindness terms are
κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, κ13(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ21(m) = κ23(m) = 0,
κ31(m) = 12(L−H) < 0, and κ32(m) = 12(1− δ)(L−H) < 0. Consider agent 1 with
U1(m) = L− ξ13 14(H − L)
2.
Then agent 1 has an incentive to deviate to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1) such that the outcome
changes to x1: pi1(mD1 ,m−i) = H, and κ12(mD1 ,m−i) = 0, and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = H + ξ13
1
4
(H − L)2 > U1(m).
(3) if m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2), but m1 = (x11, θ
1
1, z
1), then the outcome is x1. Outcome x1
results in material payoffs pi1(m) = pi2(m) = H, and pi3(m) = L; and kindness terms
are κ12(m) = 0, κ13(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ21(m) = 0, κ23(m) = 12(L − H) < 0,
κ31(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ32(m) = 12(H − L) > 0. Consider agent 3 with
U3(m) = L− (ξ32 + ξ32)14(H − L)
2.
Then agent 3 has an incentive to deviate to mD3 = (x
3
2, θ
3
1, z
3), with z3 > z1, z2 such
that the outcome changes to x2 by the integer game (rule (3)): pi3(mD3 ,m−i) = H,
and κ31(mD3 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, and κ32(mD3 ,m−i) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, such
that
U3(m1,m2,mD3 ) = H + ξ31
1
4
(H − L)2 − ξ32 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 > U3(m).
(4) if m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2), but m1 = (x13, θ
1
1, z
1), then the outcome is x3. Outcome
x1 results in material payoffs pi1(m) = pi3(m) = M , and pi2(m) = L; and kindness
terms are κ12(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ13(m) = κ21(m) = κ23(m) = κ31(m) =
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(δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, and κ32(m) = 12(L−H) < 0. Consider agent 2 with
U2(m) = L− (ξ21 + ξ23)12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2.
Then agent 2 has an incentive to deviate to mD2 = (x
2
1, θ
2
1, z
2), with z2 > z1, z3 such
that the outcome changes to x1 by the integer game (rule (3)): pi2(mD2 ,m−i) = H,
and κ21(mD2 ,m−i) = 0, and κ23(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U2(m1,mD2 ,m3) = H + ξ23
1
4
(H − L)2 > U2(m).
(5) if m2 = m3 = (x2, θ2) 6= m1, with m1 6= (x11, θ11, z1), and m1 6= (x13, θ11, z1), then
the outcome is x2. Material payoffs are pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and pi1(m) = H;
and kindness terms are κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L) > 0, κ13(m) = 12(H − L) > 0,
κ21(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ23(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ31(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, and
κ32(m) = 12(1− δ)(L−H) < 0. Consider agent 1 with
U1(m) = L− ξ12 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 − ξ13 14(H − L)
2.
Then agent 1 has an incentive to deviate to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1) such that the outcome
changes to x1: pi1(mD1 ,m−i) = H, and κ12(mD1 ,m−i) = 0, and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, such that
U1(mD1 ,m2,m3) = H + ξ13
1
4
(H − L)2 > U1(m).
Lemma 10. Let θ1 be the true state. Any profile such that rule (3) applies is not a NFE.
Proof. Suppose all three agents announce different messages mi 6= mi′ 6= mi′′ such that
the integer game takes place. Then the outcome by this message profile m results always
in the lowest material payoff for one of the agents; and this agent will always have an
incentive to deviate. Consider step by step all three possible outcomes:
first, suppose the outcome of the integer game is x1. Then pi1(m) = pi2(m) = H and
pi3(m) = L; the kindness terms are κ12(m) = κ21 = 0, κ13(m) = κ23(m) = 12(L−H) < 0,
and κ31(m) = κ32(m) = 12(H −L) > 0. Agent 3 is the agent for whom outcome x1 results
in her lowest material payoff; hence, the fairness utility is
U3(m) = L− (ξ31 + ξ32)14(H − L)
2.
Consider a unilateral deviation by agent 2 such that her favorite outcome x2 is imple-
mented, that is mD3 = (x2, θ1, z
3) with z3 > z1, z2. Then κ31(mD3 ,m−i) = κ32(mD3 ,m−i) =
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1
2(L−H) < 0, and
U3(mD3 ,m2,m3) = H + (ξ31 + ξ32)
1
4
(H − L)2 > U3(m).
Second, suppose the outcome of the integer game is x2. Then pi1(m) = L, pi2(m) = M , and
pi3(m) = H; the kindness terms are κ12(m) = (δ − 12)(H − L), κ13(m) = 12(H − L) > 0,
κ21(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, κ23(m) = 12(H − L) > 0, κ31(m) = 12(L − H) < 0, and
κ32(m) = 12(1− δ)(L−H) < 0. Agent 1 is now the agent for whom outcome x2 results in
her lowest material payoff; and her fairness utility is
U1(m) = L− ξ12 12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2 − ξ13 14(H − L)
2.
Consider a unilateral deviation by agent 1 to mD1 = (x
1
1, θ
1
1, z
1) with z1 > z2, z3 such that
the outcome changes to x1. Then κ12(mD1 ,m−i) = 0 and κ13(mD1 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0,
and
UD1 (m
D
1 ,m2,m3) = H + ξ13
1
4
(H − L)2 > U1(m).
Finally, if the outcome is x3, material payoffs are pi1(m) = M , pi2(m) = L, and pi3(m) = M ,
and it is now agent 2 for whom x2 results in the lowest material payoff. The kindness
terms are κ12(m) = 12(L−H) > 0, κ13(m) = κ21(m) = κ23(m) = κ31(m) = (δ− 12)(H−L),
and κ32(m) = 12(L−H) < 0; and agent 2’s fairness utility is
U2(m) = L− (ξ21 + ξ23)12(δ −
1
2
)(H − L)2.
Consider a unilateral deviation by 2 to mD2 = (x
2
1, θ
2
1, z
2), with z2 > z1, z3, such that the
outcome changes to x1. Then κ21(mD2 ,m−i) = 0, and κ23(mD2 ,m−i) =
1
2(L−H) < 0, and
U2(m1,mD2 ,m3) = H + ξ23
1
4
(H − L)2 > U2(m).
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Chapter 2
Cooperation, Communication, and
Partner Selection in a High-Stakes
Field Experiment
joint with Donja Darai
1 Introduction
A large body of evidence from experimental and empirical studies, performed by psy-
chologists and economists, indicates that people are motivated by something other
than only their material well-being. Communication is an important and powerful
tool to influence individual behavior. Over the last decades, the impact of com-
munication has been analyzed in many respects (see e.g., Crawford, 1998; Farrell
and Rabin, 1996; Ledyard, 1995). One of the most prominent ideas is that cost-free
communication comprises of more than non-binding cheap talk, especially in games
where a selfish action conflicts with the socially optimal one. For instance, Sally
(1995) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) show that mere promises are effective
in fostering cooperation and trust; and e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and
Gneezy (2005) propose that people show a reluctance to lie as a matter of guilt
aversion or morals. However, non-verbal means of communication, like gestures and
handshakes, as well as consequences of revealed lies on future behavior have so far
- to the best of our knowledge - received no attention in the economic analysis.
In this study we investigate the impact of verbal and non-verbal communication, pre-
commitment, and previous interactions on the formation of cooperative behavior.
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We use field data from the British television game show “Golden Balls”, in which
at the end a slightly modified version of the prisoner’s dilemma game is played.
The show starts with two rounds of pre-play, in which stakes are accumulated and
in which two of initially four contestants are selected to proceed to the final round,
the prisoner’s dilemma. Stakes are accumulated via a random process, which does
not involve the contestant’s cognitive ability or an effort task. However, the stakes
are partly private information to a contestant and are not observable to the others.
This lack of information between contestants allows them to lie and bluff, but these
lies are disclosed by the show host after each round. Therefore, after each pre-play
round not only stakes are common knowledge among contestants, but also who was
honest and who was not.
The selection among contestants takes place via a voting process, in which at the
end of each pre-play round every contestant has to vote for one among them to
leave the show. In the final stage the two remaining contestants play to eventually
share the accumulated stakes in a prisoner’s dilemma, which slightly differs from
the standard model since defection is a weakly dominant strategy.
The game show distinguishes itself from laboratory experiments through extraor-
dinary high stakes – the average stake size amounts to £13 000 – and face-to-face
communication between contestants.
Our analysis shows a unilateral cooperation rate of 54% and contestants even manage
to mutually cooperate in 33% of cases. Communication, both verbal and non-verbal,
and stake size have a major impact on cooperative behavior. In particular, contes-
tants who promise to cooperate and who in addition corroborate their intention to
cooperate with a handshake are indeed significantly more likely to cooperate than
if they make no promises and handshakes at all. However, a mere handshake is
actually used to manipulate the opponent’s attitude towards cooperation: contes-
tants who shake hands immediately before they choose their action for the prisoner’s
dilemma, are actually 19 percentage points more likely to defect. Concerning stake
size, we identify a negative correlation between stake size as well as expected stake
size and cooperation. Also the propensity to lie, i.e., to neglect a promise or hand-
shake, is significantly positively correlated with stake size.
The data also offers the opportunity to test for consistent behavior of contestants
(e.g., Falk and Zimmermann, 2011). Immediately before the show, contestants are
privately asked to state whether they intend to defect or cooperate in case they
reach the final round. This statement is broadcasted to the television audience, but
not to the other contestants. We test whether a contestant’s pre-action statement
can serve as a predictor for actual behavior. The results show that 75% (65%) of
contestants who explicitly state to cooperate (defect) before the show, indeed coop-
erate (defect) when they actually choose their action in the prisoner’s dilemma.
The particular structure of the pre-play allows us to investigate lying in a situation
where people are aware that lies are revealed and individually identified. We find
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that lying is punished and that contestants are bounded rational in their decision
to lie. A liar of the current or previous round is significantly more often eliminated
from the show than an honest contestant. For this reason lying is costly, but still
more than half of the players lie in at least one of the pre-play rounds, and they lie
not only when it is particularly harmful for them to be honest. And, contestants
condition their lie and the size of overstatement merely on their own position in the
game, but neglect the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents. Further, a liar
from the pre-play encounters a reputation cost, which has an effect on the outcome
of the prisoner’s dilemma: two finalist who have been honest throughout the game,
manage to mutually cooperate significantly more likely than contestants who have
lied before; though, lying is no predictor for stealing behavior.
Besides, we control for several individual player characteristics, such as age, gender,
race, place of residence, occupation, as well as for observational learning through
experience in later episodes.
Our study is related to independent work by van den Assem et al. (2012), who
analyze cooperative behavior using data from “Golden Balls”.1 However, the anal-
ysis of (non-)verbal communication and pre-commitment for cooperative behavior,
as well as lying, and the partner selection process is exclusive to our study. To
strengthen the explanatory power of our results, we control for their findings and
can confirm their results with respect to player characteristics and stake size (e.g.,
“small peanut phenomenon”). However, we offer a different channel to identify re-
ciprocal behavior and find support for conditional cooperation.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section we de-
scribe the course of the game show and the data set. Section 3 refers to the analysis
of communication and cooperation. Section 4 proceeds by the analysis of lying and
partner selection in two stages of pre-play. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Game show and data set
In this section we describe in detail the course of events in the game show (Section
2.1) and the data set (Section 2.2).
1While writing the first draft of this study, which was published in July 2010, it came to our
attention that van den Assem et al. (2012) are independently analyzing data from “Golden Balls”
(first working paper version in April 2010). Both data sets are independently and individually
established, and they differ by the collection, definition and construction of variables.
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Figure I: Structure of round 1 and 2
1st round 2nd round
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1
Player 3 Player 4 Player 3 Player 4
Note: Black balls depict “closed back row balls”; white balls depict
“open front row balls”.
2.1 Structure of the game show
The game show “Golden Balls” consists of three rounds of play with the final round
being divided into two phases.
Round 1 The game show starts with four contestants, usually two women and
two men, who are briefly introduced by the show host, i.e., the contestants provide
some information about themselves including their names, occupation and place of
residence.2 Then the first round starts: 16 golden balls are mixed, twelve of them
have written a cash amount (in £) inside and four have written the word “killer”
inside. Killer balls are dangerous, because these may damage the jackpot in the final
round. The balls containing a cash value are drawn from a lottery of 100 golden balls
with a minimum ball value of £10 and a maximum ball value of £75 000.3 Each
contestant arranges the closed golden balls in two rows of two balls in front of herself
(see Figure I, left). The two balls on the front row are opened by each contestant,
thus their content is common knowledge. The content of the remaining two balls
on the back row is private information to each contestant, i.e., the contestants are
allowed to secretly look inside. Afterwards the show host asks each contestant to
state what is inside her closed balls. The order in which contestants are asked for
their claims is exogenously determined by the show host. A discussion between the
contestants about the claims that have been made follows. The discussion ends with
2Endemol UK ensured us that the four contestants do not know each other before the show
and enter and leave the television studio separately, so that they have no opportunity to make any
further arrangements after the show.
3Players have only limited information about the lottery, i.e., they only know that there may
be doubles and they know the margins of the distribution. But they do not know the distribution
of the remaining 98 balls.
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each contestant secretly casting a vote against one of the other contestants. On the
basis of the votes, a contestant is eliminated from the show.4 After the contestant
who has to leave is determined, all contestants open their back row balls and thereby
reveal whether they stated the truth or not. The four balls of the leaving contestant
are out of the game, while the remaining twelve are carried over to round 2.
Round 2 At the beginning of the second round, two new cash balls are drawn
from the lottery and one killer ball is added. These three new balls are mixed with
the remaining twelve from round 1, and then shuﬄed and distributed to the three
contestants at random. Again each contestant arranges the closed balls in two rows,
i.e., two balls are on the front and three balls are on the back row. As in round 1
the two balls on the front row are opened and the content is common knowledge,
while the three balls on the back are private information (see Figure I, right). This
time the contestants themselves determine the order of stating the content of their
back row balls. Like in the first round, a discussion between the contestants follows
and afterwards they secretly choose a contestant they want to vote off. After the
contestant to leave has been determined all ball values are revealed, and the five
balls of the leaving contestant are out of the game.
Final Round The ten balls from round 2 are carried over to the final round and
one last ball, a killer, is added. The maximal amount the contestants can gain is the
sum of the highest five cash values among the eleven balls. Before the first phase
starts, this amount is announced as the potential jackpot by the show host.
In the first phase of the final round the two contestants successively select five of
the eleven closed and shuﬄed balls. These five values build the actual jackpot. If a
contestant chooses a killer ball for the jackpot the accumulated amount up to that
point is reduced to one-tenth of the original value.
In the second phase of the final round the contestants play a prisoner’s dilemma in
which defection is a weakly dominant strategy (see Figure II).5 Such a prisoner’s
dilemma has three pure-strategy Nash equilibria, namely (steal, split), (steal, steal),
and (split, steal).6 The dilemma game is played as follows: each contestant is
assigned two balls, one with the word “steal” and one with the word “split” inside.
Then both contestants choose one of the balls and open it simultaneously. If both
contestants chose the split ball, the jackpot (J) is divided equally between the two
4The contestant who receives the highest number of votes has to leave the show. In case of a tie
the contestants having received no vote can decide which contestant has to leave. If all contestants
received one vote each, contestants openly discuss which contestant has to leave. If contestants do
not reach a conclusion, ties are broken arbitrarily.
5The show host explains the different outcomes of the game in each episode with the same
neutral words (for the exact wording see Appendix A.1).
6Two of the resulting Nash equilibria involve one contestant to cooperate. Applying the method
of iterated elimination of weakly dominant strategies, however, leaves only the (steal, steal) equi-
librium, which should be the only one observed. Thus, each contestant has an incentive to defect,
because she is never monetarily worse off when doing so.
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contestants. If one contestant chooses steal and the other chooses split, the former
gets the whole jackpot and the latter receives nothing. If both chose steal, both get
nothing.
Figure II: Prisoner’s dilemma game
split (cooperate) steal (defect)
split (cooperate) 1/2 jackpot ,
1/2 jackpot 0 , jackpot
steal (defect) jackpot , 0 0 , 0
Note: Defection is a weakly dominant strategy
Immediately before the contestants decide which action to choose, they get roughly
30 to 60 seconds time to discuss. All communication in the game show is free-format.
2.2 Data description
“Golden Balls” was first aired on June, 18th 2007 as a late afternoon (5pm) game
show and ended December, 18th 2009.7 In total, we have records of 222 episodes, di-
vided into four series, with 203 regular and 19 special episodes. Ten special episodes
consist of contestants who are on the show for the second time. We exclude these
ten episodes from the analysis in order to avoid any bias from repeated interac-
tions. The other nine special episodes comprise of contestants of the same sex. The
regular episodes always consist of two women and two men and the contestants
are on the show for the first time. All 40 episodes of the first series were filmed
prior to the show’s television premiere, i.e., all contestants in these episodes had
no chance to observe others playing the game. In total we use a data set of 212
episodes (848 contestants), divided into 4 series, where series 1, 2, 3, and 4 consist
of N = 160, 232, 300, and 156 contestants, respectively.
For all episodes we recorded variables describing the contestant characteristics (age,
gender, race, occupation, and place of residence) and the game (all true and stated
ball values in rounds 1 and 2, the order of claims in both rounds, votes the contes-
tants received and submitted, the potential and actual jackpot size, communication
between contestants before and in the final (handshakes, promises), and the final
decision). In addition, we recorded the contestant’s action-statement, i.e., before the
show starts, the contestants are individually and privately asked to explain which
action they intend to play in the final. Table V in the Appendix provides an overview
of the data.
7The show reached up to 2.2 million people per episode which corresponds to a market share
of 21% (“ITV strikes teatime gold”, guardian.co.uk, July 3rd, 2007).
Chapter 2: Cooperation, Communication, and Partner Selection 63
3 Analysis of cooperative behavior
We observe an average unilateral cooperation rate of 53.8% and contestants suc-
cessfully manage to cooperate in even 32.6% (mutual defection in 25.0%) of cases.8
These rates are considerable keeping in mind that unilateral defectors take home
three times as much money as mutual cooperators, £15 693 versus £4 784. The av-
erage amount of money left on the table due to mutual defection is £14 426, overall
that sums up to £1 558 045 being left on the table.
What parameters affect the positive cooperation rate in the prisoner’s dilemma
and by what means do cooperators identify each other?
We investigate the individual as well as mutual decision outcome of the contestants
when playing the prisoner’s dilemma. We make use of the bivariate probit model
where the dependent variable yi is the decision of contestant i either to split (yi = 1)
or steal (yi = 0). To analyze team cooperation rates, we make use of the inherent
ordering of the mutual decision outcomes, and code the team outcome as equaling 0
if both contestants choose steal (yi = 0), equaling 1 if one contestant chooses steal
and the other chooses split (yi = 1), and equaling 2 if both contestants choose split
(yi = 2).
9 Throughout, to quantify the influence of the explanatory variables on the
predicted probability to split (reach a certain mutual outcome) we report marginal
effects. If interactions of two variables are included, we compute interaction effects
following the method proposed by Norton et al. (2004) and Mallick (2009). For a
detailed specification of the estimation method see Appendix A.3.
The regression analysis is divided into two subsections. Section 3.1 provides pre-
liminary results with respect to player characteristics, observational learning, stake
size, and reciprocity. Section 3.2 contains the central analysis dealing with vari-
ables of communication comprising of truthful and false promises and handshakes,
pre-commitment, and lying in the pre-play.
8Note that the distribution of outcomes, in particular the mutual cooperation rate, do not
coincide with its population moments. E.g., assuming two randomly chosen contestants play the
prisoner’s dilemma, underlying an average unilateral cooperation rate of 53.8%, we should observe a
mutual cooperation rate of 28.9% (compared to the actual 32.6%). The difference of 3.7 percentage
points is significant at the 5% level, i.e., contestants manage to coordinate more frequently than
theoretically expected. A χ2-test for the variance in a normal population rejects the null hypothesis
of no difference between the observed sample frequencies and the theoretically expected frequencies
at the 5%-level (p=0.025).
9Following List (2006) we argue that the contestant’s mutual decision outcomes “split-split”,
“split-steal” and “steal-steal” depend on a single index function and thus have an inherent (natural)
ordering fitting the ordered probit model rather than the multinomial one.
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Table I: Results from binary probit regressions on unilateral cooperation
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Player characteristics
Male -0.067 (0.051) -0.057 (0.054) -0.031 (0.077) 0.040 (0.082)
Age (>40 years) 0.182*** (0.054) 0.184*** (0.056) 0.280*** (0.078) 0.248*** (0.089)
White 0.026 (0.119) 0.015 (0.114) 0.060 (0.163) 0.155 (0.171)
London -0.020 (0.104) -0.034 (0.104) 0.290*** (0.110) 0.197 (0.132)
Large city -0.079 (0.080) -0.075 (0.082) -0.193 (0.121) -0.139 (0.130)
England -0.273*** (0.068) -0.273*** (0.071) -0.305*** (0.090) -0.304*** (0.092)
Student -0.028 (0.097) -0.031 (0.093) -0.122 (0.132) -0.137 (0.137)
Pensioner -0.118 (0.166) -0.059 (0.165) -0.159 (0.172) -0.039 (0.228)
Social job (reputation) -0.035 (0.083) -0.045 (0.084) -0.057 (0.114) -0.057 (0.120)
Index (social closeness) 0.261 (0.207) 0.286 (0.205) 0.424 (0.274) 0.256 (0.293)
Opp. student 0.056 (0.093) 0.085 (0.094) 0.183 (0.122) 0.184 (0.123)
Opp. pensioner 0.100 (0.157) 0.054 (0.176) 0.130 (0.194) 0.074 (0.178)
Opp. social job 0.029 (0.084) 0.034 (0.084) 0.111 (0.111) 0.148 (0.118)
Team large city -0.099 (0.102) -0.104 (0.105) 0.122 (0.159) 0.024 (0.159)
Team small city -0.168** (0.069) -0.165** (0.071) -0.178* (0.108) -0.218* (0.114)
Observational learning
Unexperienced (series 1) -0.005 (0.070) -0.018 (0.074) -0.020 (0.151) 0.073 (0.154)
Experienced (series 4) 0.144* (0.077) 0.147* (0.080) 0.162* (0.095) 0.226** (0.096)
Stake size
Log(jackpot) -0.053*** (0.014) -0.050*** (0.015) -0.047** (0.020) -0.066*** (0.022)
Log(pot. jackpot) 0.109** (0.051) 0.134** (0.055) 0.132* (0.078) 0.175** (0.082)
Acc. most money -0.054 (0.060) 0.001 (0.090) 0.003 (0.088)
Selected higher values in bin/win 0.002 (0.054) 0.113 (0.077) 0.150* (0.079)
Selected most killers in bin/win -0.016 (0.058) -0.002 (0.080) 0.013 (0.088)
Reciprocity
“Should have left the game” 0.143** (0.062) 0.047 (0.097) 0.090 (0.101)
Communication
Started discussion -0.005 (0.049) 0.007 (0.051) -0.039 (0.078) -0.039 (0.081)
Handshakes -0.185*** (0.069) -0.187*** (0.070) -0.323*** (0.099) -0.225** (0.095)
Promise -0.076 (0.110) -0.093 (0.110) -0.252 (0.174) -0.215 (0.177)
Handshakes*promise 0.317*** (0.067) 0.326*** (0.106) 0.559*** (0.163) 0.455** (0.202)
Pre-commitment
Statement to split 0.488*** (0.063)
Lying in the pre-play
Lied about value (round 1) 0.050 (0.068) 0.086 (0.092) 0.108 (0.104)
Lied about killer (round 1) 0.048 (0.070) 0.100 (0.106) 0.139 (0.109)
Opp. lied about value (round 1) 0.096 (0.065) 0.133 (0.088) 0.150 (0.093)
Opp. lied about killer (round 1) -0.099 (0.069) -0.019 (0.098) 0.032 (0.103)
Lied about value (round 2) -0.116 (0.075) -0.147 (0.103) -0.126 (0.117)
Lied about killer (round 2) 0.035 (0.071) 0.024 (0.108) -0.010 (0.118)
Opp. lied about value (round 2) 0.012 (0.075) -0.100 (0.101) -0.170 (0.111)
Opp. lied about killer (round 2) 0.048 (0.071) -0.015 (0.100) -0.051 (0.110)
Wald X 2 50.68*** 61.64*** 63.36*** 112.05***
Log-Likelihood -258.93 -250.71 -127.69 -107.75
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.31
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.08
N 421 421 226 226
Number of clusters 212 212 161 161
Note: binary probit regressions of the decision either to “split” (yi = 1) or “steal” (yi = 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Model (1) and model (2) report results using the total sample of N = 422 finalists; model (3) and model (4) report results
using the subsample of N = 226 finalists with an action-statement. The marginal effect of the respective explanatory variable
determines the effective change of this variable on player i’s predicted probability to “split”. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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3.1 Player characteristics, learning, stakes, and reciprocity
All following results are reported in Table I, model (1) and (2), and Table VI in
Appendix A.2.
(i) Player characteristics
We control for the impact of various own player, opponent, and team characteristics,
such as age, gender, race, place of residence, and occupation on cooperative behavior.
On a priori grounds, the relation between these (personal) characteristics and social
behavior seems to be rather ambiguous. Deriving clear-cut hypotheses about the
influence of these characteristics on the player’s propensity to cooperate is therefore
impossible. Our results are the following.
Race There is no significant correlation between whites and non-whites and co-
operative behavior.
Gender There is also no significant difference between the cooperation rates of
men and women. This result is in contrast to e.g., Ortmann and Tichy (1999)
who find that females cooperate more frequently than males. However, concerning
mutual cooperation we find that a male player is significantly less likely to cooperate
with a male opponent, indicating that men are more competitive when facing the
same sex.
Age Contestants above 40 years are 18 percentage points more likely to cooperate
than contestants below 40 years.10 In addition, gender conditional on age tends to
have an effect on the cooperation rate, i.e., women below the age of 40 cooperate
more than men below the age of 40 and vice versa for men and women above the
age of 40.
Student or retired We also explore cooperative behavior depending on whether
a player herself or her opponent is a student or a pensioner. Yet there are no
significant effects.
Place of residence Based on a contestant’s place of residence, we construct vari-
ables indicating whether the contestant lives in England, London, a small or a big
city (see summary statistics in Table V in Appendix A.2). Contestants living in Eng-
land cooperate significantly less likely than contestants from other parts of Great
Britain, i.e., a player who lives in England is roughly 27 percentage points more
likely to be a defector. In addition, if both finalists live in England they are 19
percentage points less likely to reach the split-split outcome. If both finalists live
in a small city or if both live in a large city, then player i’s likelihood to cooperate
10Note, the results concerning age should not be attached too much weight since the age cate-
gories are merely assessed by personal judgment.
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decreases by 11 up to 17 percentage points compared to pairs of contestants who
are mixed, i.e., one of them is from a small city while the other is from a large city.
Reputation Since the game is played in front of a large television audience and
therefore possibly being watched by friends, family member and colleagues, it might
be in a contestant’s interest to appear trustworthy, depending on her occupational
status. For instance, police officers act as role models for observing the law and
behaving correctly, or teachers are responsible for a moral education of children.
These people might have an incentive to behave in a fair way, especially when it
comes to choosing to cooperate or not in the prisoner’s dilemma. But also having
a socially responsible job could be a sign for being a cooperator itself, because a
cooperative person might select into such a job. The variable “social job” identifies
roughly 15% of contestants with a socially responsible occupation, e.g., priests,
policemen, firemen, childminders, and teachers. However, the estimation results on a
contestant’s occupational status exhibit no significant effects for a players likelihood
to cooperate.
Index for social closeness The sociological literature argues that the degree of
similarity between players has an impact on their social interactions, i.e., people
are more likely to form social ties with others who are alike. This tendency of
people to relate to similar types is referred to as “homophily”.11 Such motivated,
we construct an index for the social closeness between players by accounting for
players’ age, gender, race, occupational status (social job), and place of residence
(England). The index ranges from 0 to 1, weighting each component by one-fifth.
Concerning the distribution, we observe 3% of pairs of players to have an index-value
of 0.2, 16% to have an index of 0.4, 44% to have an index of 0.6, 33% to have an
index of 0.8, and 4% to have an index of 1, i.e., almost 80% of players are relatively
socially close to each other having an index value between 0.6 and 0.8. However, we
do not find that the social closeness between contestants is a significant determinant
of cooperative behavior. This result remains valid for different weights attached to
the index’s input variables.
(ii) Observational learning
Since the first 40 episodes (series 1) have been filmed before the television premiere
of “Golden Balls”, contestants of series 1 had no chance to observe other contestants
playing the game, i.e., they are unexperienced. In contrast, all later episodes have
been filmed after the broadcast of series 1. Especially, contestants of series 4 are most
11Homophily was first defined by Lazarfeld and Merton (1954), for a survey with respect to
sociology see Jackson (2008) and with respect to cooperative game theory see van den Nouweland
and Slikker (2001). In many social networks, e.g., friendships or business relations, one observes
that individuals associate disproportionately with others who are similar to themselves, usually
with regard to gender, race, age, region and education.
Chapter 2: Cooperation, Communication, and Partner Selection 67
familiar with the show and thus might be better in assessing whether cooperation
or defection could be successful or not.
Hypothesis 1. Contestants in later episodes (series 4) use their familiarity with
the show and therefore learn whether cooperation could be successful or not.
Decomposing the data per series reveals that the unilateral cooperation rate is
around 50% in series 1-3 and that it jumps to 65.4% in series 4. Most strikingly,
successful cooperation even jumps from 30.0% to 48.7% and successful defection
declines from 45.0% to 33.3% (for an illustration see Figure III below).
Figure III: The evolution of cooperation over episodes
We observe a substantial difference in the cooperation rate as well as in the distri-
bution of outcomes across series 1 (first 40 episodes) and series 4 (last 39 episodes).
A two-sided binomial probability test can reject both, the null hypothesis of no
difference between the cooperation rate of experienced (65.4%) and unexperienced
(52.5%) players (p=0.000), and the null hypothesis of no difference between the prob-
ability of mutual cooperation of experienced (48.7%) and unexperienced (30.0%)
players (p=0.000).12 The estimation results exhibit a positive significant effect of
experienced players (series 4) on their likelihood to cooperate. In particular, a player
in series 4 is 14 percentage points more likely to cooperate compared to players in
series 1-3, and mutual cooperation is 20 percentage points more likely. This suggests
that contestants learn over time how to credibly signal their willingness to cooper-
ate, confirming the result of Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010), who find an effect of
12Unless stated otherwise, all tests used in this chapter are two-sided binomial probability tests.
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learning for players in later episodes of “Friend or Foe”.13 Summarizing, we cannot
reject Hypothesis 1.
(iii) Stake size
The effect of the stake size on cooperation rates in dilemma games is widely debated
and no clear answer has been found so far. While some experiments show that an
increase in monetary stakes has no significant effect on the cooperation or contribu-
tion rate (e.g., Kocher et al., 2008), others suggest that the rate decreases with the
stake size (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
Special to the structure of the game show, contestants are confronted with an actual
and potential stake size. At the beginning of the final round the size of the potential
jackpot is announced by the show host, which comprises the maximal amount the
player can gain. More precisely, the potential jackpot is the sum of the highest five
cash values out of the ten balls the two finalists carried over to the final round.
Then, in the first phase of the final round the actual jackpot is built by the alternat-
ing selection of five balls (see Section 2.1). The size of the potential jackpot varies
between £5 000 and £168 100, and the size of the actual jackpot varies between £3
and £100 150.14
Actual jackpot We find that the cooperation rate is significantly negatively cor-
related with the actual jackpot (see Table I and Table VI in Appendix A.2). A 1%
increase in the actual jackpot decreases a contestant’s likelihood to cooperate by 5
percentage points. But the effect of the actual stakes disappears for stakes above
the median. Interestingly, there is a cutoff at £500: the cooperation rate declines
sharply from 73.6% for jackpots below £500 to 50.3% for jackpots above £500. In
addition, the mutual cooperation rate is significantly higher if the actual jackpot is
below £500 (55.6%) than if it is above £500 (27.8%). Both differences are highly
significant (p=0.000). The result is even more remarkable if one bears in mind that a
stake size around £500 is already much higher than the one used in most laboratory
experiments.
Potential jackpot At the same time, however, we find a countervailing effect
of stake size: The cooperation rate rises with an increase in the potential jackpot.
Contestants are 10-13 percentage points more likely to cooperate the higher the po-
tential jackpot. Hence, the effects of the actual and the potential jackpot operate
in opposite directions. But the effect of the potential jackpot on cooperation dis-
appears if we exclude the actual jackpot from the regression. We tested for various
13We also separately tested for an effect of series 1, 2, and 3 on the likelihood to cooperate, and
find no significant effect.
14Stakes in “Golden Balls” are at highest level compared to laboratory experiments as well as
related studies using television game show data. These include the US game show “Friend or Foe”
analyzed by List (2006) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) and the Dutch show “Deelt ie’t of deelt
ie’t niet” studied by Belot et al. (2010).
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relations between the potential and actual jackpot, determining the ratio and differ-
ence between both. The difference has a significant negative impact on cooperation.
A 1% increase in the difference increases a player’s likelihood to cooperate by 5
percentage points (p=0.056, table unreported). For the ratio between the actual
jackpot and the potential jackpot the reverse is true. A player is 20 percentage
points less likely to cooperate the larger the ratio, i.e., the closer the spread between
actual and potential jackpot (p=0.064, table unreported).
Expectation One might presume that the contestants’ perception of the actual
jackpot depends on the potential jackpot, i.e., two actual jackpots equal in size will
be judged differently depending on their difference to the potential jackpot. Con-
testants might build an expectation about the size of the actual jackpot depending
on the observed size of the potential jackpot. Since computing the mathematically
correct expectation is a rather difficult task - especially due to the jackpot-damaging-
power15 of killer balls - contestants need some alternative method to calculate the
expectation. As mentioned before, the episodes of series 1 have been broadcasted
before all other episodes were filmed. Since contestants in later episodes could ob-
serve the average ratio between the jackpot and the potential jackpot in series 1,
we assume them using this ratio to form an estimate of the expected jackpot. The
average jackpot in series 1 is £13 066, which corresponds to 27.5% of the average
potential jackpot of £47 526. This ratio is multiplied by the observed potential jack-
pot in each episode and determines the contestants’ expected jackpot.16
We test for a relation between the expectation of the jackpot and cooperative be-
havior. We find that depending on whether the jackpot is above or below the con-
testant’s expectation, the propensity to cooperate changes. The cooperation rate
is significantly higher if the jackpot is below the expectation, and contestants are
16-17 percentage points more likely to cooperate (p=0.002, table unreported). Also
cooperation is much less successful if the expectation threshold is taken, i.e., the
mutual cooperation rate declines from 41.1% to 18.4%.
Entitlement Experimental research has accumulated evidence that people’s pref-
erences over income distribution reflect other-regarding preferences. People care
about the distributional consequences of an action, in particular, they make their
choice dependent on their individual perception of the others’ “worthiness of com-
pensation”, see e.g., Rutstro¨m and Williams (2000), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985).17
We test whether contestants in “Golden Balls” might perceive the jackpot allocation
15Recall, if a killer ball is chosen for the jackpot the accumulated amount up to that point is
reduced to one-tenth of the original value.
16In episodes following series 1 the average ratio between the jackpot and the potential jackpot
is 25.7%, which is very similar.
17Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) examine the effects on individual choices when initial entitlements
are allocated at random versus when subjects are required to earn those, and find that the frequency
of non-self-interested behavior is lower when initial entitlements are allocated according to pure
chance.
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differently if they contributed more to the final stake size by either carrying over
the higher balls’ values from round 2 to the final or by selecting the higher balls’
values during the first phase of the final round. Either way, these contestants might
feel entitled to a larger “piece of the pie”, since they contributed more to both the
potential and the actual jackpot and show this by a lower propensity to cooperate.
We construct two dummy variables, one for the contestant who contributes most
to the potential jackpot, and one for the contestant who selects the highest values
when building the actual jackpot, and formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. A contestant who contributes most to the potential jackpot and/or
a contestant who selects the higher values for the actual jackpot is less likely to
cooperate.
Our results show that both having accumulated more money as well as having se-
lected the higher values have a negative but not significant impact on the contestants’
likelihood to cooperate. Thus, we find no support for Hypothesis 2.
(iv) Reciprocity
Lastly, we have the opportunity to account for variables linked to kindness, perceived
kindness, and its repayment. It is well reported by theoretical and experimental
research that people care about underlying motives and intensions of their actions,
i.e., whether their behavior is perceived to be fair by one another (see e.g., Rabin,
1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
Recall that after each pre-play round contestants need to vote off one opponent.
However, as we will point out in Section 4, the contestant to leave is not always the
one with the lowest ball values, although from a purely monetary perspective, this
contestant should be voted off the game. If such a contestant nevertheless makes it
to the final, she might respond in her final decision to the kindness she received from
her opponent during the pre-play, since (at least in round 2) she owes her “survival”
to her opponent’s voting decision. We construct a variable labeled “should have left
the game” ranking the three contestants in round 2 with respect to their weighted
sum of cash values and killer balls. The dummy points at the contestant with the
lowest weighted sum.18
Hypothesis 3. A contestant who “should have left the game” is more likely to split
the jackpot.
In the regression analysis we find a significant and positive effect on the contestants
likelihood to cooperate: A contestant who should have left the game is roughly
18In order to rank the contestants we use the ex-post cash-killer-criterion which is described
and discussed in detail in Appendix A.4. We assume that a contestant, who does have the lowest
weighted monetary amount is aware of this, e.g., often contestants address their pass to the final
round during the final discussion and thank their opponent for having taken her so far.
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14 percentage points more likely to split which we interpret as reciprocating her
opponent’s confidence (see Table I model (2)). Hence, we find strong support for
Hypothesis 3.19
3.2 Verbal and non-verbal communication
We now turn to variables of verbal and non-verbal communication. In particular, we
address the impact of truthful and false promises and handshakes, pre-commitment,
and lying in the pre-play on cooperative behavior.
(i) Promises and handshakes
Shortly before the prisoner’s dilemma is played, the two finalist roughly get 30-
60 seconds to discuss what they intend to play, i.e., to cooperate or defect. This
communication is free-format. Usually the time is used to ensure one another the
honesty of their intention to split, corroborated by a handshake, to thank the other
for taking her through the game, or to apologize for lying during the pre-play.
From a theoretical point of view in a prisoner’s dilemma, communication is cheap
talk that should not affect peoples’ behavior (see e.g., Crawford, 1998; Farrell and
Rabin, 1996). Various experimental studies, however, have reported that communi-
cation has a considerable influence on cooperative behavior, even in one-shot situa-
tions, especially if it involves a mutual agreement to cooperate.20 The effectiveness
19We also considered a second channel for reciprocal behavior in line with van den Assem et al.
(2012). Consider the possibility that a contestant i makes it to the final, although she received
one or two votes during the pre-play. If the final opponent j had cast a vote against i, then j’s
behavior might be interpreted as unkind by agent i, i.e., the vote expresses j’s dislike against i.
Therefore i might be willing to punish j for her unkind behavior, i.e., she might be less likely
to cooperate. We estimate the same probits of Table I, including a dummy variable indicating
whether contestant j voted against contestant i in the pre-play. We indeed find that contestant i
is more likely to defect when contestant j had cast a vote against her. However, we exclude the
dummy in our main analysis, since including it reduces the data set by 55 observations due to a
voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or 1:1:1 in round 2 (in these cases it is analytically not possible
to trace back the contestants’ individual voting decision). Except for the episodes with a tie, the
outcome of the voting decision is 2:1:0 in round 2, such that none of the final contestants received a
vote from their opponent. Hence, the control variable only comprises of the voting result in round
1. Since after round 1 the contestants can only speculate who had cast a vote against whom, we
cannot control for whether a contestant received a vote by her opponent in the final, only for the
voting decision made by the particular contestant herself. Therefore we can only identify 18 out
of 390 contestants to have casted a vote against her final opponent, which leaves the variable with
not much explanatory power.
20For surveys on the effect of communication see Sally (1995) and Ledyard (1995). In laboratory
experiments free-form written communication is often used instead of face-to-face verbal and non-
verbal communication to be able to disentangle the effect of facial expressions from the bare content
of communication. Roth (1995) provides a survey of bargaining experiments in which he shows
that face-to-face communication increases the chance of reaching an agreement even further than
free-form messaging. Bohnet and Frey (1999) observe an increase in the unilateral cooperation
rate up to 78% if they allow for face-to-face communication.
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of communication differs by the words used. In a meta-analysis Sally (1995) esti-
mates that the solicitation of promises by the experimenter raises the cooperation
rate in prisoner’s dilemma games by 12%-30%. Vanberg (2008) finds supporting
evidence that people have a preference for keeping a promise and are not driven by
concerns about their expected payoff, and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) even
propose that people have a preference for keeping their word per se. In contrast,
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) develop the idea that people keep promises because
of guilt aversion.21 Belot et al. (2010) explicitly contrast the effects of voluntary
vs. elicited promises in a prisoner’s dilemma environment. While elicited promises
are uninformative, contestants are roughly 30%-60% more likely to cooperate if they
voluntarily promised to share.
Only little work has been done on non-verbal communication and its influence on
cooperative behavior so far. For instance, Scharlemann et al. (2001) investigate the
impact of a smiling face on people’s behavior in a one-shot trust game and find that
subjects are significantly more likely to trust when shown a smiling photograph of
their counterpart with whom they believe to play. Manzini et al. (2009) address this
issue in the minimum effort game and test whether people’s propensity to choose
high effort is increased if subjects can send a “smile” to the other contestant instead
of pressing an ordinary “ready to play” button. They find that this simple device
helps contestants to coordinate on a higher effort even though contestants are not
able to see or to talk to each other. Psychologists agree that handshakes have a
signaling effect, i.e., they convey information about a person’s personality and are
important for first impressions (see e.g., Chaplin et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2008).
They also have a significant effect in social interactions, e.g., the willingness to help
another person increases after having been touched (see Argyle, 1988).
We conjecture that verbal and non-verbal communication serve as an instrument
for the contestants to credibly signal their willingness to cooperate. We derive the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. A contestant who promises to split the jackpot and/or who shakes
hands with her opponent to corroborate her intention to split is more likely to coop-
erate.
We observe that 25% of pairs of contestants voluntarily promise each other to coop-
erate. In addition and most interestingly, we observe that 40% of pairs of contestants
voluntarily use handshakes to corroborate their intention to split, and 34% out of
those pairs of contestants do both, they shake hands and promise each other to
share the jackpot. Testing Hypothesis 4, we can verify that verbal and non-verbal
communication affect contestants’ behavior, but we find a countervailing effect (see
Table I, model (1) and (2)). Regarding non-verbal communication, if both final-
ists shake hands during the final discussion, a contestant is actually 19 percentage
21In related work, Miettinen and Suetens (2008) show that contestants feel most guilty if they
communicated their intention to cooperate, but then defect while the opponent cooperates.
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points more likely to defect than if she does not shake hands, and both finalists are
also 12 percentage points less likely to reach the “split-split” outcome (see Table VI
in Appendix A.2). This is surprising, since we expected handshakes to serve as a
positive commitment device, rather than to serve as an instrument to manipulate
the opponent’s attitude towards cooperation. Here, when contestants shake hands
they lie about their intention. In contrast, if both finalists promise each other to
split the jackpot and corroborate their promise via a handshake, each contestant
is 32-33 percentage points more likely to cooperate. Further, we only find limited
support that a voluntarily stated mere promises has an impact on cooperation.22
When both finalists promise each other to split the jackpot, they are more likely to
reach the “split-steal” outcome (see Table VI in Appendix A.2).
In addition, looking at the development of handshakes and promises across series,
we find that the use of both continuously increases over time. While in series 1, only
7.5% of pairs of contestants promise to split and only 15.0% shake hands, in series
4, already 48.7% promise to split and even 64.1% shake hands. Both differences
between series are highly significant, p=0.000. Also, contestants seem to learn the
proper use of handshakes: In series 1 the decision either to split or steal after a
handshake is 50:50, whereas in series 4 64% of contestants choose steal after shaking
hands.
Summarizing, the results show that verbal and non-verbal communication conveys
information about contestant’s intentions. Promises and handshakes are offered and
trusted. For the use of handshakes in combination with a promise we find a positive
impact on cooperation, but handshakes without a promise result in a negative effect.
Hence, we can partly confirm Hypothesis 4.
(ii) False promises and false handshakes
Although we observe that 60% of contestants hold their promises in combination
with a handshake, 40% of contestants are liars. As shown in the previous section, a
handshake seems to be used as a manipulating device. Table II reports probit esti-
mates on the probability to lie with respect to a promise (model (1)) or a handshake
(model (2)) as a function of contestant characteristics and stake size.
Independent of a contestant’s own choice of action, promises and/or handshakes are
used to initiate cooperative behavior from the opponent. Since we find that the
probability to cooperate is affected by stake size, we expect a positive correlation
between stake size and the propensity to lie, i.e., to make a false pledge. Indeed, we
find a direct effect of stake size on the probability of lying. An increase in the actual
jackpot increases the probability to make a false promise by 18 percentage points
and to make a false handshake by 8 percentage points. This finding is in contrast
22Our finding is in contrast to Belot et al. (2010), however, they also count a statement of intent
as a promise. We define promises more narrowly and only identify a promise if the word itself has
been used by the contestants.
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Table II: Results from binary probit regressions on a false promise or handshake
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2)
false promise false handshake
Communication
Started discussion 0.068 (0.107) 0.023 (0.083)
Handshakes -0.205 (0.144)
Promise -0.315*** (0.094)
Player characteristics
Male -0.066 (0.172) 0.177* (0.097)
Age (> 40 years) -0.331*** (0.119) -0.275*** (0.087)
White -0.241 (0.284) 0.019 (0.209)
England 0.271* (0.145) 0.374*** (0.134)
Student 0.357** (0.157) 0.080 (0.159)
Social job (reputation) 0.127 (0.166) 0.077 (0.136)
Index (social closeness) -0.285 (0.582) -0.710∗ (0.412)
Opp. age (> 40 years) -0.050 (0.124) -0.073 (0.096)
Opp. male 0.018 (0.174) 0.197** (0.097)
Opp. white 0.242* (0.134) 0.301** (0.151)
Opp. England -0.151 (0.244) -0.076 (0.160)
Opp. student -0.162 (0.182) -0.266* (0.147)
Opp. social job -0.060 (0.157) 0.074 (0.136)
Stake size
Log(jackpot) 0.179*** (0.060) 0.077** (0.031)
Log(pot. jackpot) -0.451** (0.189) -0.216** (0.096)
Acc. most money 0.057 (0.117) 0.128 (0.096)
Selected higher values in bin/win -0.104 (0.094) 0.038 (0.082)
Selected most killers in bin/win -0.050 (0.132) 0.035 (0.095)
Reciprocity
“Should have left the game” -0.184 (0.134) -0.103 (0.125)
Lying in the pre-play
Lied about value (round 1) 0.120 (0.171) -0.058 (0.125)
Lied about killer (round 1) 0.137 (0.164) 0.043 (0.133)
Opp. lied about value (round 1) -0.044 (0.180) 0.029 (0.131)
Opp. lied about killer (round 1) 0.034 (0.146) 0.149 (0.122)
Lied about value (round 2) 0.537*** (0.115) 0.123 (0.128)
Lied about killer (round 2) 0.156 (0.212) 0.144 (0.119)
Opp. lied about value (round 2) 0.259 (0.195) -0.250* (0.133)
Opp. lied about killer (round 2) -0.036 (0.187) -0.057 (0.127)
Wald χ2 56.01*** 65.22***
Log-Likelihood -46.83 -90.89
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.22
Adjusted R2 -0.09 -0.03
N 103 169
Number of clusters 52 85
Note: Model (1): binary probit regression of the decision either to “make a false promise”
(yi = 1) or to “keep a promise” (yi = 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Model (2):
binary probit regression of the decision either to “make a false handshake” (yi = 1) or
to “keep a handshake” (yi = 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma game. The marginal effect
of the respective explanatory variable determines the effective change of this variable on
contestant i’s predicted probability to “make a false promise” (“make a false handshake”).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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to Belot et al. (2010), who find no effect of stake size on the likelihood to hold a
promise.
In addition, we find significant differences in the personal characteristics of contes-
tants. Older contestants are 33 percentage points more likely to keep their promise,
while English and students tend to be significantly more likely to lie. Facing a non-
white opponent results in an increase of 24 percentage points in the contestant’s
propensity to break her promise. Males turn out to be 18 percentage points more
likely to break their handshake than women. Interestingly, if a contestant faces a
male opponent, she is now roughly 20 percentage points more likely to break a hand-
shake than if she faces a women. Again, older contestants are less likely to break
their pledge, while English are more likely to do so. Facing a non-white opponent
leads to a 30 percentage points higher likelihood to break a handshake.
(iii) Pre-Commitment
We have the opportunity to investigate the effect of early commitment. Before the
game show starts, contestants are individually asked to make a private statement
about their hypothetical action, either split or steal, in case they reach the final
round (see Section 2.2). These filmed action-statements are broadcasted to the
television audience, but neither to the (other) contestants nor the audience in the
television studio.
The action-statements are publicly observed, such that contestants might feel social
pressure to live up to it, since they commit oneself to an action.
Various studies in social psychology investigate whether people have a taste for con-
sistency, or examine the consequences of such preferences for (economic) behavior,
see e.g., Festinger (1957), or Freedman and Fraser (1966). Falk and Zimmermann
(2011) postulate a theoretical model and report evidence from three experiments
that people reveal a preference for consistency. They show that people behave
consistently to their initial commitment even though they have received additional
action-relevant information. Further, they show that people, who are provoked to
make a statement about an hypothetical action, live up to their statement when
asked to actually choose their action. Here, social pressure is the driving force.
We coded the contestants’ action-statements and use them as a best proxy to test
whether contestants choose their actual action in line with their statement.
Hypothesis 5. Contestants who made an unambiguous action-statement before the
show act according to this action-statement.
We observe an unambiguous action-statement by 53.3% (subsample, N=226) of the
finalists. The raw data show that 57.5% of finalists state to steal versus 42.5%
who state to split before the game show starts. Interestingly, the majority among
those who state to split is female (58.3%), while among those who state to steal the
majority is male (56.2%). Men state to steal significantly more often than women
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(p=0.006). The observed (actual) cooperation rate of all contestants who made an
action-statement is 52.2%, which is almost equal to the observed cooperation rate
over the whole sample (53.8%).
In Table III we depict the average cooperation rate depending on the contestants’
action-statement.
Table III: Relation between action-statement and the cooperation rate
Outcome
Action-statement Total (%) Steal (%) Split (%)
Steal 57.52 64.62 35.38
Split 42.48 25.00 75.00
Total 100 47.8 52.2
Table III shows that 75% (64.6%) of those who stated to split (steal) indeed behave
consistent with their action-statement. These contestants account for 69% of final-
ists in the subsample, and for 40% of finalists in the whole sample.
We control for the action-statement in the regression on cooperative behavior (see
Table I, model (3) and model (4), and Table VII in Appendix A.2). If a contestant
stated to split, she is actually 49 percentage points more likely to split than if she
stated to steal. Regarding the mutual outcomes, if both finalists stated to split
(steal), their likelihood to jointly cooperate (defect) increases by 35 (25) percentage
points compared to the mixed “split-steal” outcome. The magnitude of the results
is reflected by the sharp increase in the goodness of fit of both models after control-
ling for the action-statement. Comparing model (3) and (4) in Table I, we find an
increase in the adjusted R2 of 0.13. The same pattern is shown in the ordered pro-
bits, where the adjusted R2 increases by 0.02 after including the action-statement
(the sample is restricted to 117 observations of pairs of contestants, see Table VII
in Appendix A.2). Further, note that the effects of all other explanatory variables
remain unchanged, which supports the robustness of our findings. Altogether, a
substantial fraction of contestants commits to an action and acts consistently.
However, we also observe that 31% of finalists do not follow their initially stated ac-
tion. They are significantly more likely to switch from a steal-statement to splitting
(35.4%) than from a split-statement to stealing (25.0%), p = 0.008. These contes-
tants make their final decision contingent on verbal and non-verbal communication
and stake size. Also exogenous contestant characteristics seem to be important. The
results form probit regressions on the likelihood to switch from the action-statement
are reported in Table VIII in Appendix A.2. Throughout, we find a couple of differ-
ences: While it does not matter who started the final discussion for a contestant’s
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likelihood to switch from steal to split (model (2)), it has a strongly significant im-
pact on the decision to switch to steal (model (1)), i.e., a contestant who started
the discussion is 23 percentage points more likely to switch to steal. As in Section
3.2(i), handshakes increase a contestant’s likelihood to steal, while handshakes in
combination with a promise decrease it. For a contestant who stated to steal the
effects on the likelihood to switch to split are (almost) vice versa, but differ in mag-
nitude.
Summarizing, we find sufficient support for Hypothesis 5. A substantial fraction of
contestants behaves consistently to their action-statement. For contestants who de-
viate from their stated action, variables of communication turn out to be the driving
force.
(iv) Lying in the pre-play
Contestants may dishonestly state the content of their (hidden) back row balls in
the first two rounds of pre-play. Whether a contestant has lied or not is revealed by
the show host after each of the two rounds. Contestants are then labeled as a liar
and may incur a reputation cost for the rest of the game, which can have an impact
on the contestants’ behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. On the one hand, a liar may
be trusted less such that the opponent is more likely to defect. On the other hand
a liar may be more likely to defect, since she already suffers a bad reputation which
makes her inhibition threshold for choosing to defect is lower than for an honest
contestant. We test whether lying in the pre-play is correlated with non-cooperative
behavior.
Hypothesis 6. (a) A contestant is less likely to cooperate if the opponent has lied
in the pre-play. (b) A contestant who lied in the pre-play is more likely to defect.
Analyzing the raw data, we find that 61.3% of the finalists lie in at least one of the
two rounds of pre-play. In round 1, 21.9% of finalists lie about a hidden killer ball,
and 24.8% overstate a hidden cash value. In round 2, 23.8% of finalists hide a killer,
and 18.2% overstate a cash amount. Addressing the mutual outcomes, we observe
that in 19.8% of cases two honest contestants face each other in the final, in 42.5%
of cases both contestants are liars, and in 37.7% of cases we have an asymmetric
pair of finalists, i.e., one of the two contestants has lied before.
The estimation results provide very limited support for an impact of lying on co-
operation: If both finalists did not lie about the cash amount in their hidden back
row balls, they are almost 12 percentage points more likely to successfully cooperate
than if they lied (see Table VI in Appendix A.2). Including lying in the regression
on unilateral cooperation, we find no significant effect on cooperative behavior (see
Table I, model (2)). Therefore, we find no support for Hypothesis 6. However, we
find a strong correlation between lying in the second round of pre-play and lying by
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making a false promise to split: A contestant who lied about a cash value is roughly
54 percentage points more likely to also lie in promising to split (see Table II).
4 Lying and partner selection
This section consists of two subsection, where subsection 4.1 addresses the partner
selection process during the two rounds of pre-play and subsection 4.2 discusses the
role of lying.
4.1 Voting behavior
In each of the two pre-play rounds of Golden Balls the contestants face the decision
for whom to vote to leave the show. And in their voting decision the contestant can
be strategic in the following sense. Firstly, in line with the show host’s prompt “keep
in the cash, kick out the killers”, contestants may have powerful material (mone-
tary) incentives to cast their vote against the weakest contestant in terms of values
or killers in order to maximize stake size. Secondly, in view of their final decision
in the prisoner’s dilemma, contestants may also want to assess their counterpart’s
trustworthiness or susceptibility to manipulation. Thirdly, and most importantly,
contestants need to ensure their own survival, i.e., they need to make their vote
dependent on their belief about the others’ voting decision, and need to take into
account the cost of lying.
Further, the contestant’s voting behavior might vary between the two pre-play
rounds. In round 1, material incentives may be attached more weight, since the
contestants are “far away” from the final round and neither contestant has been
labeled a liar. In round 2, however, contestants may shift weight to personal judge-
ment about the potential opponent’s sympathy or trustworthiness with regard to
the final. In this sense, the two pre-play rounds give us the opportunity to test
whether people strategically vote against certain contestants.
Hypothesis 7. (a) A contestant who is materially worse off is more likely to be
voted to leave the game in round 1 than a contestant who has higher stakes. (b) A
contestant who has lied in the previous and/or current round is more likely to be
voted to leave the game in round 2 than a contestant who has been honest.
We investigate the contestants’ voting decisions in both rounds using various (or-
dered) probit regressions on the contestant’s propensity to be either voted off the
show or to receive a certain number of votes, i.e., 0-3 votes in round 1 and 0-2 votes
in round 2. The regression results are reported in Tables IV and IX in Appendix
A.2.
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Table IV: Results from binary probit regressions on voting behavior
Marginal effects
Round 1 Round 2
Player characteristics
Male 0.042 (0.036) 0.036 (0.046)
Age (> 40 years) 0.008 (0.035) 0.061 (0.046)
White -0.132* (0.069) -0.116 (0.085)
England 0.025 (0.045) 0.026 (0.051)
Material voting criteria
Log(total FR) -0.069*** (0.009) -0.034*** (0.011)
Log(total claimed BR) 0.014 (0.015) -0.001 (0.017)
No. killers FR 0.133*** (0.037) 0.046 (0.050)
No. killers claimed BR 0.027 (0.047) 0.070* (0.041)
Lying
Lied about value 0.038 (0.036) 0.135*** (0.050)
Lied about killer 0.085** (0.042) 0.137*** (0.050)
Lied in round 1 0.066* (0.038)
First to claim 0.022 (0.043) -0.095** (0.047)
Wald χ2 160.66*** 59.45***
Log-Likelihood -343.05 -353.95
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.08
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.06
N 810 607
Number of clusters 203 203
Note 1: Binary probit regressions of the probability either to “be voted off in round 1 (2)
in the pre-play” (yi = 1) or to “pass round 1 (2) in the pre-play” (yi = 0). The marginal
effect of the respective explanatory variable determines the effective change of this variable
on contestant i’s predicted probability to “be voted off”. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note 2: FR =ˆ front row; BR =ˆ back row.
(i) Material voting criteria
To account for the monetary incentives of the contestants, we construct variables
composed of the content of the two front row balls, and the claimed content of the
back row balls. Thereby we separately look at the total value (counting killers as
zero), and the total number of killers.23
In the probit regression on the likelihood to leave the show we find supporting
evidence regarding round 1, see Table IV. The larger the number of killers a con-
testant has or the lower her front row total, the more likely she is voted off the
23We also constructed a weighted total of values and killers (where each killer reduces the total
to one tenth), but we find no additional effects. The results seem to be driven by the total of
values only.
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show (increase by 13.3 percentage points and 6.9 percentage points, respectively).
The same pattern arises in the results of the ordered probit regressions (see Table
IX in Appendix A.2). In round 2, the effect of the number of killers on the front
row disappears. Here, contestants take the claimed number of killers seriously. A
possible explanation might be that contestants in round 2 have more information
about the content of all balls compared to round 1. The only unknown balls in
round 2 are the two newly drawn ones from the lottery. For an extensive discussion
of the voting behavior with respect to information advantages between contestants
and rounds we refer to Appendix A.4. The findings strongly support Hypothesis
7(a).
(ii) Player characteristics
There exists a vast economic as well as psychological literature on racial and gender
discrimination.24 We, however, find only limited support for discriminatory voting.
Contestants weakly discriminate against non-whites in round 1 (see Table IV). In
round 2 the race effect disappears. Addressing in-group biases, we observe that in
both rounds women cast a vote against men significantly more often and vice versa
(p=0.000 and p=0.000). In particular, in round 1 (round 2), in 75.4% (66.3%) of
cases a woman casts a vote against a man, and in 65.1% (67.0%) of cases a man casts
a vote against a woman. Additionally, in round 2 we find a significant difference with
respect to voting off the minority gender. Recall, that the remaining contestants in
round 2 are either a group of two women and one man or two men and one woman.
In a group of two women and one man, we find that the man is voted off significantly
more often than the woman in a group of two men and one woman (p=0.082).
(iii) Costs of lying
We control for whether it is a “good” strategy of contestants - in order to survive
the pre-play - to lie about the content of their (hidden) back row balls.
We observe that 53% of contestants lie in round 1 and 45% of contestants lie in
round 2, and significantly more contestants who have not lied in round 1 reach the
second round of pre-play (86.1% vs. 65.27%, p=0.000). Also in the second round
liars are less likely to reach the final (54.6% vs. 76.6%, p=0.000). These results
suggest that contestants seem to be able to identify and to punish liars.
The regression results support our descriptive findings, see Table IV. In round 2,
a contestant is 13.5 (13.7) percentage points more likely to be voted off if she lied
24For literature regarding discrimination in the labor market see, e.g., Becker (1957), Turner
and Brown (1978), and Altonji and Blank (1999). Levitt (2004) and Anonovics et al. (2005) test
taste-based and information-based theories of discrimination, determining whether contestants in
the US television game show “The Weakest Link” discriminate on the basis of either gender, age,
race, or skill level. Both find patterns consistent with taste-based discrimination with respect to
age and gender.
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about her total (number of killers). In round 1, contestants only punish concealing
a killer: A contestant is 8.5 percentage points more likely to be eliminated from the
game if she lied about her number of killers. Lying about a value has no significant
effect in round 1. The findings strongly support Hypothesis 7(b). Since contestants
have no information about the hidden back row balls of each other, and only know
that there have to be four killer balls in total, it is much harder to identify lying with
respect to values than to killers in round 1. Therefore, the effects of lying are much
more pronounced in round 2. We also control for the effect of a liar of round 1 in
the voting decision of round 2, since after round 1 the content of all balls is disclosed
and thus lies are uncovered. We find that a contestant is 6.6 percentage points more
likely to be voted off in round 2 if she lied in round 1. This is supported by the
results from the ordered probit, whether a contestant lied in round 1 significantly
matters for the probability of receiving zero or two votes in round 2 (see Table IX
in Appendix A.2).
Apart form that, we look at the order in which contestants make their claims each
round. Recall, in round 1 the order of claims is exogenously given by the show host,
whereas in round 2 the contestants themselves determine the order of claiming the
content of their hidden balls (see Section 2). We find that being chosen to claim first
has no effect in round 1, but choosing to be the first one in round 2 decreases the
likelihood to be voted off by 9.5 percentage points. This suggests that contestants
take the claims of the first one more seriously. Indeed, contestants who are first to
claim lie significantly less than their followers (40.9% vs. 48.0%, p=0.0419).
Finally, the explanatory power decreases sharply between both rounds. In round 1,
a much higher mass of the variance is explained compared to round 2 (see Table
IV, Pseudo R2=0.25 to Pseudo R2=0.08). This decline serves as an indicator for a
switch of contestants’ voting incentives between the two pre-play rounds. It is likely
that contestants decide on whom to vote off the game by means of sympathy or
trustworthiness. Unfortunately, we are not able to directly control for those effects.
To summarize, strategic considerations such as accumulating a high jackpot and
selecting a trustworthy counterpart for the final round, are the primary determi-
nants of voting behavior. A contestants personal characteristics only seem to play
a minor role. Hence, we find strong support for Hypothesis 7.
4.2 The decision to lie
The effect of lying on economic decision making is highly discussed in the literature.
If players have the opportunity to costly punish the other subjects for playing self-
ishly, Brandts and Charness (2003) show that contestants punish much more often if
the selfish action followed a deceptive message. Gneezy (2005), and Fischbacher and
Heusi (2008) explore the circumstances under which people lie. Gneezy (2005) uses
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a cheap talk sender-receiver game and shows that people’s evaluation of whether to
lie or not in a particular situation depends on the consequences of the lie in terms
of payoffs. Thereby not only gains achievable through lying are considered but also
possible losses that might occur to the other contestants. The fraction of liars is
largest if the resulting gains are high and the costs, i.e., losses for the other contes-
tants, are low. Contrasting this result, Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) find that the
distribution of (partially) truthful, and untruthful people is more or less the same
independent of the stake size, the consequences of lying, learning, and the degree
of anonymity. It has also been shown that people give themselves away when lying.
E.g., Wang et al. (2010) find in a sender-receiver game that peoples’ pupils widen
significantly when subjects are lying, thereby allowing others to identify a liar. And
it is a folk wisdom that people may recognize a liar with the help of certain body
signals, for instance, avoiding eye contact, sweating, or blushing.
We define lying as an untruthful claim of the content of the hidden back row balls.
While an undetected lie might increase the likelihood to survive in the game, an
identified liar might be more likely to be punished by being voted to leave the show
in the current or following round. Therefore contestants need to trade off the costs
and benefits of lying.
Beyond that, the first round allows us to investigate people’s decision to lie and if
so, how they lie. We focus on the first round to avoid biases arising out of a player’s
history from play. Here, contestant would lie in a “rational” way, when they condi-
tion their lie on their own (material) position in the game (in terms of open front
row balls) relative to her opponents.
Hypothesis 8. A contestant is more likely to lie if she is a weak player relative to
the others in terms of the value of her open front row balls.
First of all, one could think that observed lies are only “white” lies, i.e., only contes-
tants who are worst off in terms of their balls’ content use a lie to increase their odds
of survival. Looking at those contestants we find that 77.5% indeed lie.25 But 28.3%
of contestants lie even though they do not have the weakest balls. Following a liar
from round 1, we find that she is also more likely to lie in the second round compared
to contestants that have not lied in the first round (50.9% vs. 39.9%, p=0.000). As
expected a pairwise correlation test shows that lying in the first and second round
is positively correlated (ρ=0.109) and highly significant (p=0.006). This result is
surprising, because the balls are reshuﬄed after round 1 and randomly allocated to
the contestants in round 2.
We also run various probit regressions on the propensity to lie, as well as ordinary
least squares regressions on the difference between the claimed and the true values,
25A contestant is defined to be worst off if she has either the lowest total, the highest number of
killers, or the lowest weighted total (this corresponds to the prediction generated by the ex-post
material voting criteria, see Appendix A.4).
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see Table X and Table XI in Appendix A.2, respectively.
The results in Table X show that contestants are significantly more likely to lie
about their balls’ content if they have one or two killers on their front or back row
as well as if they have a low total. These effects are also present if we consider lying
about a value (model (2)) and lying about a killer (model (3)) separately. The main
difference is that contestants are additionally taking the other contestants’ front
row into account when making the decision to lie about a killer. A contestant is
significantly more likely to lie about a killer if the others have a high total and she
is less likely to lie if the others have at least one or two killers. That a contestant
seems to neglect the other contestants’ position in the game could be interpreted
in terms of level-k reasoning. A level-1 contestant makes her decision to lie only
dependent on her own position in the game, since she believes that her opponents
are level-0. A level-0 contestant uniformly randomizes over all actions (lying, not
lying).26 Level-k behavior is present through all series of the game show. However,
an unexperienced contestant is significantly more likely to lie than an experienced
contestant. Running probits separately for contestants of the first and later series
and comparing the results, we find stronger evidence for level-1 behavior among
unexperienced contestants. This suggests that observational learning does not help
the contestants to overcome their limited sophistication entirely. In addition, as
already pointed out above, the contestant’s decision to lie seems to be correlated
with the order of precedence in making claims. The contestant who is first to make
her claims is 8.8 percentage points less likely to lie about a killer.
Conditional on the fact that a contestant is lying we also analyze by how much a
contestant chooses to overstate her balls’ content. We find that, on average, a con-
testant’s lie amounts to £6 442. Table XI shows that a contestant’s overstatement is
significantly higher the higher the other contestant’s total, and is significantly lower
the better the contestant’s own position in the game. Interestingly, males are lying
by a significantly lower amount than females.
To summarize, the decision to lie as well as the chosen amount of a lie is driven by a
contestant’s own position in the game, but the strength and weaknesses of the other
contestants are ignored in many respects. We therefore cannot fully support Hy-
pothesis 8. Contestants show limited sophistication and are rather bounded rational
in their decision to lie.
5 Conclusion
In this study we investigate the formation of cooperative behavior in a high stakes
prisoner’s dilemma with face-to-face communication and two stages of pre-play. We
26The level-k model was introduced by e.g., Stahl and Wilson (1994).
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use data from a British television game show, which consists of two rounds of pre-
play and a third round in which two final contestants play a (weak) one-shot pris-
oner’s dilemma game.
The unilateral cooperation rate is 54%, and the mutual cooperation rate is 33%. The
main findings are that verbal and non-verbal communication as well as stake size
have a powerful influence on cooperative behavior. A promise in combination with a
handshake increases the likelihood to cooperate significantly. However, a handshake
alone serves as manipulating device in the sense that a contestant’s probability to
cooperate significantly decreases when she offers a handshake. Further, we find a
negative correlation between (expected) stake size and cooperation.
There is also a strong link between the contestants behavior in the pre-play and the
behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. A contestant who, from a monetary perspec-
tive, should have been voted off the game show in the pre-play, but who nevertheless
reaches the prisoner’s dilemma game, reciprocates the perceived kindness, i.e., her
survival, with an increased propensity to cooperate.
The data also reveal several interesting insights with respect to lying and the per-
ception and consequences of lies: A revealed liar is punished by a higher propensity
to be eliminated from the game. With respect to the decision to lie, contestants
seem to be bounded rational, i.e., contestants make their lie dependent on their own
position in the game, but neglect the strength and weaknesses of their opponents.
Finally, we test for consistent behavior of the contestants in the sense that they
act accordingly to their pre-announced intended action. The data reveal that a
substantial fraction of contestants who explicitly state their intended action for the
prisoner’s dilemma before the show, actually live up to it.
Our results corroborate the relevance and informational value of communication
in a field setting, and augment the existing literature with evidence on non-verbal
communication.
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Appendix
A.1 Instructions of the prisoner’s dilemma
The show host Jasper Carrott explains the “weak” prisoner’s dilemma in every episode
with almost the same words:
“It is time to split or steal. You have got two final golden balls left, you have
each got a golden ball with the word split written inside, you have got each
a golden ball with the word steal written inside. I will ask you to make a
conscious choice and you will choose either the split or the steal ball, neither
of you will know what the other has chosen. If you both choose the split balls,
you split today’s jackpot of £J and you both go home with £J/2. If one of
you splits and one of you steals, whoever steals goes home with all the money
£J , whoever splits goes home with nothing. If you both decide to steal and
you are very greedy, you both go home with nothing. Before I ask you to
choose, Player A, B just check the two balls to make sure you know which is
to split and which is to steal. Do not show to each other. It is very important
that you know which is which. [players check the balls] Are you happy
to know which is split and which is steal? Okay, before I ask you to choose, I
will give you some time to talk to each other about what has happened today
and how you feel. [players discuss] Okay, player A, B choose the split or
steal ball now. [players choose balls] Hold it up, make sure that when
you open it, the other player can see it. Player A, B split or steal? [players
open balls]”
A.2 Tables
Chapter 2: Cooperation, Communication, and Partner Selection 86
Table V: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.
dev.
Min Max N
Series (1 = series 1, 2 = series 2, 3 = series 3, 4 = series 4) 2.56 0.50 0 4 888
Player characteristics
Social joba (1 = social job) 0.14 0.34 0 1 887
Student (1 = student) 0.08 0.27 0 1 888
Pensioner (1 = retired) 0.03 0.17 0 1 888
England (1 = England, 0 = SCO, WAL, NIR, IRL) 0.85 0.36 0 1 886
Large Cityb (1 = population > 268 300) 0.30 0.46 0 1 886
London (1 = London) 0.13 0.34 0 1 888
Gender (1 = male) 0.50 0.50 0 1 888
Race (1 = white) 0.92 0.27 0 1 888
Agec (1 = above 40 years) 0.43 0.50 0 1 888
Action-statementd (0 = steal, 1 = split, 2 = other) 1.08 0.86 0 2 612
Average cash ball in the show 5619.55 10374.12 10 75000 3108
Round 1
Value of open balls (balls 1 and 2)e 8802.64 13858.91 0 104000 888
Value claimed for balls 3 and 4 14265.86 13908.53 0 83000 888
Value of closed balls (balls 3 and 4) 7852.88 12315.07 0 83000 888
Number of killers in open balls 0.47 0.58 0 2 888
Number of killers claimed 0.23 0.43 0 2 888
Number of killers in closed balls 0.53 0.60 0 2 888
Player lied at least about one ball 0.53 0.50 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one value 0.32 0.47 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 888
Number of killers taken to round 2 2.59 0.76 1 4 888
Round 2
Value of open balls (balls 5 and 6) 9651.32 14275.73 0 103000 666
Value claimed for balls 7, 8 and 9 18421.19 16683.73 105 95000 666
Value of closed balls (balls 7, 8 and 9) 13352.47 16291.90 0 95000 666
Number of killers in open balls 0.44 0.58 0 2 666
Number of killers claimed 0.44 0.52 0 2 666
Number of killers in closed balls 0.75 0.69 0 3 666
Player lied at least about one ball 0.45 0.50 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one value 0.23 0.42 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 666
Number of killers taken to final round 2.14 0.91 0 5 666
Value of balls taken to final round 23003.79 21134.80 150 143300 666
Final round (1st phase)
Potential jackpot 51238.36 31261.51 5000 168100 444
Average cash ball 6932.27 12030.86 10 75000 1122
Number of killers 3.21 0.94 1 6 144
Number of killers to bin 1.74 0.92 0 4 144
Number of killers to win 1.47 0.88 0 4 144
Final round (2nd phase)
Jackpot 13343.03 19247.56 3 100150 444
Ratio (jackpot/potential jackpot) 0.25 0.28 0.0001 1 444
Decision (1 = split) 0.54 0.50 0 1 444
Money taken home 4916.96 12000.86 0 100150 444
Money taken home (steal / split) 15693.11 20087.90 3 100150 94
Money taken home (split / split) 4783.64 8440.02 1.83 43950 148
Money left on the table 14426.34 20255.76 100 92330 108
Discussion (1 = starts discussion) 0.5 0.5 0 1 444
Handshake (1 = shake hands) 0.39 0.49 0 1 444
Mutual promise (1 = say promise) 0.25 0.43 0 1 444
Handshake*promise (1 = shake hands and say promise) 0.16 0.37 0 1 444
a A social job is defined as a job in which people care for other people, e.g., doctors, nurses, child minders, social
workers, teachers, police officers, firemen, soldiers.
b Large cities are cities with more than 268,300 inhabitants (based on the Mid-2008 Population Estimates published
by the Office for National Statistics).
c Contestants are estimated to be below or above the age of 40 by personal judgment.
d Contestants secretly state their intended action for the final before the show starts. Note, that the action-
statement is not filmed in the first 18 episodes of series 1. This reduces the data set to 194 episodes.
e Killer balls are counted as zero for all value variables.
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Table VI: Results from ordered probit regressions on outcomes in the PD
Marginal effects
steal/steal (0) split/steal (1) split/split (2)
Player characteristics
Team male 0.159 (0.108) -0.007 (0.029) -0.151* (0.083)
Team female 0.009 (0.073) 0.002 (0.012) -0.010 (0.085)
Team > 40 years -0.080 (0.071) -0.029 (0.041) 0.109 (0.110)
Team < 40 years 0.128* (0.076) 0.011 (0.014) -0.139* (0.076)
Team England 0.140** (0.055) 0.050 (0.032) -0.190** (0.081)
Team small city 0.118** (0.055) 0.022 (0.017) -0.140** (0.065)
Team large city 0.168* (0.101) -0.016 (0.033) -0.152** (0.072)
Index (social closeness) -0.342 (0.230) -0.065 (0.057) 0.407 (0.272)
Learning
Unexperienced (series 1) -0.024 (0.064) -0.005 (0.017) 0.029 (0.081)
Experienced (series 4) -0.134** (0.056) -0.062 (0.051) 0.196* (0.104)
Communication
Handshakes 0.103* (0.061) 0.020* (0.011) -0.122** (0.062)
Promise -0.044 (0.066) 0.112*** (0.017) 0.053 (0.082)
Handshakes*promise -0.306*** (0.108) 0.034 (0.100) 0.340*** (0.067)
Stake size
Log(jackpot) 0.048*** (0.013) 0.009 (0.006) -0.058*** (0.015)
Log(pot. jackpot) -0.092** (0.045) -0.017 (0.015) 0.110** (0.055)
Lying round 1 and 2
Team lied cash -0.089 (0.062) -0.033 (0.040) 0.122 (0.100)
Team lied killer 0.019 (0.070) 0.003 (0.010) -0.022 (0.079)
Team never lied Cash -0.096* (0.053) -0.021 (0.018) 0.117* (0.067)
Team never lied Killer 0.022 (0.057) 0.004 (0.010) -0.025 (0.067)
Wald X 2 42.23***
Log-Likelihood -203.42
Pseudo R2 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.02
N 212
Number of clusters 212
Note: Ordered probit regressions on the mutual decision outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma game, where the
mutual outcome is coded as equaling 0 if both contestants choose “steal”, as equaling 1 if one contestant chooses
“steal” and the other contestant chooses “split”, and as equaling 2 if both contestants choose “split”. The
marginal effect determines how a change in the respective explanatory variable changes the distribution of the
outcome. The “team variables” are indicators and equal 1 if the team is so composed and 0 otherwise, e.g., “team
female” equals 1 if both contestants are female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are corrected for episode clusters. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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Table VII: Results from ordered probit regressions on outcomes in the PD, sub-
sample of contestants who made an unambiguous action-statement
Marginal effects
steal/steal (0) split/steal (1) split/split (2)
Player characteristics
Team male 0.125 (0.131) -0.007 (0.032) -0.118 (0.105)
Team female 0.074 (0.128) 0.001 (0.016) -0.076 (0.117)
Team > 40 years -0.082 (0.114) -0.026 (0.063) 0.108 (0.175)
Team < 40 years 0.168 (0.108) -0.003 (0.027) -0.165 (0.095)
Team England 0.101 (0.081) 0.024 (0.031) -0.125 (0.106)
Team small city 0.083 (0.079) 0.011 (0.020) -0.095 (0.094)
Team large city 0.077 (0.126) -0.002 (0.019) -0.075 (0.110)
Index (social closeness) -0.436 (0.350) -0.055 (0.078) 0.490 (0.388)
Learning
Unexperienced (series 1) 0.010 (0.131) 0.001 (0.011) -0.011 (0.142)
Experienced (series 4) -0.121 (0.083) -0.040 (0.056) 0.161 (0.134)
Communication
Team handshakes 0.132 (0.100) 0.008 (0.027) -0.140* (0.082)
Team promise -0.015 (0.100) -0.063*** (0.008) -0.016 (0.108)
Team handshakes*promise -0.561*** (0.193) -0.023 (0.197) 0.584*** (0.093)
Stake size
Log(jackpot) 0.060*** (0.018) 0.007 (0.009) -0.067*** (0.020)
Log(pot. jackpot) -0.116* (0.060) -0.014 (0.020) 0.130* (0.068)
Lying round 1 and 2
Team lied cash -0.050 (0.114) -0.012 (0.043) 0.062 (0.156)
Team lied killer 0.027 (0.101) 0.002 (0.005) -0.029 (0.105)
Team never lied cash -0.069 (0.075) -0.010 (0.019) 0.080 (0.090)
Team never lied killer -0.013 (0.078) -0.002 (0.011) 0.014 (0.088)
Commitment
Team statement split -0.190*** (0.054) -0.160* (0.085) 0.350*** (0.125)
Team statement steal 0.251** (0.108) -0.044 (0.051) -0.208*** (0.070)
Wald X 2 53.14***
Log-Likelihood -103.70
Pseudo R2 0.18
Adjusted R2 -0.02
N 117
Number of clusters 117
Note: Ordered probit regressions on the mutual decision outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma game, where the mutual
outcome is coded as equaling 0 if both contestants choose “steal”, as equaling 1 if one contestant chooses “steal” and
the other contestant chooses “split”, and as equaling 2 if both contestants choose “split”. Here, subsample of 53.3%
of contestants who make an unambiguous action-statement (either “split” or “steal”) before the show. The marginal
effect determines how a change in the respective explanatory variable changes the distribution of the outcome. The
“team variables” are indicators and equal 1 if the team is so composed and 0 otherwise, e.g., “team female” equals
1 if both contestants are female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for
episode clusters. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
Chapter 2: Cooperation, Communication, and Partner Selection 89
Table VIII: Results from binary probit regressions on switching from the action-
statement
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2)
switch to steal switch to split
Player characteristics
Male -0.065 (0.067) -0.004 (0.099)
Age (> 40 years) -0.227*** (0.082) 0.210* (0.109)
White -0.282 (0.210) -0.023 (0.243)
London -0.133*** (0.047) 0.006 (0.174)
England 0.121** (0.054) -0.280** (0.142)
Student -0.047 (0.119) -0.142 (0.144)
Pensioner 0.361 (0.337) -0.189 (0.159)
Social job (Reputation) 0.014 (0.130) 0.050 (0.142)
Index (social closeness) -0.112 (0.224) 0.709* (0.365)
Opponent characteristics
Opp. student -0.156*** (0.044) 0.112 (0.150)
Opp. pensioner -0.115* (0.061) -0.192 (0.170)
Opp. social job 0.060 (0.137) 0.358*** (0.137)
Communication
Started discussion 0.226*** (0.083) 0.071 (0.093)
Handshakes 0.253** (0.149) -0.253*** (0.096)
Promise 0.435* (0.222) -0.193 (0.191)
Handshake*promise -0.689*** (0.162) 0.505*** (0.112)
Stake Size
Log(jackpot) 0.089*** (0.029) -0.054** (0.023)
Log(pot. jackpot) -0.131* (0.078) 0.248*** (0.095)
Wald χ2 32.18** 29.77**
Log-Likelihood -37.09 -68.97
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.18
Adjusted R2 -0.04 -0.04
N 96 130
Number of clusters 87 108
Note: Model (1): binary probit regression of the decision of player i either to choose “steal,
when announced to split in the action-statement” (yi = 1) or to “split, when announced to
split in the action statement” (yi = 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Model (2): binary
probit regression of the decision of player i either to “split, when announced to steal in the
action-statement” (yi = 1) or to “steal, when announced to steal in the action-statement”
(yi = 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma game. The marginal effect of the respective explanatory
variable determines the effective change of this variable on player i’s predicted probability to
“steal, when announced to split in the action-statement” (“split, when announced to steal
in the action-statement”). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected
for episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table X: Results from binary probit regressions on lying in round 1
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Lied Lied about value Lied about killer
Player characteristics
Male -0.033 (0.044) -0.053 (0.033) 0.061∗ (0.033)
Age (> 40 years) 0.058 (0.046) 0.067∗ (0.038) 0.060∗ (0.036)
White -0.008 (0.074) -0.069 (0.071) -0.051 (0.061)
London -0.246∗∗∗ (0.080) -0.113∗ (0.060) 0.056 (0.063)
Large city 0.137∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.041 (0.040) 0.011 (0.042)
England 0.004 (0.062) -0.014 (0.048) -0.033 (0.050)
Student -0.101 (0.077) -0.075 (0.060) 0.037 (0.063)
Pensioner 0.130 (0.105) 0.212∗∗ (0.102) -0.119∗ (0.062)
Social job (reputation) 0.009 (0.059) -0.034 (0.044) 0.026 (0.049)
Unexperienced (series 1) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.119∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.099∗∗ (0.039)
Experienced (series 4) -0.099∗ (0.054) -0.003 (0.043) -0.096∗∗∗ (0.029)
First to claim 0.004 (0.052) 0.002 (0.041) -0.088∗∗ (0.036)
Last to claim -0.020 (0.049) -0.008 (0.041) -0.022 (0.040)
Balls’ content
Log(total own FR) -0.092∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.074∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.000 (0.006)
Log(total own BR) -0.114∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.041∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.080∗∗∗ (0.007)
Log(total oth. FR) 0.049∗ (0.026) -0.015 (0.019) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.016)
1,2 killers own FR 0.384∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.106∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.036)
1,2 killers own BR 0.374∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.158∗∗∗ (0.039)
1,2 killers oth. FR -0.055 (0.060) 0.054 (0.047) -0.178∗∗∗ (0.047)
3,4 killers oth. FR -0.106 (0.089) -0.037 (0.069) -0.234∗∗∗ (0.026)
Wald χ2 337.3628∗∗∗ 187.0794∗∗∗ 238.8875∗∗∗
Log-Likelihood -350.02 -432.25 -368.86
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.18 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.15 0.22
N 845 845 845
Number of clusters 212 212 212
Note 1: Model (1): binary probit regression of the decision of player i to “lie about a killer and/or value” (yi = 1) or to
“be honest about her balls’ content” (yi = 0) in round 1. Model (2): binary probit regression of the decision of player i to
“lie about her balls’ cash values” (yi = 1) or to “not to lie about her balls’ cash values” (yi = 0) in round 1. Model (3):
binary probit regression of the decision of player i to “lie about her killers” (yi = 1) or to “be honest about her killers”
(yi = 0) in round 1. The marginal effect of the respective explanatory variable determines the effective change of this
variable on player i’s predicted probability to “lie”. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for
episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note 2: FR =ˆ front row; BR =ˆ back row.
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Table XI: Results from ordinary least squares regressions on the difference between
the stated and the true amount in round 1
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Lied Lied about value Lied about killer
Player characteristics
Male -0.276** (0.128) -0.258 (0.158) -0.213 (0.195)
Age (> 40 years) 0.204 (0.138) 0.314* (0.164) 0.011 (0.209)
White -0.032 (0.286) -0.300 (0.297) 0.092 (0.407)
London 0.111 (0.284) -0.086 (0.344) 0.291 (0.415)
Large city -0.028 (0.170) 0.151 (0.210) -0.263 (0.276)
England -0.139 (0.183) -0.362* (0.197) -0.173 (0.292)
Student -0.014 (0.267) 0.155 (0.346) -0.095 (0.339)
Pensioner -0.292 (0.438) -0.297 (0.458) -0.321 (0.584)
Social job (reputation) -0.217 (0.224) -0.227 (0.247) -0.277 (0.359)
Unexperienced (series 1) 0.632*** (0.154) 0.716*** (0.171) 0.463** (0.200)
Experienced (series 4) -0.057 (0.215) 0.030 (0.190) -0.314 (0.343)
First to claim 0.060 (0.171) -0.195 (0.218) 0.495* (0.254)
Last to claim 0.213 (0.153) 0.167 (0.188) 0.140 (0.221)
Balls’ content
Log(total own FR) -0.202*** (0.027) -0.156*** (0.032) -0.238*** (0.046)
Log(total own BR) -0.151*** (0.025) -0.071 (0.058) -0.162*** (0.028)
Log(total oth. FR) 0.277*** (0.083) 0.215** (0.094) 0.326*** (0.120)
1,2 killers own FR 0.187 (0.159) 0.462** (0.210) 0.157 (0.202)
1,2 killers own BR -0.029 (0.154) 0.542*** (0.191)
1,2 killers oth. FR 0.001 (0.162) -0.144 (0.196) 0.074 (0.232)
3,4 killers oth. FR -0.071 (0.294) -0.059 (0.337) -0.352 (0.483)
F-Statistic 6.64*** 4.78*** 4.69***
R2 0.23 0.26 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.21
N 448 270 233
Number of clusters 209 172 173
Note 1: Ordinary least squares regressions on the difference between the claimed and true balls’ contents (yi) for
subsamples of contestants who “lied” (model (1)), “lied about a cash value” (model (2)), and “lied about a killer”
(model (3)) in round 1. The regression coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the expected value of yi
associated with a one-unit increase in a control variable, holding all other control variables constant. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * (p¡0.10), ** (p¡0.05), *** (p¡0.01).
Note 2: FR =ˆ front row; BR =ˆ back row.
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A.3 Estimation method
A.3.1 Modeling the individual decision
In order to explore the individual decision process when playing the prisoner’s dilemma
game, we make use of the bivariate probit model (see e.g., Wooldridge, 2010, Chap. 15).
We build a (index) model around the latent (non-linear) regression
y∗i = α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki + εi, εi ∼ NID(0, σ2) (A.1)
where y∗i is unobservable, α is a constant, x1, ..., xk are (demographic) player character-
istics as well as (endogenous) variables evolved during the game, β denotes the response
coefficient vector, and εi is the random error that is normally, independently, and identi-
cally distributed (NID). We only observe the sign of y∗ that determines the value of the
observed binary response yi, that is
yi = 0 if y∗i ≤ 0; yi = 1 if y∗i > 0.
We can now compute the conditional probability that player i chooses split as
Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Pr(y∗i > 0|Xi) = Φ(α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki = Φ(m),
where α, β1, ..., βk are parameters to be estimated, Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, and m denotes the index α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki.
In order to quantify the influence of the explanatory variables on the predicted probabil-
ity to split we calculate marginal effects. The marginal effect for the j-th independent
(continuous) variable is computed as
MEj =
∂Pr(yi = 1|Xi)
∂xji
= φ(m)βj j = 2, ...,K
where φ(·) is the standard normal density function. The magnitude of the derivative is
proportional to φ(m)βj . If xj is a dummy variable, the marginal effect is computed as the
discrete difference
MEdiscretej =
4Pr(yi = 1|Xi)
4xji = Φ(m|xji = 1)− Φ(m|xji = 0), j = 2, ...,K.
Hence, the marginal effect of an explanatory variable is the effect of an effective percentage
change of this variable on player i’s predicted probability to split, given that all other
explanatory variable are held constant.
We also include various interactions of two discrete (dummy) variables in the regression.
Here, the interaction effect is defined as the change in player i’s predicted probability
to split for a change in both interacted variables. For the estimation of the interaction
effect we follow the method proposed by Norton et al. (2004). In particular, for the two
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interacted dummy variables x1 and x2, we model the conditional probability to split as
Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Φ(α+ β1x1i + β2x2i + β12x1ix2i + ...βkxki),
with α, β1, β2, β12, ..., βk being the parameters to be estimated. The interaction effect is
equal to the discrete double difference
ME12 =
42Pr(yi = 1|Xi)
4x1i4x2i
=Φ(m)− Φ(β1 + α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki
− Φ(β2 + α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki) + Φ(α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki).
Overall, we compute marginal effects at the sample mean. We judge the goodness of fit by
the adjusted McFaddens Pseudo R2, that is a measure for the proximity of the model to
the observed data. Standard errors are computed by the delta method. The test statistic
follows a χ2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
A.3.2 Modeling the mutual decision
In order to analyze team cooperation rates, we estimate ordered probits (see e.g., Wooldridge,
2010, Chap. 15). Here, we make use of the inherent order of outcomes by coding the team
outcome as equaling 0 if both players choose steal (yi = 0), equaling 1 if one player
chooses steal and the other chooses split (yi = 1), and equaling 2 if both players choose
split (yi = 2). The model for the latent variable is identical to the one of the bivariate
probit (see equation (A.1)). The relation between the observed variable yi and the latent
variable y∗i is given by
yi = 0 if y∗i < τ1; yi = 1 if τ1 ≤ y∗i < τ2; yi = 2 if y∗i ≥ τ2.
The boundaries between the three cases are determined by the thresholds τ1 and τ2, which
need to be estimated along with the rest of the parameters. The probabilities of the three
events yi = 0; 1; 2 are given by Pr(yi = 0) = Φ(τ1−m), Pr(yi = 1) = Φ(τ2−m)−Φ(τ1−m),
Pr(yi = 2) = Φ(m− τ2), with m = α+ β1x1i + ...+ βkxki.
Since we are interested how a change in an explanatory variable changes the distribution
of the outcome variable, we compute marginal effects. In particular, the marginal effect
of a variable xj for the l−th response is given by
MEjl =
∂Pr(yi = l|Xi)
∂xji
= [φ(τl−1 −m)− φ(τl −m)]βj ,
where again φ denotes the standard normal density function. If xj is a dummy variable,
the marginal effect is computed as the discrete difference
MEdiscretejl = 4Pr(yi = l|Xi) = Pr(yi = l|(Xi) +4xj)− Pr(yi = l|(Xi)).
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The marginal effect of an interaction between two discrete variables will again be treated
differently, since the marginal effects of the interacted variables involve the coefficient of
the interaction term, i.e., m = α+β1x1i+β2x2i+β12x1ix2i+...+βkxki. In the computation
we follow the method proposed by Mallick (2009), i.e., the marginal effect of x1 (analog
for x2) for the l-th response is calculated as
ME1l =
∂Pr(yi = l|Xi)
∂x1i
= [φ(τl−1 −m)− φ(τl −m)](β1 + β12x2i);
and the magnitude of the interaction effect for the l-th response is computed as
ME12l =
∂Pr(yi = l|Xi)
∂x1i∂x2i
=[φ(τl−1 −m)− φ(τl −m)]β12
− [φ′(τl−1 −m)− φ′(τl −m)](β1 + β12x2i)(β2 + β12ix1i),
where φ′(·) denotes the first derivative of the normal density function w.r.t. its argument.
As above, standard errors are computed by the delta method.
A.4 Voting behavior
A.4.1 Material voting criteria
Assuming that it is a contestant’s aim to maximize stake size, the contestant’s voting
decisions can be described by means of material voting criteria. For each episode and
round we define three criteria, each pointing at the contestant who is in the weakest
position in material terms with respect to the particular criterion.
• Cash-Criterion (CC): constructed on the basis of the monetary values of balls
and declares the contestant with the lowest amount of money to be voted to leave
the game (a killer ball is counted as a ball with zero value).
• Killer-Criterion (KC): accounts for the number of killer balls per contestant and
declares the contestant with the highest number of killers to be voted off the game.
• Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC): constructed on the basis of the weighted monetary
values of balls and declares the contestant with the lowest amount of money to be
voted to leave the game (a killer ball reduces the total to one-tenth of the original
value, a second killer ball reduces it to one-hundredth and so forth).
Within each criterion we distinguish three different time-dimensions:
• Ex-ante: refers to the content of the two balls on the front row.
• Claimed: refers to the content of the two front row balls and the claims about the
hidden back row balls.
• Ex-post: refers to the content of all revealed balls.
By means of these three, respectively nine criteria, we analyze to what extent each criterion
explains the contestant’s voting decision within and between round 1 and 2.
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Descriptive results
Descriptive results are reported in Table XII-XIV in Appendix A.4.3. Note that we exclude
all episodes which have a voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or a tie in round 2, since
it is analytically impossible to reconstruct the contestants’ individual decision for these
episodes. Additionally, in Table XIII and Table XIV in Appendix A.4.3 we restrict the
sample to only those contestants who take part in both rounds (with an almost equal
share of males (48.5%) and females (51.5%)); thereby we can compare the voting results
for both rounds using the decisions of the same contestants.
First we want to look at the proportions of contestants who are effectively voted off in line
with the three criteria (Table XII in Appendix A.4.3). Focusing on the time-dimensions
of each criterion, in round 1 we find that most contestants vote in line with the prediction
of the ex-ante CKC and ex-ante CC, as well as the claimed KC. In round 2 instead, the
ex-post CKC and the ex-post CC dominate, but the claimed KC again yields the best
prediction. Overall the KC, especially when looking at the claimed values, fits best: In
round 1, 81.1% of contestants who are voted off have the highest number of killer balls
both on their front row as well as claimed on their back row; in round 2 this proportion
slightly reduces to 70.3%, but still exceeds the CC and CKC.
The findings are confirmed when looking at the proportions of contestants who receive a
vote when predicted by each criterion. We additionally distinguish the data by gender
(Table XIII in Appendix A.4.3). As above, focussing on the time-dimensions of each
criterion, we find that contestants most frequently vote in line with the ex-ante CKC and
ex-ante CC in round 1, but in line with the ex-post CKC and ex-post CC in round 2.
Concerning the KC, contestants vote in line with the claimed KC in round 1 and the
ex-ante KC in round 2. Separating these findings by gender, we observe that significantly
more males than females vote in line with the claimed KC and ex-ante CKC in round 1
(p = 0.024 and p = 0.034) whereas in round 2 more females vote in line with the ex-post
CC (p = 0.021).
Most noticeable, in both rounds the contestants take the claims about killer balls seriously,
although one might argue that claims are only cheap talk and should therefore be ignored.
But a claim about a killer is “self-signaling”: If a contestant states to have a killer ball it
is the truth.
Concluding, contestants seem to base their voting decision on the ex-ante criteria in round
1, and put more weight on the claimed and ex-post criteria in round 2. This switch maybe
explained by the different extent of information a contestant has at a certain time.
A.4.2 Information based separability of contestants
Players have different information about the distribution of balls’ values depending on the
round of pre-play. In round 1, the contestants face a situation in which they must base
their voting decision on an ambiguous distribution of outcomes, i.e., only the two values
of the front row balls are common knowledge. In round 2, the contestants have additional
information. After round 1, all contestants have to reveal the content of their back row
balls. All twelve balls that are then carried over from round 1 to round 2 are now common
knowledge to the three remaining contestants, and only the two newly added cash values
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are unknown. Therefore, a contestant can be in two different states: First, if the two new
values are within the revealed balls on the front rows, or if a particular contestant has
at least one of the two new values on her own back row and the other is observable on
any other contestant’s front row, she knows the exact distribution of values in play. From
an informational point of view a contestant who knows all ball values in play makes her
voting decision in a situation where only the precise allocation of the values is uncertain.
Second, if both new values remain unobservable, a contestant again lacks information, but
not as much as in round 1.27 Naturally the extent of information should influence the
contestants’ voting decision, i.e., in round 2 contestants are able to infer - up to a certain
extent - whether a contestant claims the truth. We expect that a contestant, who faces
uncertainty about the allocation of balls - she is able to infer the true content of balls in
play - to base her voting decision on the ex-post criteria. Instead, we expect contestants
who face ambiguity about the distribution of balls’ values - she cannot infer the true con-
tent of all balls in play - to vote most frequently by means of the ex-ante criteria.
In Table XIV in Appendix A.4.3 we present proportions of the contestants’ voting decision
by means of the three criteria and their time-dimensions as well as contestants’ informa-
tional background. We had to restrict the data set to 573 contestants in order to compare
the same contestants in round 1 and 2. In round 2, we identify 50 contestants to be in
an uncertain state, and 241 contestants to be in an ambiguous state. In round 1, all 573
contestants are in the same ambiguous situation.
As suggested, we find that the proportion of uncertain contestants who vote in line with
the ex-post CKC is significantly higher than the one of ambiguous contestants (p=0.004
and p=0.000). Additionally, the spread between proportions of contestants who vote in
line with the ex-post or the claimed CKC is much larger for contestants facing uncertainty
than ambiguity. For instance, in round 2 70% of all contestants facing uncertainty vote by
means of the claimed CKC, but only 55% of all contestants in round 1, compared to 64%
of contestants facing ambiguity in round 2. The same holds for the ex-post CKC, as well
as for males and females with respect to both criteria. Besides we find a different voting
pattern for males and females facing uncertainty : In round 2, a much larger proportion of
males votes in line with the ex-ante CC and ex-ante CKC than females. But the propor-
tions are almost equal when contestants are either ambiguous or in round 1.
Summary With the help of the nine (material) criteria we find a possibility to explain
the voting decision of more than two thirds of contestants.28 Player give most weight to
the three killer criteria, and, in round 2, they seem to be able to infer the truth behind
the claims.
27We also analyze the case when only one of the two new values is known to a contestant,
termed partial ambiguity (see Table XIV in Appendix A.4.3). But for the sake of clarity we limit
the discussion to the cases when both new values are either known or not.
28Over the whole sample, we find only 22 contestants (2.8%) who do not vote in line with neither
criterion, and only 65 contestants (8.3%) who never vote in line with an ex-ante criterion.
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A.4.3 Tables voting behavior
Table XII: Voting decision by means of objective criteria
After round 1b After round 2
Criteria to predict a player in out in out
who should be voted to leavea Row % Row % Row % Row %
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
stay 87.2 12.8 72.3 27.7
vote to leave 38.3 61.7 55.4 44.6
claimed
stay 76.7 23.3 70.0 30.0
vote to leave 69.8 30.2 59.9 40.1
ex-post
stay 83.0 17.0 74.8 25.2
vote to leave 50.9 49.1 50.5 49.5
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
stay 92.0 8.0 83.6 16.4
vote to leave 23.9 76.1 32.9 67.1
claimed
stay 93.7 6.3 85.1 14.9
vote to leave 18.9 81.1 29.7 70.3
ex-post
stay 86.6 13.4 80.9 19.1
vote to leave 40.1 59.9 38.3 61.7
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
stay 87.7 12.3 73.2 26.8
vote to leave 36.9 63.1 53.6 46.4
claimed
stay 83.3 16.7 74.1 25.9
vote to leave 50.0 50.0 51.8 48.2
ex-post
stay 83.2 16.8 74.5 25.5
vote to leave 50.5 49.5 50.9 49.1
N 666 222 444 222
a We take into account that the prediction might not be unique per
episode, i.e., more than one player might have a prediction to be
eliminated.
b Each round, 222 contestants are eliminated. In round 1 (2) 55.4%
(52.2%) of the eliminated players are men.
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Table XIII: Voting decision per player by means of objective criteria
Players voted by means of
all (%) men (%) women (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
Round 1 72.4 74.5 70.5
Round 2 66.5 67.3 65.8
claimed
Round 1 36.0 38.5 33.6
Round 2 64.4 62.6 66.1
ex-post
Round 1 55.3 55.4 55.3
Round 2 70.2 66.9 73.2
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
Round 1 82.1 83.0 81.3
Round 2 81.9 84.9 79.1
claimed
Round 1 83.6 85.5 81.8
Round 2 78.9 80.2 77.6
ex-post
Round 1 70.9 72.7 69.2
Round 2 76.3 77.0 75.6
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
Round 1 71.0 74.1 68.1
Round 2 65.8 67.3 64.4
claimed
Round 1 55.0 58.3 51.9
Round 2 63.5 61.9 65.1
ex-post
Round 1 60.4 61.5 59.3
Round 2 66.8 65.5 68.1
Na 573 278 (48.5%) 295 (51.5%)
a Note: For purpose of comparability, we restrain the sample to 573
observations including only those players, who are not being elimi-
nated in round 1. Further we consider only those decisions for which
we can trace back for whom a player voted, i.e., we exclude episodes
with a voting of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 and 1:1:1 in round 2.
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Table XIV: Voting decision per player under risk or ambiguity (by means of ob-
jective criteria)
Round 2 Round 1
Players vote by means of Uncertainty Partial ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
all 64.0 66.3 67.2 72.4
men 82.4 64.9 67.7 74.5
women 54.5 67.6 66.7 70.5
claimed
all 58.0 67.7 61.8 36.0
men 52.9 65.7 60.6 38.5
women 60.6 69.6 63.2 33.6
ex-post
all 74.0 70.2 69.3 55.3
men 70.6 66.4 66.9 55.4
women 75.8 73.6 71.9 55.3
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
all 84.3 79.8 84.0 82.1
men 82.4 81.3 89.1 83.0
women 85.3 78.4 78.3 81.3
claimed
all 84.0 75.9 81.3 83.6
men 94.1 76.9 81.9 85.5
women 78.8 75.0 80.7 81.8
ex-post
all 78.0 75.2 77.2 70.9
men 88.2 76.9 75.6 72.7
women 72.7 73.6 78.9 69.2
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
all 60.0 64.9 68.0 71.0
men 76.5 62.7 70.9 74.1
women 51.5 66.9 64.9 68.1
claimed
all 70.0 61.7 64.3 55.0
men 70.6 59.0 63.8 58.3
women 69.7 64.2 64.9 51.9
ex-post
all 76.0 66.3 65.6 60.4
men 88.2 64.9 63.0 61.5
women 69.7 67.6 68.4 59.3
Na 50 282 241 573
a Note: The sample is restricted to the same 573 players in round 1 and 2.
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Chapter 3
Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative
Behavior and Beauty
joint with Donja Darai
“All that glitters is not gold;
Often have you heard that told.”
William Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice (1596-1598)
1 Introduction
Beginning with the seminal paper of Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), which identifies
a wage gap based on physical attractiveness using labor market data of the U.S. and
Canada, economists started to be interested in the effects of physical attractiveness
on economic decision making. For instance, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) show that
the beauty premium for attractive people is present in a controlled laboratory labor
market experiment. Eckel and Petrie (2011) provide evidence that people have a
willingness to pay for the possibility to see a picture of their counterpart before
making their decision in a trust game, suggesting that valuable information is con-
veyed by the physical appearance of people. However, the transmission channel of
the effect of physical attractiveness on economic decision making is still only partly
understood. The most prominent theory is “beauty-is-good” stereotyping. People
assign a wide range of positive personality traits and abilities to physically attrac-
tive people and believe that physically attractive people are, for instance, smarter,
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more trustworthy, more likable, and/or more talented (see e.g., Dion et al., 1972).
Accordingly, effects of attractiveness are driven by peoples’ beliefs about the attrac-
tive, which are then reflected in their behavior towards the attractive. But, not all
that glitters is gold. There is only very limited evidence that the “beauty-is-good”
stereotype is accurate, that is, physically attractive people do not behave differently
than less attractive people.
This study investigates the relationship between attractiveness and cooperative be-
havior and shows that the beauty premium is also present in a high-stakes field set-
ting with two-sided communication and previous interaction between players. We
provide evidence that physical attractiveness affects cooperative behavior in mixed-
gender interactions only. That is, people’s behavior is biased towards cooperation
when facing someone attractive of the other sex.
Specifically, to study cooperative behavior, we survey data from 211 episodes of the
British television game show “Golden Ball”. At the end of the show, two finalists
play for a jackpot. The rules of this game follow a slightly modified version of a
simultaneous one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game: if both contestants choose to coop-
erate, the jackpot is split equally; if one chooses to defect while the other cooperates,
the former receives the entire jackpot and the latter gets nothing; if both defect,
they both go home empty-handed. The accumulation of the jackpot takes place
in two rounds of pre-play previous to the prisoner’s dilemma and requires neither
the contestants’ effort nor cognitive ability. On average, the stake size amounts
to £12 912. During the two rounds of pre-play, the two finalists are selected out
of four initial contestants. The game show data are then combined with data on
the contestants’ facial appearance. We asked 728 independent evaluators to rate
portrait photographs of the contestants along various dimension such as physical
attractiveness, sympathy, trustworthiness, or likeability.
Our analysis shows that contestants are significantly more cooperative towards a
facially attractive opponent than towards a less facially attractive opponent, inde-
pendent of demographic characteristics, as for instance gender and age, stake size, or
communication. Facially attractive contestants are therefore awarded with signifi-
cantly higher earnings in the prisoner’s dilemma. Quantifying this beauty premium,
a one-standard deviation increase in facial attractiveness, at the margin, causes the
contestant’s expected earnings to rise by up to 2 153, as well as the contestant’s
probability to obtain positive earnings by up to 5.9 percentage points. This effect is
not driven by non-cooperative behavior of the attractive. With minor qualifications
for younger and female contestants, we find no correlation between a contestant’s
own facial attractiveness and cooperation.
Although the attractiveness effect likewise applies for men and women, we show that
it is limited to mixed-gender interactions only. Contestants are only biased in their
decision to cooperate when facing an attractive opponent of the other sex. Thus, the
attractiveness effect is not present in same-gender interactions. This finding offers
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a new perspective on the underlying mechanism of the effects caused by attrac-
tiveness. Our results are not driven by people believing that attractive others are
more likely to cooperate, but rather by people having a preference to cooperate more
with someone towards whom they are personally attracted. Furthermore, we cannot
identify a beauty premium or plainness penalty during the pre-play, which clearly
supports our conjecture that personal attraction serves as the underlying transmis-
sion channel of physical attractiveness on people’s behavior in pairwise interactions
and that attractiveness matters most when objective information is missing.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the
related literature. Section 3 provides the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data
sets. Section 5 presents the results. In Section 6 we discuss the results with respect
to the underlying transmission channels. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
There is long history of research on physical attractiveness in psychology, sociology,
and evolutionary biology, which attracted economists and also political scientists to
investigate the impact of physical attractiveness on economic and political outcomes.
In this section we provide an overview of the most important results and theories.
2.1 Physical attractiveness and economic success
Several studies show that attractiveness leads to higher economic gains in various
economic interactions in the field.
Labor markets Attractive people generally fare better in the labor market, i.e.,
they are more likely to be hired, earn higher salaries, and are more likely to be
promoted. In their seminal work Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) use a broad house-
hold survey of the U.S. and Canada and show that physically attractive employees
earn about 10 to 15 percent higher salaries than unattractive workers, independent
of the occupation. The size of the beauty premium is comparable to the race and
gender wage gaps in the U.S. labor market.1 Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) show
that the results even survive in an experimental labor market involving a real-effort
task. In the experiment participants in the role of employers pay wages to partici-
pants in the role of workers who perform a maze-solving task. Although attractive
employees are not better in solving the task than unattractive employees, attractive
1Studies on gender wage differences predict men to earn up to 25 percent more than women
in the U.S., unadjusted for gender differences in characteristics. But the gender wage gap can
be explained to large parts by differences in skills, experience, or occupational types (see O’Neill,
2003).
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employees are awarded higher wages, suggesting that employers hold stereotypical
expectations about the performance of physically attractive employees. Ruﬄe and
Shtudiner (2010) explore the value of beauty in the hiring process by examining
the response rates to CVs sent to companies in Israel. Two CVs that only differ in
containing a portrait photograph of the job applicant or not, are sent to the same
company. They find that attractive males are significantly more likely to be called
back and invited for a job interview than no-picture males and more than twice
as likely as plain-looking males. Surprisingly, no-picture females have the highest
response rate, which is 22 percent higher than the response rate of plain females and
30 percent higher than the one of attractive females. The gender specific beauty
penalty with respect to women contradicts most findings in the literature.
Political elections In political science, several studies show that physical at-
tractiveness has a significant impact on the evaluation of candidates and thereby
on electoral outcomes (see the survey by Ottati and Deiger, 2002). For instance,
Berggren et al. (2012) study political elections in Finland and show that a one-
standard deviation increase in beauty raises the average non-incumbent candidate’s
votes by 20 percent. Further evidence is provided by Rosar et al. (2008) who show
that more attractive candidates receive a significantly higher poll in a German state
election, especially when the average attractiveness of the candidates in the electoral
district is low. Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) claim that politicians are not elected
on the basis of their ability, but that voters rather infer competence form the politi-
cians’ facial appearance. Recruiting adults and children raters in Switzerland, they
find that naive voters, such as children, can predict results of the 2002 French par-
liamentary election retrospectively by rating the competence of the candidates from
their photographs.
Pro-social behavior Beauty has been analyzed in various experimental settings
with strategic interaction, providing evidence that people behave more generously or
cooperatively towards physically attractive people. Solnick and Schweitzer (1999)
investigate how recipients’ physical attractiveness affects offers in an ultimatum
game and show that attractive respondents receive significantly higher offers than
unattractive respondents. Supporting these results, Rosenblat (2008) shows that
female allocators treat physically and vocally attractive recipients more generously in
dictator games.2 Andreoni and Petrie (2008) analyze a repeated public goods game
and find that attractive players earn more than unattractive ones. This observed
beauty premium is unrelated to the own contributions of attractive players, but
can be attributed to the presence of an attractive group member, that increases
the other players’ contributions to the public good. In the trust game, Wilson and
2Rosenblat’s finding that physically attractive recipients do not achieve better outcomes in
speech-only conditions suggests that voice matters only when combined with an attractive photo-
graph.
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Eckel (2006) demonstrate that attractive trustees are trusted more and that others
expect attractive players to be more trusting than unattractive players. In addition,
the failure to meet these expectations may lead to a “beauty penalty”.3 Stirrat
and Perrett (2010) focus on the width-to-height ratio of male faces, which has been
shown to be a “sexually dimorphic, testosterone-linked trait” (p. 349) that serves
as a predictor for male aggression. In a laboratory experiment on the trust game
they find that males with a large width-to-height ratio are trusted less, and are also
less trustworthy themselves compared to males with a more narrow facial width.
Their finding provides further evidence that trustworthiness is strongly linked and
based in facial features. Mulford et al. (1998) examine repeated exchange relations
associated with a prisoner’s dilemma game. The results indicate that subjects are
more cooperative if pooled with an attractive partner, but attractiveness is based
on the perception of the one subject that makes the choice.4
2.2 Transmission channels of physical attractiveness
There are several theories about the underlying transmission channel of the effect
of physical attractiveness on economic success.
“Beauty-is-good” stereotype Ample research in sociology and psychology has
established that people attribute a variety of positive characteristics and qualities to
physically attractive people, and negative ones to physically unattractive people. In
their pioneering study, Dion et al. (1972) claim that “what is beautiful is good” by
demonstrating that attractive people are believed to have better career prospects, to
possess socially desirable traits, to lead happier lives and to be happier overall. The
link between beauty and goodness suggests the existence of a beauty stereotype.
This paper spawned a large literature on the physical attractiveness stereotype,
showing for both sexes a robust association between physically attractiveness and
cognitive ability, competence, sociability, popularity, dominance, sexual experience,
mentally health, and social skills (see reviews by Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992;
Langlois et al., 2000).5 These believes let people treat attractive ones more favorably,
resulting in higher economic gains for the attractive. The physical attractiveness
stereotype is particularly strong if there is no other information available about
a person. This favoritism would be rational, if the “beauty-is-good” stereotype is
3In a further experimental study on the trust game, Eckel and Petrie (2011) investigate the
informational value of a photograph and the differential desire to acquire this information. Subjects
are willing to pay to see the photograph of their partner whom they transact with, indicating that
a face has a positive informational value.
4It is questionable whether the used attractiveness rating can be taken as an objective measure
of the subject’s attractiveness because it is not elicited from third-party judges.
5Also, research on babyface-appearances indicates that people with a babyface will be - at all
ages - attributed childlike traits, i.e., they are perceived as more naive and more honest than people
with a more mature facial appearance (see e.g., Berry and McArthur, 1985).
Chapter 3: Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative Behavior and Beauty 110
accurate. But there is only very limited evidence. Jackson et al. (1995) show in their
meta-analysis that there is no significant correlation between physical attractiveness
and intelligence for adults and only a modest one for children. Zebrowitz et al.
(2002), and Kanazawa (2011) support this finding, showing that attractiveness is
positively correlated with IQ scores from childhood trough middle adulthood, using
large samples from the U.S. and UK. Mueller and Mazur (1997) use data from a
cohort of military officers and find that recruits with a high ranked facial appearance
are also high ranked in their physical fitness. Concerning social skillfulness and
likability there is empirical evidence that physically attractive people indeed possess
better social skills and are more likable (see e.g., Goldman and Lewis, 1977; Erwin
and Calev, 1984).6 Hope and Mindell (1994) show that the physical attractiveness
stereotype is especially accurate for socially skillful and attractive people. Lastly,
concerning non-material gains, Anderson et al. (2001) find that physically attractive
people receive higher social status in groups.
“Vocal attractiveness” stereotype and negotiation Zuckerman and Driver
(1989) and Zuckerman et al. (1990) have shown that physical attractiveness is
positively correlated with vocal attractiveness, proclaiming the existence of a vocal
attractiveness stereotype, i.e., “what sounds beautiful is good”. Rosenblat (2008)
develops the theory that the underlying transmission channel between physical at-
tractiveness and economic success is the “negotiation channel”. She shows that
vocal attractiveness helps to succeed in bargaining interactions and leads to higher
economic gains using a laboratory experiment on the dictator game.
Taste-based discrimination Probably the most well-known transmission chan-
nel is the theory of taste-based discrimination, proposed by Becker (1957). Phys-
ically attractive people are favored because people enjoy being or working with
them more than with plain looking people. Discrimination is based upon preju-
dices correlated with people’s personal characteristics and is rational in the sense
that interactions with such a person generate a (dis)utility for the discriminator in
case of positive (negative) discrimination. Belot et al. (2012) find that attractive
contestants of a Dutch television game show are positively discriminated against
unattractive ones in proceeding to the final stage of the show. However, this theory
fails to explain why attractive people are also treated more favorably in one-shot
interactions.7
6Goldman and Lewis (1977) rated the social skills during telephone calls such that the raters
were not influenced by the physical appearance of the subject.
7In particular, attractive contestants are much more likely to reach the final round of the show,
even though they are not performing better or are not more confident than unattractive contestants.
Performance in this show means being the first to correctly answer trivia questions. Attractive
contestants are believed to be more confident and to be more cooperative. Besides, at the end of
the show a prisoner’s dilemma – as we study – is played. Belot et al. (2012) also test for effects
of attractiveness on cooperative behavior, however they find no significant effects. This might be
caused by a too homogeneous sample of finalists from the selection of attractive contestants during
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Educational attainment and self-evaluation Judge et al. (2009) provide em-
pirical evidence that physical attractiveness positively influences educational attain-
ment and self-evaluation and thereby the person’s economic success. Related is the
idea of self-fulfilling prophecies (see, e.g., Eagly et al., 1991). Physical attractiveness
outshines other personality traits and links them together, such that the different
treatment by others induces physically attractive people to actually behave in the
way it is expected from them (see e.g., Berry and Zebrowitz, 1986).
3 Hypotheses
In line with the literature, we expect that facially attractive people do not behave
differently than less facially attractive people such that they should be no more or
less cooperative in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Hypothesis 1. Facially attractive contestants are no more or less likely to cooperate
than less facially attractive contestants.
But, since physical attractive people seem to be more successful in economic terms,
we expect that facially attractive contestants are treated differently in the prisoner’s
dilemma, in particular, we expect that facially attractive contestants receive a more
cooperative responding than less facially attractive people.
Hypothesis 2. Contestants are more likely to cooperate with a facially attractive
opponent than with a less facially attractive opponent.
Studies of dating and marital choice have shown that people tend to pair off with
a partner who is similar to themselves in terms of physical attractiveness (see e.g.,
Berscheid et al., 1971; Murstein, 1972). Therefore, one could expect that pairs of
contestants who are similar in terms of facial attractiveness behave differently than
contestants in mixed-pairs in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Hypothesis 3. Pairs of contestants who are similar in terms of facial attractiveness
behave differently than contestants who are unsimilar in terms of facial attractiveness
in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Further, we expect facially attractive contestants to obtain higher monetary gains,
i.e., a monetary beauty premium. In the (modified) prisoner’s dilemma, a contestant
always receives a non-negative payoff, if her opponent cooperates. Presuming that
Hypothesis 2 holds, facially attractive contestants should take more money home
from play than less facially attractive contestants.
the pre-play.
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Hypothesis 4. Facially attractive contestants earn more money than less facially
attractive contestants.
One may also expect that there are differences with respect to gender and age. On
the basis of studies about gender differences in cooperative behavior (e.g., Kahn
et al., 1971; Ortmann and Tichy, 1999), males and females might approach the
prisoner’s dilemma with different concerns. However, the results are ambiguous.8
From the literature one could, for instance, expect attractive females to be more
cooperative than males (see Ortmann and Tichy, 1999), and since males tend to be
more likely to do females a favor (see Ashmore and Longo, 1995), a male contestant
might be more cooperative if he faces an attractive female opponent, or vice versa.
Studies about differences in cooperative behavior with respect to age are very limited
and often report effects on age as a byproduct of their research.9 Thus, we have no
clear-cut hypothesis concerning effects of age and gender on cooperation.
4 Data
4.1 The television game show “Golden Balls”
We collect field data from the British television game show “Golden Balls”. In the
final stage of the show, two contestants play for a jackpot via a slightly modified one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Each finalist needs to simultaneously select among
two choices: cooperate (“split”) or defect (“steal”). Before the prisoner’s dilemma
game is played, the contestants have to pass two rounds of pre-play in which stakes
are accumulated for the jackpot and in which the two finalists are selected.10
Table I presents summary statistics about the outcomes of the prisoner’s dilemma
game and of the contestants’ personal characteristics. The unilateral cooperation
8In an experiment on the prisoner’s dilemma game Kahn et al. (1971) find that overall male
subjects tend to be more cooperative than female subjects, and that females are more cooperative
when playing the game with a male opponent than with one of the same sex. Controversially,
Ortmann and Tichy (1999) find that women cooperate significantly more than men in a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma in the laboratory, but cooperation rates equalize over time. This matches
evidence from psychology that males are motivated to win and females are more concerned with
interpersonal situation than with winning (see e.g., Amidjaja and Vinacke, 1965). For a survey on
gender differences in preferences see Croson and Gneezy (2009).
9Using data from television games shows, e.g., List (2006) finds that older contestants (age
≥ 31) are significantly more likely to cooperate than younger contestants (age < 31); whereas
Belot et al. (2010) finds no age effect.
10The show starts with four contestants and after each pre-play round one contestant is voted to
leave the game by the other contestants. In the final round the prisoner’s dilemma game is played.
The accumulation of the jackpot does not involve contestant’s cognitive ability or an effort task.
Throughout the game show contestants face each other and are allowed to communicate with each
other. For a detailed description of the game show see Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.
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rate is 54%, and contestants mutually cooperate (defect) in 32% (25%) of cases.
54% percent of final players are female and the mean age is 37, with an age interval
from 18 to above 70. On average, the jackpot amounts to £12 912.
Table I: Summary statistics Golden Balls
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Decision variables
Cooperatea 0.54 0.5 0 1 422
Mutual decision 1.07 0.76 0 2 422
(0=“steal-steal”, 1=“steal-split”, 2=“split-split”)
Amount money taken home 4 614.8 10 799.03 0 93 250 422
Demographics
Male 0.46 0.5 0 1 422
Age (cont.)b 3.21 1.1 1 6.5 422
Age of male (cont.) 3.26 1.07 1 6.4 422
Age of female (cont.) 3.19 1.09 1.25 6.6 422
White 0.94 0.25 0 1 422
London 0.11 0.32 0 1 422
England (1 = ENG, 0 = SCO, WAL, NIR, IRL) 0.85 0.36 0 1 420
Social job (reputation)c 0.16 0.36 0 1 421
Unexperienced (series 1) 0.19 0.39 0 1 422
Experienced (series 4) 0.19 0.39 0 1 422
Stake size
Jackpot 12912.33 18213.95 3 93250 422
Potential jackpotd 50329.69 29946.46 5000 168100 422
Pre-play & communication
Accumulated most money 0.5 0.5 0 1 422
Selected higher values in bin/win 0.5 0.5 0 1 422
Selected most killers in bin/win 0.33 0.47 0 1 422
“Should have left the game”e 0.26 0.44 0 1 422
Lied during pre-play 0.62 0.49 0 1 422
Promise or vow 0.42 0.494 0 1 422
Handshake 0.33 0.47 0 1 422
a Separated by gender and age, men (women) are found to cooperate in 51% (56%) of the observations; and older
contestants (≥ 37 years) cooperate more often than younger contestants (< 37 years), with cooperation rates of
63% and 46%, respectively.
b Age is judged on a 7-item scale (see questionnaire and section 4.2), where 3=“30-40”, and 4=“40-50” implying that
the scale average of 3.21 equals a mean age of 37 years.
c A social job is defined as a job in which people care for other people, e.g., doctors, nurses, child minders, social
workers, teachers, police officers, firemen, soldiers.
d Maximal amount of money the contestants potentially can gain in the prisoner’s dilemma.
e The variable “should have left the game” points at the player who is the “weakest” in material terms in round 2.
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4.2 Evaluation of facial appearance
We evaluate the contestants’ facial appearance using a panel of independent raters.
The raters are recruited at the Euro-Airport Basel, at the University of Zurich, and
at the University of the elderly of Zurich.11 All 844 contestants are judged by 728
raters and, from those, 365 raters judged the 422 finalists. Each rater was asked
to individually rate the facial appearance of five randomly assigned contestants, of
which two or three were male or female. On average, a finalist is judged by 4.3
raters.
Table II reports summary statistics for the finalists’ raters and Table X in the
Appendix for all contestants’ raters. The mean age of the 365 raters is 41 years and
50% are male.
Table II: Summary statistics of the finalists’ raters
Rater’s variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Male 0.5 0.5 0 1 365
Age (in years) 40.88 15.54 17 93 361
Age of male (in years) 41.58 15.60 17 93 183
Age of female (in years) 40.15 15.50 18 86 178
Female (≥ 40.15 years) 53.51 10.36 41 86 86
Female (< 40.15 years) 27.66 6.38 18 40 92
Male (≥ 41.58 years) 55.21 11.42 42 93 85
Male (< 41.58 years) 29.76 6.28 17 41 98
The survey is questionnaire based. For an illustration of a sample questionnaire
see Figure I. Each questionnaire contains two portrait photographs of the same
contestant. To receive non-biased evaluations and to reduce measurement error,
these photographs are all selected from the same two sequences of the game show
such that the photograph showed once a neutral facial expression with a view to the
camera and once a view to the side of the camera.12
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. In the first part, raters were asked
to judge the contestant with respect to her age on a 7-item scale, with the categories
fitting the person either “<20”, “20-30”, “30-40”, “40-50”, “50-60”, “60-70”, “>70”.
The second part includes assessments of the contestant’s appearance using 4 opposite
word pairs, i.e., “attractive - unattractive”, “likable - unlikable”, “trustworthy -
untrustworthy”, and “honest - dishonest”. The photographs were rated on a 1-to-7
point scale, where 1 equals very unattractive, 4 comprises a neutral position and 7
11The University of Zurich provides lectures for a senior audience, that are mainly attended by
retired people.
12If possible we chose a neutral facial expression of the contestant, otherwise a positive one was
chosen, but never a negative or disadvantageous one.
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equals very attractive.13 In the last part of the questionnaire we asked the raters
to give a binary response (Yes/No) to the two statements “this person’s appearance
helps him/her in life” and “this person strikes me as calculating”.
Figure I: Sample questionnaire
4.3 A measure of facial appearance
The raters’ evaluations are used to construct a facial appearance measure for each of
the four items: attractiveness, honesty, likability, and trustworthiness. We account
for rater specific variation in the perception of the respective appearance item in the
construction of each measure.14 For each rater j we calculate the average across all
images rated by her, x¯j. Then we mean-center the ratings by subtracting the rater’s
mean from each rater’s individual rating of image i, xij. This demeaned ratings are
13The use of a 7-item scale, which includes a neutral element, allows for sufficient diversification
and is standard in the relevant literature, see e.g., Alreck and Settle (1995), pp.113-114.
14Raters may differ in how to interpret the 7-item scale, and vary in anchoring their average
rating above, below or close to 4. Student t-tests of differences of means of the attractiveness
ratings by the raters’ gender are t = 2.799, p = 0.005, for likability t = 4.746, p = 0.000, for
trustworthiness t = 4.913, p = 0.000, and for honesty t = 4.591, p = 0.000, i.e., female raters tend
to give higher ratings than male raters. This problem is also persistent with respect to the raters’
age. A second problem with a direct measure of facial attractiveness, which is often addressed in
the literature, is that images of females tend to be rated higher than images of males (see e.g.,
Jackson et al, 1995; Wilson and Eckel, 2006). Since we control directly for gender-related effects
in the regressions, the attractiveness measure can be used uncorrected for gender.
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now anchored at 0 for each rater, such that we have corrected for rater-specific fixed
effects (see Figure II). We now take the mean of all mean-centered ratings for image
i over all raters, resulting in the particular facial item measure for each image. The
exact formula is as follows,
[Facial-item]i = Ej[xij − x¯j] with
{
i = i-th contestant;
j = j-th rater.
Figure II: Boxplot [left] raw and [right] demeaned variables of facial appearance,
N=422
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Additionally, we construct two variables from the binary statements “appearance
helps in life” and “appearance strikes as calculating” by taking the mean for each
image. Table III provides summary statistics of all appearance measures.
Table III: Summary statistics facial appearance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Attractiveness (mean-centered, cont.) 0 0.79 -1.8 2.65 422
Honesty (mean-centered, cont.) 0 0.6 -1.8 1.45 422
Likability (mean-centered, cont.) 0 0.66 -1.95 1.65 422
Trustworthiness (mean-centered, cont.) 0 0.6 -1.75 1.65 422
Appearance helps in life (cont.) 0.58 0.3 0 1 422
Appearance strikes as calculating (cont.) 0.35 0.25 0 1 422
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All four facial appearance variables are highly positively correlated (see Table IV),
which is also reflected in a sufficiently high Cronbach coefficient alpha of α = 0.82.15
Table IV: Correlation matrix for mean-centered variables of facial appearance
Attractiveness Honesty Likability Trustworthiness Helps in life
Attractiveness 1
Honesty 0.288∗∗∗ 1
Likability 0.461∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 1
Trustworthiness 0.340∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 1
Helps in life 0.643∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 1
Strikes as calculating 0.007 −0.313∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗ 0.034
The statement variable “appearance helps in life” is also positively correlated with
all four appearance variables. However, the statement variable “appearance strikes
as calculating” is not correlated with attractiveness and “appearance helps in life”,
and is even negatively correlated with the remaining facial appearance variables.
In the following we focus on the facial attractiveness, since it is a crucial part of
the first impression of a person; and it is a stable characteristic which is almost
impossible to mimic. The two statement variables are used as additional controls.
There are many options to define an attractive person. We use the following classi-
fications: First, we classify a contestant as facially attractive if her facial attractive-
ness rating lies above or is equal to the mean over all facial attractiveness ratings,
and as facially unattractive if her facial attractiveness rating lies below the mean
over all facial attractiveness ratings. The average mean-centered rating of facially
attractive contestants is 0.599 and the one of facially unattractive contestants is
−0.650. Second, we define extreme measures of facial attractiveness. A contestant
is classified as most attractive if her facial attractiveness rating lies within the top
10% percentile of the distribution of facial attractiveness and as least attractive if
her facial attractiveness rating lies within the bottom 10% percentile. Contestants
who are rated as most attractive receive, on average, a mean-centered rating of 1.389
and those who are rated as least attractive receive a mean-centered rating of 1.386.
For an illustration of the distribution of facial attractiveness see Figure II. Third,
we define a contestant’s appearance to be helpful in life (to strike as calculating) if
her “helps in life”-rating (“strikes as calculating”-rating) lies above or is equal to
the mean over all “helps in life”-ratings (“strikes as calculating”-ratings), and as not
15We use Cronbach’s alpha for standardized variables to measure the inter-item reliability for
facial appearance. The measure adjusts for item specific mean and variance. Also a nonparametric
test for testing whether samples originate from the same distribution cannot be rejected (Kruskal-
Wallis K = 0.9868).
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to be helpful in life (not to strike as calculating) if her “helps in life”-rating (“strikes
as calculating”-rating) lies below this mean. Table V summarizes the binary at-
tractiveness and statement variables. A detailed description of the distribution of
attractive and unattractive finalists with respect to gender and age is provided by
Table XI in the appendix.
Table V: Summary statistics facial attractiveness
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Attractiveness (mean-centered, d) 0.52 0.5 0 1 422
Most attractive (90 % percentile, d) 0.1 0.3 0 1 422
Least attractive (10 % percentile, d) 0.1 0.3 0 1 422
Helps in life (d) 0.50 0.50 0 1 422
Strikes as calculating (d) 0.47 0.50 0 1 422
5 Results
5.1 Facial attractiveness
In order to investigate the effect of facial attractiveness on cooperative behavior we
use several binary probit models with the decision to cooperate as the dependent
variable (with yi = 1 equal cooperate; yi = 0 equal defect). Throughout the analysis,
we control for effects and interactions related to the contestant’s gender and age,
various demographic variables, as well as variables of stake size, communication,
and variables describing the course of events of the game show previous to the pris-
oner’s dilemma (pre-play), see Table I. To quantify the influence of the explanatory
variables on the predicted probability to cooperate we compute marginal effects,
following the method of Norten et al. (2004). See also Appendix A.3 of Chapter 2.
Own attractiveness The results depicted in Table XII in the appendix, model
(1) to (4), show that facially attractive contestants do not behave differently with
respect to cooperativeness than facially unattractive contestants, independent of
the specification of the attractiveness measure. This finding supports Hypothesis 1.
Facially attractive contestants are not more cooperative than facially unattractive
contestants.16
16Table XII in the appendix reports the regression results including a dummy variable for the at-
tractive contestant. For robustness of all our results, we also estimate the regressions including (i)
the continuous measure for attractiveness, (ii) the mean over the four facial appearance variables,
(iii) the predicted factors obtained in a confirmatory factor analysis, (iv) a normalized attractive-
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Whereas, overall we find no difference between facially attractive and unattractive
contestants, model (5) of Table XII shows that attractiveness has even a slightly
negative effect on cooperative behavior when considering the extreme measure of
attractiveness. If a contestant is rated as most attractive, she is actually 16.9 per-
centage points more likely to defect than if she is neither most attractive nor least
attractive. Further, there are some qualifications with respect to gender and age.17
Both, gender and age seem to mediate the effect of a contestant’s attractiveness on
cooperation, see Table XIII in the appendix. Attractive females (model (1)) and at-
tractive younger contestants (model (3)) show a more cooperative behavior, whereas
attractive males (model (1)) and attractive older contestants (model (3)) cooperate
less.
Opponent’s attractiveness We now turn to the impact of the opponent’s facial
attractiveness on a contestant’s willingness to cooperate. The regression results in
Table XII in the appendix, model (1) to (5), show that a contestant is 11 − 17
percentage points more likely to cooperate when facing an attractive opponent than
when facing an unattractive opponent. This result strongly supports Hypothesis
2. Attractive contestants are rewarded with greater cooperativeness, and this pro-
vides attractive contestants a beauty premium. The premium is independent of the
opponent’s gender and age, see Table XIII in the appendix, model (2) and (4). Fur-
thermore, our results show that least attractive contestants suffer a beauty penalty
due to lower cooperativeness towards them. As model (5) reports, a contestant is
20.4 percentage points less likely to cooperate if the opponent is rated to be least at-
tractive than if the opponent is neither rated to be most nor least attractive. There
is no significant effect on cooperative behavior if the opponent is rated to be most
attractive. There is no significant effect on cooperative behavior if the opponent is
rated to be most attractive. The results hold independently of the definition of the
extreme measure of attractiveness. These findings suggest that contestants rather
focus on the opponent’s “negative” than “positive” appearance in the decision to
cooperate.
ness measure in line with Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), in which our attractiveness measure is
normalized across all contestants, (v) a normalized measure in line with Biddle and Hamermesh
(1998) in which the normalization is across all raters, and (vi) the mean and median attractive-
ness ratings from the raw data, where the mean (median) is 0.443 (0.728), with an average rating
of facially attractive contestants above the mean (median) of 5.552 (4.914), and below the mean
(median) of 3.196 (2.357). All measures produce qualitatively the same results.
17Irrespective of a contestant’s own attractiveness, we find a very strong and significant corre-
lation between age and cooperative behavior (see Table XII in the appendix). Older contestants
(≥ 37 years) are much more likely to cooperate than younger contestants (< 37 years), regardless
of the age of the opponent. This result is in line with List (2006) who finds that contestants ≥
31 years are significantly more likely to cooperate than younger contestants. Concerning gender,
we find no direct effect, which is contrary to the studies of Kahn et al (1971) and Ortmann and
Tichy (1999). But we find that younger males are significantly more likely to defect, and, as age
increases, males are more likely to cooperate than females (see Table XIV in the appendix).
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The results remain unchanged when adding the two binary statement variables, i.e.,
whether the “contestant’s appearance helps her in life” and whether the “contes-
tant’s appearance strikes as calculating” (see model (3) and (4) of Table XII in the
appendix). There is additional evidence that a contestants is less likely to cooperate
if the opponent’s appearance is rated as to “help her in life” than if it is not. But we
find no interaction effect of the binary statement variables and our attractiveness
measures, which indicates that the statement variables have not much additional
explanatory power.18
Similarity Since contestants behave more cooperatively towards the attractive
counterpart, the question arises whether pairs of attractive contestants behave dif-
ferently in the prisoner’s dilemma than pairs of unattractive contestants or pairs
who are mixed in terms of facial attractiveness. We denote pairs of contestants as
similar team if either both contestants are facially attractive or both are facially
unattractive, and we identify pairs of contestants as an attractive team if both are
facially attractive, and as an unattractive team if both are facially unattractive.
Table VI reports the regression results.
Table VI: Results from binary probit regressions on unilateral cooperation, consid-
ering teams variables
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Similar team (d) -0.043 (0.054)
Attractive team (d) 0.045 (0.067) 0.027 (0.070)
Unattractive team (d) -0.154** (0.064) -0.113* (0.067)
Demographics yes yes yes
Stake size yes yes yes
Pre-play & communication – – yes
Wald χ2 40.40*** 46.68*** 68.32***
Log-Likelihood -266.77 -263.49 -250.48
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.042 0.049
N 419 419 419
Number of clusters 211 211 211
Note: Binary probit regressions of the decision either to cooperate (yi = 1) or defect (yi = 0) in the prisoner’s
dilemma game. The “team variables” are indicators and equal 1 if the team is so composed and 0 otherwise, e.g.,
the variable “similar team” equals 1 if both contestants are either attractive or unattractive, and 0 otherwise.
The marginal effect of the respective explanatory variable determines the effective change of this variable on
team i’s predicted probability to cooperate (“split”). (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01).
We find no evidence that contestants who are similar with respect to attractiveness
are more or less likely to cooperate or defect, see model (1). However, we find that
18Note, that the effect of the variable “the contestant’s appearance helps her in life” without the
inclusion of the facially attractiveness variables is positive, but not significant (table unreported).
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an unattractive contestant is 11.3 to 15.4 percentage points less likely to cooperate
with her unattractive counterpart compared to teams of contestants who are both
attractive or mixed, see model (2) and (3). This improves our attractiveness-results:
contestants not only behave more cooperatively towards an attractive partner, but
also more deceitfully towards an unattractive partner, and this unattractive-penalty
is likely to dominate. Addressing the mutual cooperation outcomes using ordered
probits, also shows that similar teams as well as teams of attractive contestants are
no more or less likely to reach a certain outcome, but that pairs of unattractive
contestants are significantly less likely to manage to mutually cooperate (tables un-
reported).
Furthermore, we estimate regressions including the relative difference between both
final contestants’ attractiveness, i.e., the distance in attractiveness between both
contestants, and including an index of the contestants’ similarity with respect to
facial attractiveness, age, and gender, weighting each component by one-third. All
measures do not matter for the contestant’s decision to cooperate (tables unre-
ported). Summarizing, we cannot reject Hypothesis 3.
Thus, our results provide evidence for a (causal) relationship between the oppo-
nent’s attractiveness and cooperative behavior. Facially attractive contestants are
able to provoke cooperation from their counterpart, independent of their gender
or age. But we do not find a significant difference in behavior between facially
attractive and facially unattractive contestants.
5.2 Beauty premium
The results of the previous section should also translate into a monetary beauty
premium, i.e., into higher earnings for the attractive than for the unattractive con-
testant. In order to quantify the marginal beauty premium, we use a standard
censored tobit model (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 667-690). The outcome “taking
no money home” from the prisoner’s dilemma is interpreted as a corner solution
outcome, where the response variable yi describes the observable outcome of a con-
testant, which takes on the value zero with positive probability (if the opponent
defects), but which is a continuous variable over strictly positive values (if the op-
ponent cooperates). We build a (index) model around the latent variable y∗i ,
y∗i = β0 + β1x1i + ...+ βkxki + εi = Xiβ + εi, εi ∼ NID(0, σ2),
where x1, ..., xk are demographic player characteristics as well as the log value of
the stake size, β denotes the response coefficient vector, including a constant, and
εi is the random error that is normally, independently, and identically distributed
(NID), with σ2 denoting the variance. The latent variable y∗i is observed whenever
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it is positive, and is censored at zero otherwise,
yi =
{
y∗i , if y
∗
i > 0;
0, otherwise.
The conditional expectation, E[yi|Xi], that contestant i receives yi is determined as
E[yi|Xi] = Pr(yi > 0|Xi)E[yi|Xi, yi > 0] = Φ
(
Xiβ
σ
)
Xiβ + σφ
(
Xiβ
σ
)
,
with Φ(·) the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and φ(·) the stan-
dard normal density function. The marginal effect for the j-th independent (con-
tinuous) variable is computed as
MEj =
∂E[yi|Xi]
∂xj
= Φ
(
Xiβ
σ
)
βj, j = 2, ..., K,
where the estimated scale factor Φ
(
Xiβˆ
σˆ
)
is the estimated probability, Pˆ r(yi > 0|Xi),
of observing a positive response given Xi. Table VII reports the regression results.
Table VII: Censored tobit regression results for E[yi|Xi]
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Attractiveness (standardized) 1783.681* (1.83) 2152.525** (2.26)
Opp. attractiveness (standardized) 1327.387 (1.60)
Log(jackpot) 1993.899*** (4.54) 1788.198*** (4.42)
Demographics yes yes
Opp. demographics – yes
F-Statistic 3.19*** 2.84***
Log-Likelihood -2593.35 -2578.46
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.006
σˆ 15059.81 14483.33
N 419 419
Number of clusters 211 211
Note: Censored tobit regression for the conditional expectation, E[yi|Xi], that contestant i receives the
outcome yi. yi takes on the value zero with positive probability if the opponent defects, and is a continuous
variable over strictly positive values if the opponent cooperates. Marginal effects of E[yi|Xi] are reported to
quantify the expected increase in earnings. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Model (1) includes the contestant’s facial attractiveness and demographic charac-
teristics. Model (2) includes in addition the opponent’s facial attractiveness and
demographic characteristics. We also include the logarithm of the stake size in
order to control for different stake levels. We find that a one standard deviation in-
crease in facial attractiveness increases a contestant’s expected earnings by £1 784
(£2 153) depending on the controls included.19 Figure III provides an illustration
of the beauty premium based on model (2) of Table VII, and depicts the predicted
earnings for attractive and unattractive contestants as a function of stake size. The
figure shows that the predicted earnings of facially attractive contestants are always
above the earnings of unattractive contestants.
Figure III: Predicted earnings by attractive and unattractive contestants
Further, we estimate the effect of the contestant’s expected earnings conditional on
being positive, E[yi|Xi, yi > 0], as well as the contestant’s probability of obtaining
positive earnings, Pr(yi > 0|Xi), separately.
A contestant i’s expected earnings conditional on being positive are given by
E[yi|Xi, yi > 0] = Xiβ + σ
[
φ(Xiβ/σ)
Φ(Xiβ/σ)
]
,
where the term φ(Xiβ/σ)
Φ(Xiβ/σ)
denotes the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at Xiβ
σ
. The
marginal effect for the j-th independent (continuous) variable on E[yi|Xi] is com-
19The standardization of the facial attractiveness variable allows us to interpret the regression
coefficient as the effect of a one-standard deviation increase (decrease) in facial attractiveness.
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puted as
MEj =
∂E[yi|Xi]
∂xj
= βj
[
1− φ(Xiβ/σ)
Φ(Xiβ/σ)
(
Xiβ
σ
+
φ(Xiβ/σ)
Φ(Xiβ/σ)
)]
.
Concerning the marginal effect for the j-th independent (continuous) variable on
the probability of observing positive earnings given Xi, Pr(yi > 0|Xi) = Φ(Xiβ/σ),
we have
∂Pr(yi > 0|Xi)
∂xj
=
βj
σ
φ
(
Xiβ
σ
)
.
Table XV and Table XVI in the appendix report the regression results of the
marginal effects, respectively. The marginal effect for E[yi|Xi, yi > 0] amounts
to £617 (model (1)) and £741 (model (2)), depending on the number of controls
included, and is smaller in size compared to the marginal effect for E[yi|Xi]. The
probability of obtaining positive earnings increases by 4.7 (5.9) percentage points.
To sum up, we find strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4, i.e., facially attractive
contestants earn a beauty premium in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
6 Transmission channels
Our results show that attractive people are able to provoke cooperative behavior
from their opponent and, since they are not more or less cooperative than unattrac-
tive people, they obtain a beauty premium in the prisoner’s dilemma. In this section
we will address the potential transmission channels suggested by the literature (see
Section 2.2) and evaluate their explanatory power for our observed effects of attrac-
tiveness.
Beauty-is-good stereotyping and taste-based discrimination According to
the most prominent theory called “beauty-is-good” stereotyping, effects of attrac-
tiveness on behavior are caused by stereotype believes about attractive people. Peo-
ple are said to believe that attractive ones behave more pro-socially than less at-
tractive ones. In the presence of interdependent social preferences, people holding
this belief may then behave more cooperatively towards attractive people with the
intention to reciprocate cooperation. Hence, these stereotype beliefs can mediate
people’s behavior. Recall, that we observe a higher likelihood of cooperation to-
wards attractive contestants in the prisoner’s dilemma. If the theory of “beauty-is-
good” stereotyping is driving our results, this effect should be independent of the
selected sample. However, theories from evolutionary psychology argue that effects
of physical attractiveness on behavior originate in primeval partner selection and
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therefore predict the effects to be more prevalent in mixed-gender interactions (see
e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 1987). To scrutinize this argument, we parse the data in
mixed-gender and same-gender interactions (63% and 37% of all interactions). The
two subsamples are not different regarding the observed cooperation rates (54% in
mixed- vs. 53% in same-gender interactions). Within the two subsamples, we run
several probit regressions to evaluate the influence of facial attractiveness on a con-
testant’s propensity to cooperate, controlling for demographic characteristics and
stake size.
Table VIII: Results from binary probit regressions of the decision in the prisoner’s
dilemma in mixed- and same-gender interactions
Marginal effects
(1) Mixed-gender (2) Same-gender
Attractiveness (mean-centered, d) 0.054 (0.068) 0.127 (0.089)
Opp. attractiveness (mean-centered, d) 0.142** (0.063) 0.040 (0.089)
Demographics yes yes
Stake size yes yes
Wald χ2 45.15*** 19.66*
Log-Likelihood -161.34 -97.00
Adjusted R2 0.047 -0.032
N 265 154
Number of clusters 133 78
Note: Binary probit regressions of the decision either to cooperate (yi = 1) or to defect (yi = 0) in the
prisoner’s dilemma game, restricting the sample to (1) mixed-gender and (2) same-gender interactions. The
marginal effect of the respective explanatory variable determines the effective change of this variable on
player i’s predicted probability to cooperate (“split”). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
corrected for episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
As the regression results of Table VIII show, attractiveness only matters in mixed-
gender interactions, but not in same-gender ones. Males and females are about 14
percentage points more likely to cooperate if they face a facially attractive opponent
of the other sex than if they face an unattractive opponent.20 The finding applies
across sexes, both females and males are biased towards attractiveness if facing
someone of the other sex.21
Further, we find no effect of attractiveness in the two group-decisions taken by
20This result is also displayed in the fact that facially attractive contestants enjoy a beauty
premium in mixed-gender interactions, but not in same-gender ones (tobit regression tables unre-
ported). A one standard deviation increase in attractiveness results in significantly higher gains
for the attractive in mixed-gender (p = 0.003), but not in same-gender interactions (p = 0.840).
21This extends the finding of Ashmore and Longo (1995), who note that only attractive females
tend to have the ability to make males more likely to do them a favor. We show that males have
the same ability.
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the contestants prior to the prisoner’s dilemma. Contestants might favor to be in
the final round with a facially attractive person. If facially attractive contestants
are more likely to be in the final than unattractive contestants, then taste-based
discrimination (Becker, 1957) could explain this beauty premium. Using binary and
ordered probit models, we estimate whether attractive contestants are more or less
likely to be voted off the game and whether attractiveness affects the likelihood to
receive a certain number of votes after the first and second round of pre-play. We
find no significant effect of attractiveness on the voting outcome (tables unreported).
This is also reflected in an almost equal share of attractive contestants in the final
and initial round of the game show (52.4% vs. 51.8%), see Table IX below.22
Table IX: Distribution of players above average attractiveness per round
Number of Avg. number of Avg. share of
players attractive players attractive players
Round 1 4 2.07 51.78%
Round 2 3 1.59 52.92%
Final (PD) 2 1.05 52.37%
The absence of a beauty premium or plainness penalty in the pre-play as well as
in same-gender interactions in the final suggests that neither beauty-is-good stereo-
typing nor taste-based discrimination can explain our results consistently. It rather
seems that the ability of attractiveness to mediate behavior is entangled to the op-
ponent’s sex and that people have a preference to cooperate with someone to whom
they are personally attracted.
Vocal attractiveness and social skills In addition to the theories discussed
above, the literature reports that physical and vocal attractiveness are highly corre-
lated and thus suggests the existence of a vocal rather than a visual attractiveness
stereotype (see, e.g., Zuckerman and Driver, 1989). Furthermore, physically attrac-
tive people are also assigned stronger verbal and social skills (e.g., Goldman and
Lewis, 1977). In the presence of other regarding preferences, vocal attractiveness
and potentially strong verbal and social skills might enable attractive people to
trigger cooperative behavior off their opponents. Although our data does not allow
us to directly test for the impact of (perceived) vocal attractiveness on coopera-
tive behavior, we can indirectly test for a correlation between facial attractiveness
22In all regressions we control for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, race and place
of residence as well as for objective voting criteria such as the stake size a contestant accumulated,
and whether a contestant lied in a previous round of the pre-play. We also follow Belot et al.
(2008) approach and rank the contestants by their facial attractiveness to explain the likelihood
to be voted off during the game, which yields no significant effects either (table unreported).
Our finding is in contrast to Belot et al. (2008), who find that attractive people are positively
discriminated against unattractive people.
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and communication which comprises verbal and social skills. Shortly before the
prisoner’s dilemma is played both contestants are given some extra time to talk to
each other. In these short conversations (on average, 38 seconds) each contestant
tries to convince her opponent to cooperate. Since it has been shown that promises
effect people’s behavior in experiments (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, and
Vanberg, 2008) and in the field (e.g., Belot et al., 2010), we code whether a contes-
tant explicitly promises her opponent to cooperate.23 Furthermore, we observe that
contestants use handshakes to corroborate their mutual intention to cooperate and
therefore we also code whether two contestants shake hands. We find that promises
have a significantly positive impact on cooperative behavior, whereas handshakes
have a negative one. These effects are robust to various specifications of the regres-
sion model. The effect of attractiveness on cooperation remains almost unchanged
when we add the variables of communication as controls. We find also no evidence
that the effects of attractiveness and communication are interacted. However, we
find limited evidence that contestants are significantly more likely to state a promise
if the opponent is attractive (table unreported).24 Even though we cannot entirely
exclude that promises underly the effects of attractiveness, the theory of better so-
cial and verbal skills or vocal attractiveness can also not explain the absence of the
beauty premium in the pre-play.
7 Conclusion
This study shows that men and women are biased by attractiveness in their eco-
nomic decision making when facing someone attractive of the opposite sex. We
analyze the relationship between attractiveness and cooperative behavior in a high-
stakes field setting with two-sided communication. Two independent data sets are
combined. One on cooperation, collected from decisions (either to “split” or “steal”
a jackpot) made in a slightly modified prisoner’s dilemma played in the final round
of a television game show. The other one on the physical attractiveness of the game
23We count all statements as a promise when they contain either the word “promise” or “swear”
or they are a statement of intent. Examples are “I promise to split”, “I promise I will not steal”,
“I swear I will split”, “I swear I will not steal”, “I will split”, or “I will not steal”.
24If attractive contestants are better in terms of verbal and social skills, a promise or handshake
of a facially attractive contestant might be more convincing than a promise or handshake of a
facially unattractive contestant. Further, we could expect that facially attractive contestants are
more likely to elicit a promise from their opponent and less likely to engage in a handshake and
thereby provoke more cooperative behavior from their counterpart. Testing for interaction effects
between facial attractiveness and the communication variables, reveals no additional effects (table
unreported). Using binary probit regressions on the contestant’s propensity to promise or to shake
hands, we find that facially attractive contestants are not more likely to state a promise or to shake
hands than facially unattractive contestants (table unreported).
Chapter 3: Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative Behavior and Beauty 128
show’s contestants using a sample of independent third-party raters.
Our results show a strong and robust effect of attractiveness: contestants are sig-
nificantly more likely to cooperate with a facially attractive opponent. But facially
attractive contestants are not more cooperative than facially unattractive contes-
tants. Hence, attractive contestants are rewarded by a beauty premium, which, at
the margin, amounts to up to £2 153 for an increase in attractiveness by a one stan-
dard deviation. The attractiveness effect is robust to demographic characteristics,
including gender, stake size, and communication. However, the effects of attractive-
ness might be amplified by the attractive contestant’s ability to talk their opponent
into promising to cooperate, which has a significantly positive effect on a contes-
tant’s likelihood to cooperate.
Decomposing the data into same- and mixed-gender interactions reveals a new in-
sight on effects of attractiveness. The ability of attractive contestants to elicit coop-
erative behavior from their opponent vanishes in interactions between two contes-
tants of the same sex. That is, contestants are only biased by the facial attractiveness
of their opponent when the opponent is of the other sex. This suggests that stereo-
type beliefs about attractive people, such as them being more pro-social, cannot
explain our results. Since for this explanation to hold, the effect should prevail in
all interactions. In line with our finding are rather theories from evolutionary psy-
chology arguing that effects of physical attractiveness originate in primeval partner
selection and should therefore be only or at least more present in mixed-gender
interactions. In addition, the absence of a beauty premium or plainness penalty
in the pre-play suggests that physical appearance is particularly important as soon
as people are lacking objective information. Hence, we propose a preference-based
mechanism as the underlying transmission channel of attractiveness on cooperative
behavior. People are more likely to cooperate with someone towards whom they are
personally attracted.
Our results are relevant and applicable to one-shot face-to-face interactions and are
particularly important when objective information is scarce. Such situations are, for
instance, job interviews or negotiations. Further, the finding that attractive people
fare better in the labor market might be reinforced by the fact that attractive people
benefit from greater cooperativeness towards them.
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Appendix
Table X: Summary statistics all raters
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Age (in years) 41.76 18.46 17 93 720
Age of male (in years) 39.57 17.70 17 93 371
Age of female (in years) 44.10 19.00 18 86 349
Male 0.51 0.5 0 1 728
Female (≥ 44.1 years) 62.07 10.10 45 86 162
Female (< 44.1 years) 28.52 7.84 18 44 187
Male (≥ 39.6 years) 58.02 11.88 40 93 153
Male (< 39.6 years) 26.62 5.17 17 39 218
Table XI: Distribution of attractive and unattractive finalists
Facially attractive Facially unattractive
Male (< 37 years) 21% 27%
Male (≥ 37 years) 15% 30%
Female (< 37 years) 41% 18%
Female (≥ 37 years) 23% 25%
100% (N=221) 100% (N=201)
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Table XV: Censored tobit regressions results for E[yi|Xi, yi > 0]
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Attractiveness (standardized) 616.927∗ (334.835) 741.419∗∗ (325.057)
Opp. attractiveness (standardized) 457.207 (285.004)
Log(jackpot) 689.636∗∗∗ (157.020) 615.929∗∗∗ (146.146)
Demographics yes yes
Opp. demographics – yes
F-Statistic 3.19*** 2.84***
Log-Likelihood -2593.35 -2578.46
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.006
σˆ 15059.81 14483.33
N 419 419
Number of clusters 211 211
Note: Censored tobit regression for the conditional expectation, E[yi|Xi, yi > 0], that player i receives a positive
earnings yi > 0 from the prisoner’s dilemma game. Marginal effects of E[yi|Xi, yi > 0] are reported to quantify
the expected increase in earnings, conditional on the earnings being positive. (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for episode clusters. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table XVI: Censored tobit regressions results for Pr(yi > 0|Xi)
Marginal effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.047∗ (0.024) 0.059∗∗ (0.025)
Opp. attractiveness (standardized) 0.036 (0.023)
Log(Jackpot) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.049∗∗∗ (0.011)
Demographics yes yes
Opp. demographics – yes
F-Statistic 3.19*** 2.84***
Log-Likelihood -2593.35 -2578.46
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.006
σˆ 15059.81 14483.33
N 419 419
Number of clusters 211 211
Note: Censored tobit regression for the probability, Pr(yi > 0|Xi), of obtaining positive earnings from the prisoner’s
dilemma game. Marginal effects of Pr(yi > 0|Xi) are reported to quantify the probability increase of obtaining
positive earnings. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are corrected for episode clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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